THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOFT SKILL ASPECT THROUGH COOPERATIVE LEARNING STRATEGY ON ELECTRONIC CIRCUIT LESSON FOR THE XIITH GRADE STUDENT AT DEPONTMENT OF AUDIO-VIDEO ENGINEERING IN SMK N 2 KLATEN

This research is development or increase of soft skills for student with cooperative learning strategy so that development process of soft skills can do in the study classroom, for example commitment, responsibility, cooperate, creativity and ethics. Beside that for knowing, what of soft skills with cooperative learning strategy can increase of soft skills for student compare with conventional method or discourse method in the study classroom can be doing by student XIIth class of 2 Klaten vocational high school. This research is Classroom Action Research execute at 2 Klaten vocational High school. Every cycle begin from planning, action, observation and reflection. Data analyst is doing to compare between the observation result of cycle I, Cycle II, and cycle III with qualitative description method which to clear with the mean of percent of soft skills who have a student. The result of the research is cooperative learning can be development of soft skills for student on commitment aspect, responsibility, cooperate, creativity and ethics with step that is group discussion and practice. The mean of soft skills who have student base observation at cycle I are 53,20 % (enough), Cycle II are 61,20 % (high) and cycle III are 64,80 % (high). While the observation result in soft skills aspect, is commitment aspect beginning at cycle I are 52 % (enough), cycle II are 63 % (high) and cycle III are 66 % (high). In the responsibility aspect beginning at cycle I are 53 % (enough), cycle II are 59 % (enough) and cycle III are 60 % (high), in the cooperate aspect beginning at cycle I are 55 % (enough), cycle II are 70 % (high) and cycle III are 71 % (high), in the creativity aspect beginning at cycle I are 53 % (enough), cycle II are 59 % (enough) and cycle III are 63 % (high), and in the ethics aspect beginning at cycle I are 53 % (enough), cycle II are 55 % (enough) and cycle III are 62 % (high), from of all observation result above, so can be said in general soft skills for student experiencing development with using cooperative learning strategy in the study classroom. Keyword : Cooperative Learning, soft skills, commitment, responsibility, cooperate, creativity and ethic

Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint

We propose a clarification of the notion of a soft budget constraint, a concept widely used in the analysis of socialist, transitional, and market economies. Our interpretation is broad enough to embrace most existing approaches to soft budget constraint phenomena and provides a classification of their causes and consequences. In light of this interpretation, we then review the theoretical literature on the subject and compare it with those on other dynamic commitment problems in economics.

Tax Competition in a Fiscal Union with Decentralized Leadership

This paper examines capital tax competition in the presence of an interstate transfer policy without federal commitment. Lack of commitment implies that tax policy is chosen prior to federal transfers. The paper’s main result is that ex-post federal policy internalizes horizontal fiscal externalities, insulating tax policy from capital mobility. Federal policy, however, introduces a new source of inefficiency unrelated to tax competition. Specifically, ex-post transfer payments prove to be equivalent to an interstate revenue-sharing system which may render federal intervention in the presence of fiscal externalities welfare-deteriorating relative to tax competition.federalism, capital tax competition, commitment, soft budget constraints

Collusion and Commitment in Bank Bailout

Collusion and soft budget constraint are two conspicuous phenomena in transition economies¡¯ banking system. Literature has separately investigated those two phenomena from theoretical point of views. However, the cross-point of both phenomena has been neglected in the research of banking regulation. The present paper addresses this issue in a simple model of two-period contract with termination at the end of the first period. By comparing the two hierarchies -- ¡°bank-firm¡± and ¡°government-bank-firm¡±, we show that the government¡¯s non-commitment and banking bailout cause inefficiency in the contact relationship. Moreover, after introducing collusion possibility, non-commitment of the government increases the stakes, or bribes, which the collusive bank can extract, and makes it more costly for the government to implement this contract. However, taking into account the fact that the bank is collusive, the government who aims to prevent collusion will switch to the other equilibrium where she sticks to her commitment and excludes collusion from the contract relationship. Here, collusion plays a role as a hardening budget constraint device. Some policy implications are suggested at the end.soft budget constraint, collusion, moral hazard, commitment, transition, centralized economy.

