Ignorance and indifference

The epistemic state of complete ignorance is not a probability distribution. In it, we assign the same, unique, ignorance degree of belief to any contingent outcome and each of its contingent, disjunctive parts. That this is the appropriate way to represent complete ignorance is established by two instruments, each individually strong enough to identify this state. They are the principle of indifference (PI) and the notion that ignorance is invariant under certain redescriptions of the outcome space, here developed into the 'principle of invariance of ignorance' (PII). Both instruments are so innocuous as almost to be platitudes. Yet the literature in probabilistic epistemology has misdiagnosed them as paradoxical or defective since they generate inconsistencies when conjoined with the assumption that an epistemic state must be a probability distribution. To underscore the need to drop this assumption, I express PII in its most defensible form as relating symmetric descriptions and show that paradoxes still arise if we assume the ignorance state to be a probability distribution. Copyright 2008 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved

Probabilities and Quantum Reality: Are There Correlata?

Any attempt to introduce probabilities into quantum mechanics faces difficulties due to the mathematical structure of Hilbert space, as reflected in Birkhoff and von Neumann's proposal for a quantum logic. The (consistent or decoherent) histories solution is provided by its single framework rule, an approach that includes conventional (Copenhagen) quantum theory as a special case. Mermin's Ithaca interpretation addresses the same problem by defining probabilities which make no reference to a sample space or event algebra (``correlations without correlata''). But this leads to severe conceptual difficulties, which almost inevitably couple quantum theory to unresolved problems of human consciousness. Using histories allows a sharper quantum description than is possible with a density matrix, suggesting that the latter provides an ensemble rather than an irreducible single-system description as claimed by Mermin. The histories approach satisfies the first five of Mermin's desiderata for a good interpretation of quantum mechanics, including Einstein locality, but the Ithaca interpretation seems to have difficulty with the first (independence of observers) and the third (describing individual systems).Comment: Latex 31 pages, 3 figures in text using PSTrick

Quantum Structure in Cognition, Origins, Developments, Successes and Expectations

We provide an overview of the results we have attained in the last decade on the identification of quantum structures in cognition and, more specifically, in the formalization and representation of natural concepts. We firstly discuss the quantum foundational reasons that led us to investigate the mechanisms of formation and combination of concepts in human reasoning, starting from the empirically observed deviations from classical logical and probabilistic structures. We then develop our quantum-theoretic perspective in Fock space which allows successful modeling of various sets of cognitive experiments collected by different scientists, including ourselves. In addition, we formulate a unified explanatory hypothesis for the presence of quantum structures in cognitive processes, and discuss our recent discovery of further quantum aspects in concept combinations, namely, 'entanglement' and 'indistinguishability'. We finally illustrate perspectives for future research.Comment: 25 pages. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1412.870

Probabilistic Algorithmic Knowledge

The framework of algorithmic knowledge assumes that agents use deterministic knowledge algorithms to compute the facts they explicitly know. We extend the framework to allow for randomized knowledge algorithms. We then characterize the information provided by a randomized knowledge algorithm when its answers have some probability of being incorrect. We formalize this information in terms of evidence; a randomized knowledge algorithm returning ``Yes'' to a query about a fact \phi provides evidence for \phi being true. Finally, we discuss the extent to which this evidence can be used as a basis for decisions.Comment: 26 pages. A preliminary version appeared in Proc. 9th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK'03

An Ordinal View of Independence with Application to Plausible Reasoning

An ordinal view of independence is studied in the framework of possibility theory. We investigate three possible definitions of dependence, of increasing strength. One of them is the counterpart to the multiplication law in probability theory, and the two others are based on the notion of conditional possibility. These two have enough expressive power to support the whole possibility theory, and a complete axiomatization is provided for the strongest one. Moreover we show that weak independence is well-suited to the problems of belief change and plausible reasoning, especially to address the problem of blocking of property inheritance in exception-tolerant taxonomic reasoning.Comment: Appears in Proceedings of the Tenth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI1994