Incentive and stability in the Rock-Paper-Scissors game: an experimental investigation

In a two-person Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game, if we set a loss worth nothing and a tie worth 1, and the payoff of winning (the incentive a) as a variable, this game is called as generalized RPS game. The generalized RPS game is a representative mathematical model to illustrate the game dynamics, appearing widely in textbook. However, how actual motions in these games depend on the incentive has never been reported quantitatively. Using the data from 7 games with different incentives, including 84 groups of 6 subjects playing the game in 300-round, with random-pair tournaments and local information recorded, we find that, both on social and individual level, the actual motions are changing continuously with the incentive. More expressively, some representative findings are, (1) in social collective strategy transit views, the forward transition vector field is more and more centripetal as the stability of the system increasing; (2) In the individual behavior of strategy transit view, there exists a phase transformation as the stability of the systems increasing, and the phase transformation point being near the standard RPS; (3) Conditional response behaviors are structurally changing accompanied by the controlled incentive. As a whole, the best response behavior increases and the win-stay lose-shift (WSLS) behavior declines with the incentive. Further, the outcome of win, tie, and lose influence the best response behavior and WSLS behavior. Both as the best response behavior, the win-stay behavior declines with the incentive while the lose-left-shift behavior increase with the incentive. And both as the WSLS behavior, the lose-left-shift behavior increase with the incentive, but the lose-right-shift behaviors declines with the incentive. We hope to learn which one in tens of learning models can interpret the empirical observation above.Comment: 19 pages, 14 figures, Keywords: experimental economics, conditional response, best response, win-stay-lose-shift, evolutionary game theory, behavior economic

Optimal cooperation-trap strategies for the iterated Rock-Paper-Scissors game

In an iterated non-cooperative game, if all the players act to maximize their individual accumulated payoff, the system as a whole usually converges to a Nash equilibrium that poorly benefits any player. Here we show that such an undesirable destiny is avoidable in an iterated Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game involving two players X and Y. Player X has the option of proactively adopting a cooperation-trap strategy, which enforces complete cooperation from the rational player Y and leads to a highly beneficial as well as maximally fair situation to both players. That maximal degree of cooperation is achievable in such a competitive system with cyclic dominance of actions may stimulate creative thinking on how to resolve conflicts and enhance cooperation in human societies.Comment: 5 pages including 3 figure

Negative outcomes evoke cyclic irrational decisions in Rock, Paper, Scissors

Rock, Paper, Scissors (RPS) represents a unique gaming space in which the predictions of human rational decision-making can be compared with actual performance. Playing a computerized opponent adopting a mixed-strategy equilibrium, participants revealed a non-significant tendency to over-select Rock. Further violations of rational decision-making were observed using an inter-trial analysis where participants were more likely to switch their item selection at trial n + 1 following a loss or draw at trial n, revealing the strategic vulnerability of individuals following the experience of negative rather than positive outcome. Unique switch strategies related to each of these trial n outcomes were also identified: after losing participants were more likely to ‘downgrade’ their item (e.g., Rock followed by Scissors) but after drawing participants were more likely to ‘upgrade’ their item (e.g., Rock followed by Paper). Further repetition analysis revealed that participants were more likely to continue their specific cyclic item change strategy into trial n + 2. The data reveal the strategic vulnerability of individuals following the experience of negative rather than positive outcome, the tensions between behavioural and cognitive influences on decision making, and underline the dangers of increased behavioural predictability in other recursive, non-cooperative environments such as economics and politics

Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics

We show that any evolutionary dynamic that satisfies three mild requirements— continuity, positive correlation, and innovation—does not eliminate strictly dominated strategies in all games. Likewise, we demonstrate that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics

Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics

We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild requirements fails to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We also show that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics. Numerical analysis reveals that dominated strategies can persist at nontrivial frequencies even when the level of domination is not small.Evolutionary game theory, evolutionary game dynamics, nonconvergnece, dominated strategies

The coevolution of toxin and antitoxin genes drives the dynamics of bacterial addiction complexes and intragenomic conflict

Bacterial genomes commonly contain ‘addiction’ gene complexes that code for both a toxin and a corresponding antitoxin. As long as both genes are expressed, cells carrying the complex can remain healthy. However, loss of the complex (including segregational loss in daughter cells) can entail death of the cell. We develop a theoretical model to explore a number of evolutionary puzzles posed by toxin–antitoxin (TA) population biology. We first extend earlier results demonstrating that TA complexes can spread on plasmids, as an adaptation to plasmid competition in spatially structured environments, and highlight the role of kin selection. We then considered the emergence of TA complexes on plasmids from previously unlinked toxin and antitoxin genes. We find that one of these traits must offer at least initially a direct advantage in some but not all environments encountered by the evolving plasmid population. Finally, our study predicts non-transitive ‘rock-paper-scissors’ dynamics to be a feature of intragenomic conflict mediated by TA complexes. Intragenomic conflict could be sufficient to select deleterious genes on chromosomes and helps to explain the previously perplexing observation that many TA genes are found on bacterial chromosomes

A Simple Test of Learning Theory?

We report experiments designed to test the theoretical possibility, first discovered by Shapley (1964), that in some games learning fails to converge to any equilibrium, either in terms of marginal frequencies or of average play. Subjects played repeatedly in fixed pairings one of two 3 × 3 games, each having a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. The equilibrium of one game is predicted to be stable under learning, the other unstable, provided payoffs are sufficiently high. We ran each game in high and low payoff treatments. We find that, in all treatments, average play is close to equilibrium even though there are strong cycles present in the data.: Games, Learning, Experiments, Stochastic Fictitious Play, Mixed Strategy Equilibria.

Behavioural and neural modulation of win-stay but not lose-shift strategies as a function of outcome value in Rock, Paper, Scissors

Competitive environments in which individuals compete for mutually-exclusive outcomes require rational decision making in order to maximize gains but often result in poor quality heuristics. Reasons for the greater reliance on lose-shift relative to win-stay behaviour shown in previous studies were explored using the game of Rock, Paper, Scissors and by manipulating the value of winning and losing. Decision-making following a loss was characterized as relatively fast and relatively inflexible both in terms of the failure to modulate the magnitude of lose-shift strategy and the lack of significant neural modulation. In contrast, decision-making following a win was characterized as relatively slow and relatively flexible both in terms of a behavioural increase in the magnitude of win-stay strategy and a neural modulation of feedback-related negativity (FRN) and stimulus-preceding negativity (SPN) following outcome value modulation. The win-stay / lose-shift heuristic appears not to be a unified mechanism, with the former relying on System 2 processes and the latter relying on System 1 processes. Our ability to play rationally appears more likely when the outcome is positive and when the value of wins are low, highlighting how vulnerable we can be when trying to succeed during competition