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The calculative reproduction of social structures : The field of gem mining in Sri Lanka
Peer reviewedPostprin
Quid Pro Quo: A Mechanism for Fair Collaboration in Networked Systems
Collaboration may be understood as the execution of coordinated tasks (in the
most general sense) by groups of users, who cooperate for achieving a common
goal. Collaboration is a fundamental assumption and requirement for the correct
operation of many communication systems. The main challenge when creating
collaborative systems in a decentralized manner is dealing with the fact that
users may behave in selfish ways, trying to obtain the benefits of the tasks
but without participating in their execution. In this context, Game Theory has
been instrumental to model collaborative systems and the task allocation
problem, and to design mechanisms for optimal allocation of tasks. In this
paper, we revise the classical assumptions and propose a new approach to this
problem. First, we establish a system model based on heterogenous nodes (users,
players), and propose a basic distributed mechanism so that, when a new task
appears, it is assigned to the most suitable node. The classical technique for
compensating a node that executes a task is the use of payments (which in most
networks are hard or impossible to implement). Instead, we propose a
distributed mechanism for the optimal allocation of tasks without payments. We
prove this mechanism to be robust event in the presence of independent selfish
or rationally limited players. Additionally, our model is based on very weak
assumptions, which makes the proposed mechanisms susceptible to be implemented
in networked systems (e.g., the Internet).Comment: 23 pages, 5 figures, 3 algorithm
Markets with bilateral bargaining and incomplete information
We study the relationship between bargaining and competition with incomplete information. We consider a model with two uninformed and identical buyers and two sellers. One of the sellers has a privately-known reservation price, which can
either be Low or High. The other sellerâs reservation price is commonly known to be in between the Low and High values of the privately-informed seller. Buyers move in sequence, and make offers with the second buyer observing the offer
made by the first buyer. The sellers respond simultaneously. We show that there are two types of (perfect Bayes) equilibrium. In one equilibrium, the buyer who moves second does better. In the second equilibrium, buyersâ expected payoffs are equalised, and the price received by the seller with the known reservation value is determined entirely by the equuilibrium of the two-player game between a single buyer and an informed seller. We also discuss extensions of the model to multiple buyers and sellers, and to the case where both sellers are privately informed
Signaling equilibria for dynamic LQG games with asymmetric information
We consider a finite horizon dynamic game with two players who observe their
types privately and take actions, which are publicly observed. Players' types
evolve as independent, controlled linear Gaussian processes and players incur
quadratic instantaneous costs. This forms a dynamic linear quadratic Gaussian
(LQG) game with asymmetric information. We show that under certain conditions,
players' strategies that are linear in their private types, together with
Gaussian beliefs form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the game.
Furthermore, it is shown that this is a signaling equilibrium due to the fact
that future beliefs on players' types are affected by the equilibrium
strategies. We provide a backward-forward algorithm to find the PBE. Each step
of the backward algorithm reduces to solving an algebraic matrix equation for
every possible realization of the state estimate covariance matrix. The forward
algorithm consists of Kalman filter recursions, where state estimate covariance
matrices depend on equilibrium strategies
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