Environmental Justice: Challenges of Contaminated Site Cleanup in Rural AK

A shorter version of this article appeared on pp. 1–4 of the Summer 2018 print edition.Efforts to clean up contaminated sites from military installations and other sources have been ongoing in Alaska since the 1980s, and new sites continue to be identified. Most Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS) properties are in remote locations, placing a disproportionate impact on Alaska Native communities that depend upon environmental resources for their livelihood. Cleanup projects that are begun may take many years to complete due to the complicated nature of each site. Since 1990, over 5,300 sites have been cleanup up; more than 2,200 sites remain open, including military installations (both abandoned and active), bulk fuel storage and gas stations, airports and airfields, maintenance facilities, and oil exploration, transport, and refining facilities.Superfund and FUDS / Multiple projects and parties / FUDS closure but site still open / DEC closed sites vs. open sites / Assessing risk / [Sidebar:] Cleanup in rural Alaska is expensive and complicated / Liability and costs of cleanup / Financing assessment and remediation / Federal funds / Reference

Determinants and Effects on Property Values of Participation in Voluntary Cleanup Programs: The Case of Colorado

State Voluntary Cleanup Programs (VCPs) were established starting in the 1990s to encourage the environmental remediation and redevelopment of contaminated properties. These programs typically offer liability relief, subsidies and other regulatory incentives in exchange for site cleanup. This paper asks three questions: First, what type of properties are attracted to voluntary cleanup programs? Second, what is the interaction between these state programs and other incentives for remediation and economic development, such as Enterprise Zone and Brownfield Zone designations? Third, what is the effect of participation in the VCP on property values? We use data from Colorado’s VCP to answer these questions. We find that most of the properties enrolled in this program were not previously listed on EPA’s contaminated site registries, and that most applicants seek to obtain directly a “no further action” determination without undergoing remediation. The main determinants of participation are the size of the parcel and whether the surrounding land use is primarily residential, while other incentives have little effect. Properties with confirmed contamination sell at a 47% discount relative to comparable uncontaminated parcels, and participation tends to raise the property price, but this latter effect is not statistically significant. Taken together, these findings suggest that the participating properties are those with high development potential, and hint at the possibility that owners or developers may be seeking to obtain a clean bill of health from the State with only minimal or no cleanup efforts. Were these findings confirmed with data from other states, they would raise doubts about the effectiveness of voluntary programs in encouraging remediation and their usefulness in reversing some of the undesired effects of the Superfund legislation.Brownfields, Contaminated sites, Voluntary cleanup programs, Incentives

What are the Effects of Contamination Risks on Commercial and Industrial Properties? Evidence from Baltimore, Maryland

Using the hedonic pricing approach, we investigate how the information released on public registries of contaminated and potentially contaminated sites affects nearby commercial and industrial properties in Baltimore, Maryland. We find that commercial and industrial properties are virtually unaffected by proximity to a site with a history of contamination. Knowing that the site is no longer considered contaminated does not have a rebound effect on property prices either. We also find that urban economic development policies, such as Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Zones, have little effect on property values. In sum, brownfield properties in Baltimore are not particularly attractive investments for developers, and there is little potential for self-sustaining cleanup based on appropriate fiscal incentives, such as Tax Increment Financing. It is doubtful that “one size fits all” measures to encourage the cleanup of contaminated sites can be successful in this context.Contaminated sites registries, Distance to contaminated sites, Hedonic pricing model, Brownfields

Superiorfund - An Answer to State Court Holdings That Government-Mandated Cleanup Costs Constitute Damages under Comprehensive General Liability Policies

This comment analyzes the state high court decisions which seem to be reaching a consensus that the term damages in a Comprehensive General Liability policy encompasses the cost of cleaning up a hazardous waste site. In six state high court cases, the courts held in favor of the insureds, holding that cleanup costs constitute damages. In only three state high court cases, decided by two courts, the holdings were in favor of insurers with rulings that cleanup costs do not constitute damages. Two possible solutions to resolve the insurance carriers\u27 dilemma regarding the damages question are proposed in this comment. The preferred alternative is to amend the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act and make cleanup costs an uninsurable interest. With reimbursement of cleanup costs by insurers an impossibility, an alternative to insurance would be necessary. The author proposes a solution to the problem in the creation of a pollution fund to clean up hazardous waste sites. As a less desirable alternative, the author recommends that insurance carriers seek alternatives to litigation such as settling out of court

