Too-connected-to-fail Institutions and Payments System’s Stability: Assessing Challenges for Financial Authorities

The most recent episode of market turmoil exposed the limitations resulting from the traditional focus on too-big-to-fail institutions within an increasingly systemic-crisis-prone financial system, and encouraged the appearance of the too-connected-to-fail (TCTF) concept. The TCTF concept conveniently broadens the base of potential destabilizing institutions beyond the traditional banking-focused approach to systemic risk, but requires methodologies capable of coping with complex, cross-dependent, context-dependent and non-linear systems. After comprehensively introducing the rise of the TCTF concept, this paper presents a robust, parsimonious and powerful approach to identifying and assessing systemic risk within payments systems, and proposes some analytical routes for assessing financial authorities’ challenges. Banco de la Republica’s approach is based on a convenient mixture of network topology basics for identifying central institutions, and payments systems simulation techniques for quantifying the potential consequences of central institutions failing within Colombian large-value payments systems. Unlike econometrics or network topology alone, results consist of a rich set of quantitative outcomes that capture the complexity, cross-dependency, context-dependency and non-linearity of payments systems, but conveniently disaggregated and dollar-denominated. These outcomes and the proposed analysis provide practical information for enhanced policy and decision-making, where the ability to measure each institution’s contribution to systemic risk may assist financial authorities in their task to achieve payments system’s stability.Payments systems, too-connected-to-fail, too-big-to-fail, systemic risk, network topology, simulation, central bank liquidity. Classification JEL:E58, E44, C63, G21, D85.

The Risks of Financial Institutions

Over the last twenty years, the consensus view of systemic risk in the financial system that emerged in response to the banking crises of the 1930s and before has lost much of its relevance. This view held that the main systemic problem is runs on solvent banks leading to bank panics. But financial crises of the last two decades have not fit the mold. A new consensus has yet to emerge, but financial institutions and regulators have considerably broadened their assessment of the risks facing financial institutions. The dramatic rise of modern risk management has changed how the risks of financial institutions are measured and how these institutions are managed. However, modern risk management is not without weaknesses that will have to be addressed.

Considerations regarding the role and the importance of the financial stability in the context of th european banking integration

The work is part of a complex research theme approached by the author which follows the knowledge development with favourable implications on the increase of the role and of the importance of the financial stability, having as objective to identify the best methods and institutional structures for the financial stability assurance in an European banking system which slowly surpasses the barriers imposed by the national and economical frontiers. The importance of the financial stability assurance is crucial not only for the general economical evolution, but also for the efficiency of the monetary politics of the central bank. As far as the banks (especially in Romania) represent the key element for the financial system, the state of the economy and the structure of the banking system are closely connected to the financial stability assurance and the macroeconomical evolutions.financial stability, banking globalization, efficiency, macroeconomic evolution

MANAGEMENT OF BANKING RISKS: ROMANIAN BANKS VERSUS EUROPEAN BANKS

The role of the banking system as essential link the savinginvestment process makes of its stability a priority on the agenda of the public authorities. One of the major objectives of a central bank is to prevent the risk by promoting an efficient bank monitoring, which should contribute to the achievement of the stability and viability of the entire financial system. Thus, the central banks developed methods and processes for the continual supervising and evaluation of the banks – premises of the prevention of the apparition of a great variety of bank crisis or other unpleasant surprises regarding the entities of the banking system.model, banking risk, trend analysis, rating system

Analyzing Systemic Risk with Financial Networks An Application During a Financial Crash

A financial network model, where the coded identity of the counterparties of every trade is known, is applied to both stable and crisis periods in a large and liquid overnight repo market in an emerging market economy. We have analyzed the financial crisis by using various network investigation tools such as links, interconnectivity, and reciprocity. In addition, we proposed a centrality measure to monitor and detect the ‘systemically important financial institution’ in the financial system. We have shown that our measure gives strong signals much before the crisis.systemic risk, financial regulation, financial crisis, BASEL III, systemically important financial institution, Turkey, IMF

Systemic risk in the financial sector; a review and synthesis

In a financial crisis, an initial shock gets amplified while it propagates to other financial intermediaries, ultimately disrupting the financial sector. We review the literature on such amplification mechanisms, which create externalities from risk taking. We distinguish between two classes of mechanisms: contagion within the financial sector and pro-cyclical connection between the financial sector and the real economy. Regulation can diminish systemic risk by reducing these externalities. However, regulation of systemic risk faces several problems. First, systemic risk and its costs are difficult to quantify. Second, banks have strong incentives to evade regulation meant to reduce systemic risk. Third, regulators are prone to forbearance. Finally, the inability of governments to commit not to bail out systemic institutions creates moral hazard and reduces the market’s incentive to price systemic risk. Strengthening market discipline can play an important role in addressing these problems, because it reduces the scope for regulatory forbearance, does not rely on complex information requirements, and is difficult to manipulate.