45,626 research outputs found
Embodied cognition: A field guide
The nature of cognition is being re-considered. Instead of emphasizing formal operations on abstract symbols, the new approach foregrounds the fact that cognition is, rather, a situated activity, and suggests that thinking beings ought therefore be considered first and foremost as acting beings. The essay reviews recent work in Embodied Cognition, provides a concise guide to its principles, attitudes and goals, and identifies the physical grounding project as its central research focus
Beyond persons: extending the personal / subpersonal distinction to non-rational animals and artificial agents
The distinction between personal level explanations and subpersonal ones has been subject to much debate in philosophy. We understand it as one between explanations that focus on an agent’s interaction with its environment, and explanations that focus on the physical or computational enabling conditions of such an interaction. The distinction, understood this way, is necessary for a complete account of any agent, rational or not, biological or artificial. In particular, we review some recent research in Artificial Life that pretends to do completely without the distinction, while using agent-centered concepts all the way. It is argued that the rejection of agent level explanations in favour of mechanistic ones is due to an unmotivated need to choose among representationalism and eliminativism. The dilemma is a false one if the possibility of a radical form of externalism is considered
A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience
When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as
many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either
consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or
it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of
these two approaches vehicle and process theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may
be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because
of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research which purports to show that the
explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are dissociable, and on the
other, by the classical computational theory of mind – the theory that takes human cognition to be a species
of symbol manipulation. But two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a
reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the
experimental methodologies employed in the dissociation studies – so critical, in fact, it’s no longer
reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been
adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in
cognitive science as it once was. It now has a lively competitor in the form of connectionism; and
connectionism, unlike classicism, does have the computational resources to support a robust vehicle theory
of consciousness. In this paper we develop and defend this connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. It
takes the form of the following simple empirical hypothesis: phenomenal experience consists in the explicit
representation of information in neurally realized PDP networks. This hypothesis leads us to re-assess some
common wisdom about consciousness, but, we will argue, in fruitful and ultimately plausible ways
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