Commitment Contracts

We review the theoretical and empirical literature on commitment devices.A commitment device is any arrangement, entered into by an individual, with the aim of making it easier to fulfill his or her own future plans. We argue that there is growing empirical evidence supporting the proposition that people demand commitment devices and that these devices can change behavior. We highlight the importance of further research exploring soft commitment – those involving only psychological costs – and the welfare consequences of hard commitments – those involving actual costs – especially in the presence of bounded rationality.consumer/household economics, institutional and behavioral economics

Incentive Regulation, Investments and Technological Change

Based on an idiosyncratic reading of the literature I propose intermediate (rather than tight or soft) regulation for balancing investment incentives with allocative efficiency and competition objectives. Intermediate regulation is compatible with incentive regulation and helps lengthening the regulatory commitment period necessary for incentives. However, such commitment for the whole time horizon of infrastructure or innovation investments is impossible. The compatibility of incentive regulation and efficient investment is thus in doubt. Incentive regulation for regular infrastructure investments therefore needs periodic updating based on rate-of-return regulation criteria. Innovative infrastructure investments may warrant regulatory holidays, which should be conditioned on strict criteria.

The Impact of Different HRM Regimes on Labour Productivity: National Results and a Regional Perspective

This paper uses AWIRS 95 and IRWIRS 96-7 data to test whether workplaces which used ‘soft’ versus ‘hard’ Human Resource Management (HRM) policies and practices experienced significant differences in labour productivity improvements. Generally, the results support the proposition that management attitudes, policies and practices which aim to develop workforce skills, commitment and motivation were positively associated with improvements in labour productivity. Very few ‘hard’ practices other than performance pay had the same effect. EEO/AA and maternity leave policies were strongly correlated with improved productivity.human resource management policies, labour productivity

Too many to fail? Inter-enterprise arrears in transition economies

In advanced market economies, the use of trade credits is an important way of short-term financing and generally considered as being part of normal business practice. Some transition economies, however, have experienced a rapid accumulation of trade credits which have led to interlocking webs of arrears and collective bailouts by the government. In this paper, firm-level data is used to test whether trade credits are just part of normal business practice comparable to more advanced market-economies or whether trade credits represent a systematic phenomena supporting soft budget constraints of firms in transition. The results suggest that trade credits are not just normal business practice but that they can have negative spill-over effects on other firms by worsening their financial situation. We conclude that the problem of interlocking effects is more pronounced in countries with less developed institutions, low financial intermediation and, overall, no credible commitment to market economic reforms.inter-enterprise arrears, soft budget constraints, transition economies

Performance related pay: what makes a successful scheme?

The complexities surrounding the issue of reward management can be seen as indicative of the contradictions that exist within the discipline labelled human resource management (HRM). For example, Storey's (1992: 27) distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' HRM identifies the need for 'strategic interventions designed to elicit commitment and to develop resourceful humans' ('soft' HRM) and 'strategic interventions designed to achieve full utilisation of labour resources' ('hard' HRM. The current state of knowledge on reward systems suggests that these are often designed to attempt both strategic interventions together; how successful they are on either count is perhaps less well documented. This tension within HRM has been noted by several writers and the processes currently used to reward individuals have been well scrutinised (Smith, 1992; Legge, 1995; Kessler, 1995). In the final analysis, it appears that many of the reward initiatives pursued represent no more than a 'shuffling of the pack' (Kessler, 1995:274), rather than any innovative, integrated strategy which could be considered part of a distinctive HRM approach. This paper considers one aspect of the current debate on reward systems by examining the operation of a PRP scheme in a multi-divisional company in Ireland. Before considering the findings of the research, the paper first of all considers some of the evidence available on the operation of PRP systems and describes the background to the study and the methodology used in the research