3 research outputs found
Social Choice with Non Quasi-linear Utilities
Without monetary payments, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem proves that
under mild requirements all truthful social choice mechanisms must be
dictatorships. When payments are allowed, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
mechanism implements the value-maximizing choice, and has many other good
properties: it is strategy-proof, onto, deterministic, individually rational,
and does not make positive transfers to the agents. By Roberts' theorem, with
three or more alternatives, the weighted VCG mechanisms are essentially unique
for domains with quasi-linear utilities. The goal of this paper is to
characterize domains of non-quasi-linear utilities where "reasonable"
mechanisms (with VCG-like properties) exist. Our main result is a tight
characterization of the maximal non quasi-linear utility domain, which we call
the largest parallel domain. We extend Roberts' theorem to parallel domains,
and use the generalized theorem to prove two impossibility results. First, any
reasonable mechanism must be dictatorial when the utility domain is
quasi-linear together with any single non-parallel type. Second, for richer
utility domains that still differ very slightly from quasi-linearity, every
strategy-proof, onto and deterministic mechanism must be a dictatorship
Almost Quasi-linear Utilities in Disguise: Positive-representation An Extension of Roberts' Theorem
This work deals with the implementation of social choice rules using dominant
strategies for unrestricted preferences. The seminal Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem shows that only few unappealing social choice rules can be implemented
unless we assume some restrictions on the preferences or allow monetary
transfers. When monetary transfers are allowed and quasi-linear utilities
w.r.t. money are assumed, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms were shown to
implement any affine-maximizer, and by the work of Roberts, only
affine-maximizers can be implemented whenever the type sets of the agents are
rich enough.
In this work, we generalize these results and define a new class of
preferences: Preferences which are positive-represented by a quasi-linear
utility. That is, agents whose preference on a subspace of the outcomes can be
modeled using a quasi-linear utility. We show that the characterization of VCG
mechanisms as the incentive-compatible mechanisms extends naturally to this
domain. Our result follows from a simple reduction to the characterization of
VCG mechanisms. Hence, we see our result more as a fuller more correct version
of the VCG characterization.
This work also highlights a common misconception in the community attributing
the VCG result to the usage of transferable utility. Our result shows that the
incentive-compatibility of the VCG mechanisms does not rely on money being a
common denominator, but rather on the ability of the designer to fine the
agents on a continuous (maybe agent-specific) scale.
We think these two insights, considering the utility as a representation and
not as the preference itself (which is common in the economic community) and
considering utilities which represent the preference only for the relevant
domain, would turn out to fruitful in other domains as well.Comment: An extended abstract of this work is forthcoming in: The 15th
Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2019
Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity
We consider a combinatorial auction model where preferences of agents over
bundles of objects and payments need not be quasilinear. However, we restrict
the preferences of agents to be dichotomous. An agent with dichotomous
preference partitions the set of bundles of objects as acceptable} and
unacceptable, and at the same payment level, she is indifferent between bundles
in each class but strictly prefers acceptable to unacceptable bundles. We show
that there is no Pareto efficient, dominant strategy incentive compatible
(DSIC), individually rational (IR) mechanism satisfying no subsidy if the
domain of preferences includes all dichotomous preferences. However, a
generalization of the VCG mechanism is Pareto efficient, DSIC, IR and satisfies
no subsidy if the domain of preferences contains only positive income effect
dichotomous preferences. We show the tightness of this result: adding any
non-dichotomous preference (satisfying some natural properties) to the domain
of quasilinear dichotomous preferences brings back the impossibility result