Determinants and Effects on Property Values of Participation in Voluntary Cleanup Programs: the Case of Colorado

State Voluntary Cleanup Programs (VCPs) were established starting in the 1990s to encourage the environmental remediation and redevelopment of contaminated properties. These programs typically offer liability relief, subsidies and other regulatory incentives in exchange for site cleanup. This paper asks three questions: First, what type of properties are attracted to voluntary cleanup programs? Second, what is the interaction between these state programs and other incentives for remediation and economic development, such as Enterprise Zone and Brownfield Zone designations? Third, what is the effect of participation in the VCP on property values? We use data from Colorado’s VCP to answer these questions. We find that most of the properties enrolled in this program were not previously listed on EPA’s contaminated site registries, and that most applicants seek to obtain directly a “no further action†determination without undergoing remediation. The main determinants of participation are the size of the parcel and whether the surrounding land use is primarily residential, while other incentives have little effect. Properties with confirmed contamination sell at a 47% discount relative to comparable uncontaminated parcels, and participation tends to raise the property price, but this latter effect is not statistically significant. Taken together, these findings suggest that the participating properties are those with high development potential, and hint at the possibility that owners or developers may be seeking to obtain a clean bill of health from the State with only minimal or no cleanup efforts. Were these findings confirmed with data from other states, they would raise doubts about the effectiveness of voluntary programs in encouraging remediation and their usefulness in reversing some of the undesired effects of the Superfund legislation.

Paying for Permanence: Public Preferences for Contaminated Site Cleanup

We use conjoint choice questions to investigate people’s preferences for income and reductions in mortality risks delivered by contaminated site remediation policies. Our survey is self-administered using the computer by residents of four cities in Italy with severely contaminated sites. We estimate the Value of a Statistical Life to be about €5.6 million for an immediate risk reduction. If the risk reduction takes place 20 years from now, however, the implied VSL is about €1.26 million. The discount rate implicit in the responses to the conjoint choice questions is about 7%. People are willing to pay for permanent risk reductions, but not just any amount. Risk reductions in the nearer future are valued more highly than risk reductions in the more distant future. We also find that the VSL is “individuated,” in the sense that it depends on observable individual characteristics of the respondents, familiarity with contaminated sites, concern about the health effects of exposure to toxicants, having a family member with cancer, perceived usefulness of possible government actions, and the respondent’s beliefs about the goals of government remediation programs. Additional questions suggest that respondents discount lives, and do so at a discount rate in the ballpark of that implicit in their risk v. money tradeoffs.Value of a Statistical Life, Latent Risk Reductions, Individual Discount Rates, Conjoint Choice Questions, Contaminated Sites, Remediation

A Strategic analysis of the Rocky Flats cleanup

The Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site is located in Golden, Colorado. It is situated on 384 acres in a 6,550-acre natural preserve. Rocky Flats ended its original mission in 1989, after raids on the site by both the FBI and the EPA for illegal dumping and other environmental violations. Since then the site has been scheduled for cleanup. This thesis will provide background information on the site and on the company hired to perform the cleanup. It also provides an evaluation of some key policies regarding the cleanup procedures. Since the end of the cold war, the production of nuclear weapons has ceased. The proposed cost of cleaning up such sites is dramatically higher than for similar sites not involved in the nuclear industry. This cost differential leads us to the inevitable conclusion that since such sites already exist, we must maintain efficient means of cleanup. Because a major factor in the cost is the speed or amount of time it takes to cleanup a site. So there is a need for streamlining the proposed cleanup of this site and others like it. To keep cost as low as possible

