Implications of quantum automata for contextuality

We construct zero-error quantum finite automata (QFAs) for promise problems which cannot be solved by bounded-error probabilistic finite automata (PFAs). Here is a summary of our results: - There is a promise problem solvable by an exact two-way QFA in exponential expected time, but not by any bounded-error sublogarithmic space probabilistic Turing machine (PTM). - There is a promise problem solvable by an exact two-way QFA in quadratic expected time, but not by any bounded-error $o(\log \log n)$-space PTMs in polynomial expected time. The same problem can be solvable by a one-way Las Vegas (or exact two-way) QFA with quantum head in linear (expected) time. - There is a promise problem solvable by a Las Vegas realtime QFA, but not by any bounded-error realtime PFA. The same problem can be solvable by an exact two-way QFA in linear expected time but not by any exact two-way PFA. - There is a family of promise problems such that each promise problem can be solvable by a two-state exact realtime QFAs, but, there is no such bound on the number of states of realtime bounded-error PFAs solving the members this family. Our results imply that there exist zero-error quantum computational devices with a \emph{single qubit} of memory that cannot be simulated by any finite memory classical computational model. This provides a computational perspective on results regarding ontological theories of quantum mechanics \cite{Hardy04}, \cite{Montina08}. As a consequence we find that classical automata based simulation models \cite{Kleinmann11}, \cite{Blasiak13} are not sufficiently powerful to simulate quantum contextuality. We conclude by highlighting the interplay between results from automata models and their application to developing a general framework for quantum contextuality.Comment: 22 page

Topological Foundations of Cognitive Science

A collection of papers presented at the First International Summer Institute in Cognitive Science, University at Buffalo, July 1994, including the following papers: ** Topological Foundations of Cognitive Science, Barry Smith ** The Bounds of Axiomatisation, Graham White ** Rethinking Boundaries, Wojciech Zelaniec ** Sheaf Mereology and Space Cognition, Jean Petitot ** A Mereotopological Definition of 'Point', Carola Eschenbach ** Discreteness, Finiteness, and the Structure of Topological Spaces, Christopher Habel ** Mass Reference and the Geometry of Solids, Almerindo E. Ojeda ** Defining a 'Doughnut' Made Difficult, N .M. Gotts ** A Theory of Spatial Regions with Indeterminate Boundaries, A.G. Cohn and N.M. Gotts ** Mereotopological Construction of Time from Events, Fabio Pianesi and Achille C. Varzi ** Computational Mereology: A Study of Part-of Relations for Multi-media Indexing, Wlodek Zadrozny and Michelle Ki

Zeno's Paradoxes. A Cardinal Problem 1. On Zenonian Plurality

In this paper the claim that Zeno's paradoxes have been solved is contested. Although no one has ever touched Zeno without refuting him (Whitehead), it will be our aim to show that, whatever it was that was refuted, it was certainly not Zeno. The paper is organised in two parts. In the first part we will demonstrate that upon direct analysis of the Greek sources, an underlying structure common to both the Paradoxes of Plurality and the Paradoxes of Motion can be exposed. This structure bears on a correct - Zenonian - interpretation of the concept of division through and through. The key feature, generally overlooked but essential to a correct understanding of all his arguments, is that they do not presuppose time. Division takes place simultaneously. This holds true for both PP and PM. In the second part a mathematical representation will be set up that catches this common structure, hence the essence of all Zeno's arguments, however without refuting them. Its central tenet is an aequivalence proof for Zeno's procedure and Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis. Some number theoretic and geometric implications will be shortly discussed. Furthermore, it will be shown how the Received View on the motion-arguments can easely be derived by the introduction of time as a (non-Zenonian) premiss, thus causing their collapse into arguments which can be approached and refuted by Aristotle's limit-like concept of the potentially infinite, which remained - though in different disguises - at the core of the refutational strategies that have been in use up to the present. Finally, an interesting link to Newtonian mechanics via Cremona geometry can be established.Comment: 41 pages, 7 figure

Quantum Contextuality

A central result in the foundations of quantum mechanics is the Kochen-Specker theorem. In short, it states that quantum mechanics is in conflict with classical models in which the result of a measurement does not depend on which other compatible measurements are jointly performed. Here, compatible measurements are those that can be performed simultaneously or in any order without disturbance. This conflict is generically called quantum contextuality. In this article, we present an introduction to this subject and its current status. We review several proofs of the Kochen-Specker theorem and different notions of contextuality. We explain how to experimentally test some of these notions and discuss connections between contextuality and nonlocality or graph theory. Finally, we review some applications of contextuality in quantum information processing.Comment: 63 pages, 20 figures. Updated version. Comments still welcome

Is the quantum state real? An extended review of ψ\psi-ontology theorems

Towards the end of 2011, Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph derived a theorem that aimed to show that the quantum state must be ontic (a state of reality) in a broad class of realist approaches to quantum theory. This result attracted a lot of attention and controversy. The aim of this review article is to review the background to the Pusey--Barrett--Rudolph Theorem, to provide a clear presentation of the theorem itself, and to review related work that has appeared since the publication of the Pusey--Barrett--Rudolph paper. In particular, this review: Explains what it means for the quantum state to be ontic or epistemic (a state of knowledge); Reviews arguments for and against an ontic interpretation of the quantum state as they existed prior to the Pusey--Barrett--Rudolph Theorem; Explains why proving the reality of the quantum state is a very strong constraint on realist theories in that it would imply many of the known no-go theorems, such as Bell's Theorem and the need for an exponentially large ontic state space; Provides a comprehensive presentation of the Pusey--Barrett--Rudolph Theorem itself, along with subsequent improvements and criticisms of its assumptions; Reviews two other arguments for the reality of the quantum state: the first due to Hardy and the second due to Colbeck and Renner, and explains why their assumptions are less compelling than those of the Pusey--Barrett--Rudolph Theorem; Reviews subsequent work aimed at ruling out stronger notions of what it means for the quantum state to be epistemic and points out open questions in this area. The overall aim is not only to provide the background needed for the novice in this area to understand the current status, but also to discuss often overlooked subtleties that should be of interest to the experts.Comment: 88 pages, 15 figures, and a lot of sleepless nights. v2 is the journal version. Reformatted in journal format, references updated, many typo corrections and other minor updates. TeX source had to be modified slightly to compile using the arXiv autocompiler, so I recommend downloading the journal version from http://quanta.ws/ojs/index.php/quanta/article/view/2