The Domestic Market for Short-term Debt Securities

The market for short-term debt is dominated by the issuance of bank securities. Yields on these securities act as an important reference rate within the financial system. The turmoil in global markets during recent years has led to significant changes in the short-term debt market as the funding profiles of banks and other issuers of short-term securities has altered.short-term debt; prime banks; BBSW; ABCP; LIBOR; OIS

Default and the maturity structure in sovereign bonds

This paper studies the maturity composition and the term structure of interest rate spreads of government debt in emerging markets. In the data, when interest rate spreads rise, debt maturity shortens and the spread on short-term bonds is higher than on long-term bonds. To account for this pattern, we build a dynamic model of international borrowing with endogenous default and multiple maturities of debt. Short-term debt can deliver higher immediate consumption than long-term debt; large long-term loans are not available because the borrower cannot commit to save in the near future towards repayment in the far future. However, issuing long-term debt can insure against the need to roll-over short-term debt at high interest rate spreads. The trade-off between these two benefits is quantitatively important for understanding the maturity composition in emerging markets. When calibrated to data from Brazil, the model matches the dynamics in the maturity of debt issuances and its comovement with the level of spreads across maturities.Bonds ; Debt ; Default (Finance)

Why do firms borrow on a short-term basis ? Evidence from European countries

This paper investigates empirically the use of short-term bank loans by firms. We face two analytical frameworks. According to the corporate finance theory, short-term and long-term ebts are substitutes, while in the credit channel literature they are distinct and complementary vehicles. We estimate a model that explains the level of short-term bank debt, using panel data from the BACH database for six European countries (1989-2003). Our results indicate that the two types of bank loans are complements. They show that short-term bank debt should be analysed as a specific vehicle that finances current assets, as in the credit channel literature.corporate short-term debt, debt maturity structure, credit channel

Default and the maturity structure in sovereign bonds

This paper studies the maturity composition and the term structure of interest rate spreads of government debt in emerging markets. We document that in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Russia, when interest rate spreads rise, debt maturity shortens and the spread on short-term bonds is higher than on long-term bonds. To account for this pattern, we build a dynamic model of international borrowing with endogenous default and multiple maturities of debt. Short-term debt can deliver higher immediate consumption than long-term debt; large longterm loans are not available because the borrower cannot commit to save in the near future towards repayment in the far future.> ; However, issuing long-term debt can insure against the need to roll-over short-term debt at high interest rate spreads. The trade-off between these two benefits is quantitatively important for understanding the maturity composition in emerging markets. When calibrated to data from Brazil, the model matches the dynamics in the maturity of debt issuances and its comovement with the level of spreads across maturities.Bonds ; Debt ; Default (Finance) ; Emerging markets ; International finance

Debt policy under constraints between Philip II, the Cortes and Genoese bankers

The large public debt was created in 16th century Castile. A new view of its fiscal system is presented. The main part of the debt was in perpetual redeemable annuities and its credibility was enhanced by decentralized funding through taxes administered by cities that represented the Realm in the Cortes. Accumulation of short-term debt would be refinanced by long-term debt. Short-term debt crises occurred when the service of the long-term debt reached the revenues of the taxes that funded the domestic long-term debt. They were resolved after protracted negotiations in the Cortes by tax increases and interest rate reductionsDebt funding, Sovereign loan defaults, Financial crises, Parliaments

Why Do Emerging Economies Borrow Short Term?

We argue that emerging economies borrow short term due to the high risk premium charged by bondholders on long-term debt. First, we present a model where the debt maturity structure is the outcome of a risk sharing problem between the government and bondholders. By issuing long-term debt, the government lowers the probability of a rollover crisis, transferring risk to bondholders. In equilibrium, this risk is reflected in a higher risk premium and borrowing cost. Therefore, the government faces a trade-off between safer long-term debt and cheaper short-term debt. Second, we construct a new database of sovereign bond prices and issuance. We show that emerging economies pay a positive term premium (a higher risk premium on long-term bonds than on short-term bonds). During crises, the term premium increases, with issuance shifting towards shorter maturities. The evidence suggests that international investors' time-varying risk aversion is crucial to understand the debt structure in emerging economies.

The Impact of Firm and Industry Characteristics on Small Firms' Capital Structure: Evidence from Dutch Panel Data

We investigate small firms’ capital structure, employing a proprietary database containing financial statements of Dutch small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) from 2003 to 2005. We find that the capital structure decision of Dutch SMEs is consistent with the pecking order theory: SMEs use profits to reduce their debt level, and growing firms increase their debt position since they need more funds. Furthermore, we document that profits reduce in particular short term debt, whereas growth increases long term debt. This implies that when internal funds are depleted, long term debt is next in the pecking order. We also find evidence for the maturity matching principle in SME capital structure: long term assets are financed with long term debt, while short term assets are financed with short tem debt. This implies that the maturity structure of debt is an instrument for lenders to deal with problems of asymmetric information. Finally, we find that SME capital structure varies across industries but firm characteristics are more important than industry characteristics.Capital Structure;SMEs;pecking order theory;trade-off theory

Why Do Emerging Economies Borrow Short Term?

We argue that emerging economies borrow short term due to the high risk premium charged by bondholders on long-term debt. First, we present a model where the debt maturity structure is the outcome of a risk sharing problem between the government and bondholders. By issuing long-term debt, the government lowers the probability of a rollover crisis, transferring risk to bondholders. In equilibrium, this risk is re‡ected in a higher risk premium and borrowing cost. Therefore, the government faces a trade-o¤ between safer long-term debt and cheaper short-term debt. Second, we construct a new database of sovereign bond prices and issuance. We show that emerging economies pay a positive term premium (a higher risk premium on long-term bonds than on short-term bonds). During crises, the term premium increases, with issuance shifting towards shorter maturities. The evidence suggests that investor risk aversion is important to understand the debt structure in emerging economiesemerging market debt; financial crises; investor risk aversion

Debt Dilution and Maturity Structure of Sovereign Bonds

We develop a dynamic model of sovereign default and renegotiation to study how expectations of default and debt restructuring in the near future affect the ex ante maturity structure of sovereign debts. This paper argues that the average maturity is shorter when a country is approaching financial distress due to two risks: default risk and "debt dilution" risk. Long-term yield is generally higher than short-term yield to reflect the higher default risk incorporated in long-term debts. When default risk is high and long-term debt is too expensive to afford, the country near default has to rely on short-term debt. The second risk, "debt dilution" risk, is the focus of this paper. It arises because there is no explicit seniority structure among different sovereign debts, and all debt holders are legally equal and expect to get the same haircut rate in the post-default debt restructuring. Therefore, new debt issuances around crisis reduce the amount that can be recovered by existing earlier debt-holders in debt restructuring, and thus ``dilute'' existing debts. As a result, investors tend to hold short-term debt which is more likely to mature before it is "diluted" to avoid the "dilution" risk. Model features non-contingent bonds of two maturities, endogenous default and endogenous hair cut rate in a debt renegotiation after default. We show that ``debt dilution'' effect is always present and is more severe when default risk is high. When default is a likely event in the near future, both default risk and ``dilution'' risk drive the ex ante maturity of sovereign debts to be shorter. In a quantitative analysis, we try to calibrate the model to match various features of the recent crisis episode of Argentina. In particular, we try to account for the shifts in maturity structure before crisis and the volatility of long-term and short-term spreads observed in the prior default episode of ArgentinaMaturity Structure, Debt Dilution, Sovereign Default, Debt Renegotiation