Exploring the rationale of enlightened shareholder value in the realm of UK company law – the path dependence perspective

Despite conventional beliefs in the predominance of shareholder value, a broader agenda of stakeholder consideration has been advocated in the UK by the recently-introduced ESV principle – the overriding corporate objective in the new company law regime. In this paper, the efficiency of this principle in terms of stakeholder enhancement is challenged through an interdisciplinary analysis. Through a critical review of the ESV principle, it is discovered that stakeholder enhancement practices in the context of the 2006 company law regime are still for the fundamental goal of shareholder value maximisation, and that their enlightened impact has been fairly limited in practice. Furthermore, by revisiting the interrelationships between UK economic, political and cultural factors with the predominance objective of shareholder value maximisation in the Companies Act 2006, it is discovered that the enlightened effect of this new approach in the company law regime is in fact impeded by strong, persistent forces deriving from shareholder-oriented particulars. Providing insight into the future direction of corporate governance practice, the paper concludes the rationale behind the shareholder-oriented ESV principle, and further suggests the continuing predominance of shareholder value in UK corporate governance

Corporate culture and shareholder value in banking industry

This paper analyses the casual relationship between corporate culture and shareholder value using a sample of large banks in the French, German, Italian and U.K. banking systems over the 2000 to 2003 period. Firstly, we measure shareholder value using an Economic Value Added estimated through a procedure tailored to account for banking peculiarities. Secondly, we measure corporate culture using language as its particular artifact and developing a cultural survey based on the application of a text-analysis model to a corpus of reference texts produced by the sample of banks. We posit six hypotheses regarding the relationship between corporate culture and bank profits and shareholder value. Our results noticeably show that bank profits and shareholder value benefit from different orientations of banking corporate culture.

Economic Value Added versus Traditional Performance Metrics in the Czech Food-Processing Sector

The aim of this article is to investigate the relationship between Economic Value Added, traditional performance measures (Return on Assets ‘ROA’ and Return on Equity ‘ROE’) and their ability to measure the creation of shareholder wealth in food-processing firms in the Czech Republic. To assess the relationship, a simple regression test was used and the following hypothesis were tested: • a strong positive linear relationship exists between EVA and the traditional performance measures of ROA and ROE and • the EVA measure reflects changes in shareholder wealth more consistently than the traditional performance measures ROA and ROE. The regression analysis results indicate in all cases a positive correspondence between EVA and financial performance metrics and show higher quality information content of EVA indicator as regards the ability to create shareholder wealth than the traditional performance measures.economic value added, traditional performance metrics, information content, food-processing sector, Consumer/Household Economics, Production Economics, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods, Q10, Q11,

ANALISIS PENGARUH NON PERFORMING LOAN, PROPORSI INVESTASI, LOAN TO DEPOSIT RATIO, RASIO KEWAJIBAN TERHADAP EKUITAS DAN BANK SIZE TERHADAP SHAREHOLDER VALUE PADA BANK KONVENSIONAL YANG LISTING DI BEI TAHUN 2011 HINGGA 2014

This research aims to analyze the influence of the Non Performing Loan, Investment Proportion, Loan to Deposit Ratio, Liability to Equity Ratio, and Bank Size to Shareholder Value of conventional bank which are listing in Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2011 until 2014 and measured by Market to Book Value (MBV). The population that included in this research consisted of all banking companies which are listing in Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2011 until 2014. So the number of total population is 36 banks. After passed the step of purposive sampling method it was gotten 31 banks over 4 years, so there were 124 data. The data analysis method used is multiple linier regression analysis with the classical assumption test. The results of this research showed that Investment Proportion and Loan to Deposit Ratio have negative and significant effect to Shareholder Value (MBV), Bank size has a positive and significant effect to Shareholder Value, meanwhile Non Performing Loan and Liability to Equity Ratio have no significant effect to Shareholder Value

Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform

Shareholder litigation challenging corporate mergers is ubiquitous, with the likelihood of a shareholder suit exceeding 90%. The value of this litigation, however, is questionable. The vast majority of merger cases settle for nothing more than supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy statement. The attorneys that bring these lawsuits are compensated for their efforts with a court-awarded fee. This leads critics to charge that merger litigation benefits only the lawyers who bring the claims, not the shareholders they represent. In response, defenders of merger litigation argue that the lawsuits serve a useful oversight function and that the improved disclosures that result are beneficial to shareholders. This Article offers a new approach to assessing the value of these claims by empirically testing the relationship between merger litigation and shareholder voting on the merger. If the supplemental disclosures produced by the settlement of merger litigation are valuable, they should affect shareholder voting behavior. Specifically, supplemental disclosures that are, in effect, “compelled” by settlement should produce new and unfavorable information about the merger and lead to a lower percentage of shares voted in favor of it. Applying this hypothesis to a hand-collected sample of 453 large public company mergers from 2005-2012, we find no such effect. We find no significant evidence that disclosure-only settlements affect shareholder voting. These findings warrant a reconsideration of Delaware merger law. Specifically, under current law, supplemental disclosures are viewed by courts as providing a substantial benefit to the shareholder class. In turn, this substantial benefit entitles the plaintiffs’ lawyers to an award of attorneys’ fees. Our evidence suggests that this legal analysis is misguided and that supplemental disclosures do not in fact constitute a substantial benefit. As a result, and in light of the substantial costs generated by public company merger litigation, we argue that courts should reject disclosure settlements as a basis for attorney fee awards. Our approach responds to critiques of merger litigation as excessive and frivolous by reducing the incentive for plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring weak cases, but it would have an additional benefit. Current practice drags state court judges into the task of indirectly promulgating disclosure standards in connection with the approval of fee awards. We argue, instead, for a more efficient specialization between state and federal courts in the regulation of mergers: public company merger disclosure should be policed by the federal securities laws while state corporate law focuses on substantive fairness

Reconsidering the rise of ‘shareholder value’ in the United States, 1960-2000

This study analyses thousands of corporate annual reports and financial data from 1960-2000 to propose an early history of the term ‘shareholder value’ in the United States. Scholarly interest in ‘shareholder value’ has burgeoned since 2000, but still little is known about the term’s origins. My findings suggest that corporate managers’ intentional and repeated use of the term did not begin until the early 1980s and was not widespread until the 1990s. Further, my analysis of General Electric Corporation, Johnson & Johnson, and The Coca-Cola Company suggests that adopting ‘shareholder value’ rhetoric likely had little impact on the performance of these case study firms

Considering the shareholder perspective: value-based management systems and stock market performance

We empirically study the use of value-based management systems in listed German firms and examine implications for firms' stock market performance. Using a novel, hand-collected data set covering 1,083 firm years from 2002 to 2008, we find that value-based management systems become increasingly common. Specifically, in 2008 42% of our sample firms have implemented such a system. In the empirical analysis, we find that firms that implement value-based management systems earn statistically significant and economically substantial abnormal stock market returns measured within a two-year adoption phase. These excess returns are not jeopardized by poor post-adoption returns. In the analysis, we carefully control for risk and account for endogeneity concerns. Overall, our findings support the view that shareholders consider the adoption of a value-based management system as a credible signal that management will focus on shareholder interests and that such systems actually increase shareholder value. --value-based management,corporate governance,econometric analysis,Germany

Shareholder agreements and firm value: Evidence from French listed firms.

In listed companies, some shareholders can be signatories to agreements that govern their relations. This paper investigates the effects of such agreements on the valuation of firms. I use a sample of French firms that is well suited for my analysis insofar as French law requires the disclosure of the shareholder agreements’ clauses. In line with previous literature, a negative relationship between firm value and the dispersion of voting rights across major shareholders is observed. However, the existence of a shareholder agreement tends to offset this negative effect. This countervailing effect is more pronounced when a “concerted action” provision is in force and/or the contracting shareholders are of the same type. Shareholder agreements thus appear as efficient coordination mechanisms rather than expropriation mechanisms.Large Shareholders; Shareholder Agreements; Corporate Governance;

Strategic decisions and shareholder value: an analysis of ConocoPhillips

Overview of strategic decisions that ConocoPhillips has made and the effect it has on shareholder value. Uses knowledge a basic investor would be equipped with to analyze the spin-off of ConocoPhillips and Phillips 66 by comparing it to Marathon Oil\u27s spin-off and the returns it created for investors

Do Bank Mergers Create Shareholder Value? An Event Study Analysis

This paper investigates the economic role of bank mergers in creating shareholder value based on the idea that shareholder wealth will increase if the consolidation leads to the aforementioned gains. This paper is divided into seven sections. The second section of my paper provides an academic review of the literature, focusing on econometric theory that tests the gains in shareholder value and corporate synergies after a merger. The third section introduces a conceptual model I have designed using econometric tools to test how bank mergers create shareholder value. The fourth section embarks on a discussion about my ideal data followed by the fifth section about my actual data. The sixth section is an analysis of my actual regression results. It was found that the average bank merger has either no effect/ X effect on total firm value. The reasons for these results are also enumerated and critiqued in this section. The study of bank mergers remains an area of interesting econometric research because of the performance implications of such mergers and thus, the concluding seventh section will suggest possible areas for future research