Land Use and Remedy Selection: Experience from the Field — The Fort Ord Site

In September of 1994, the Army closed the Fort Ord Military Reservation, a Superfund site of some 28,000 acres located in Monterey County, California. Under the Base Closure and Realignment Act, nearly all of this land will be transferred to federal and state entities and to a number of cities of the Monterey peninsula that border the base. A good deal of this property is valuable real estate — coastal dunes, golf courses, and barracks that can be converted to apartments or dormitories. For the beneficiaries of these property transfers the Fort Ord cleanup is a modern day gold rush that is taking place as part of a Superfund cleanup. What effect have economic development pressures had on the cleanup process and on decisions about cleanup standards? This case study addresses this question by examining: (i) how the legal requirements regulating cleanup, community involvement and reuse have been implemented by the Army and the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency; and (ii) the effectiveness of two groups created by legislation to integrate reuse planning and cleanup — the Fort Ord Reuse Authority, an economic planning authority representing the area’s local governments, and the Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board, a citizens group mandated to advise the Army about the cleanup process.

Are Risk Regulators Rational' Evidence from Hazardous Waste Cleanup Decisions

Using original data on the cleanup of 130 hazardous waste sites, W. Kip Viscusi of Harvard Law School and James T. Hamilton of Duke University's Sanford Institute of Public Policy examine the extent that political decisions and quantitative risk assessments influence cleanup and remediation decisions. They conclude that target risk levels chosen by regulators are largely a function of political variables and risk-perception biases. Communities with higher voter turnouts are more likely at times to have lower risks remaining after final site cleanup and to have more spent to avert expected cases of cancer. They find these political influences are most significant for the least cost-effective site cleanups and the lowest site risks. By basing its policies on an individual risk approach that does not reflect the size of the exposed population or whether the population exists at the site, the Environmental Protection Agency often fails to recognize important aspects of the overall beneficial consequences of its efforts. The mean cost per case of cancer averted at the sample of 130 EPA sites is $11.7 billion. The median cost is$418 million. These estimates use EPA conservative risk assumptions and assume no latency period. With such adjustments, the median cost rises to above $1 billion per cancer case. The most effective 5 percent of all cleanup expenditures eliminate over 99 percent of the cancer risk. Put somewhat differently, 95% of the costs are spent to address less than 1 percent of the risks.

The value of superfund cleanups : evidence from U.S. Environmental Protection Agency decisions

Under the Superfund law, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for inspecting hazardous waste sites and for putting those with the most serious contamination problems on a national priorities list. The EPA then oversees the cleanup of these sites, suing potentially responsible parties for the costs of cleanup when possible, and funding the cleanup of"orphaned"sites out of the Superfund, money raised taxing chemical and petroleum products. The Superfund program is controversial. Cleanups are costly and it is unclear whether the benefits of cleanup, especially the relative benefits of more permanent clenanup, are worth the costs. At many sites, imminent danger of exposure to contaminants can be removed at low cost. What raises the cost of cleanup is the decision to clean up the site for future generations - to incinerate contaminated soil, for example, or to pump and treat an aquifer for 30 years. To shed light on this debate, the authors infer the EPA's willingness to pay (or have others pay) for more permanent cleanups at Superfund sites. They do so by analyzing cleanup decisions for contaminated soils at 110 Superfund sites. They find that, other things being equal, the EPA was more likely to choose less expensive cleanup options. But, holding costs constant, the EPA was more likely to select more permanent options, such as incinerating the soil instead of capping it or putting it in a landfill. The EPA was willing to pay at least twice as much for onsite incineration of contaminated soil as it was for capping the soil. Has the EPA chosen more permanent Superfund cleanups in areas where residents are predominantly white and have high incomes? The authors find no evidence that the percentage of minority residents near a site influences the choice of cleanup selected. But offsite treatment was more likely at sites with higher incomes.General Technology,Environmental Governance,Sanitation and Sewerage,TF030632-DANISH CTF - FY05 (DAC PART COUNTRIES GNP PER CAPITA BELOW USD 2,500/AL,Environmental Economics&Policies