The Shared Concerns of Nietzsche and Rumi on Humanity

Nietzsche and Rumi belong to two different time and spaces: one a Germen Post-modern Philosopher, the other an Afghani Middle Ages Sufi. After an introduction about both figures and methodology used here, this paper presents a detailed discussion on commonalities between Nietzsche and Rumi. The first section illustrates on the shared methodology of writings which are the rousing language, hidden ideas amid simple points, and the paradoxical teachings. The second part studies the shared fundamental concepts among these philosophers. These concepts are Anti-idolism, the intuitional knowledge, and the authenticity of person. The last section of this paper called “inspirations” explains how those shared methodology and ideas serve two aims: mutual understanding between two different philosophies as well as enhancing our comprehension of humanity

The Chronotope of Humanness : Bakhtin and Dostoevsky

Bakhtin and Dostoevsky shared the conviction that human life must be understood in terms of temporality. Both thinkers were obsessed with time’s relation to life as people experience it. For each, a rich sense of humanity demanded a chronotope of open time. In many respects, the views of Bakhtin and Dostoevsky coincide. Theologically speaking, one could fairly call them both heretics, as we shall see. Their differences reflect their different starting points. Bakhtin began with ethics, whereas Dostoevsky thought about life first and foremost in terms of psychology. For Bakhtin, any viable view of the world had first of all to give a rich meaning to moral responsibility. Dostoevsky could accept no view that was false to his sense of how the human mind thought and felt

New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A Critical Appraisal of the Antiquities Trade Debates

In debates over the trade in archaeological objects or antiquities, on one end are those who believe that everyone has a shared interest in and claim to the common heritage of humanity, and thus support a vibrant and legal trade in cultural materials. On the other end are those who believe that cultural objects have special significance for specific groups and thus support the efforts of such groups to regulate their trade and seek their repatriation. The aim of this Essay is to critically examine the components of each group\u27s arguments--their goals, assumptions, and inconsistencies--and try, where possible, to identify what implicit concerns may be driving their current stances in the debate. For it is only when we unpack the individual positions and arguments of the different stakeholders in the antiquities debates that we may move the discussion forward from its current stalemate and develop more nuanced policies, which not only may represent pragmatic solutions, but might better satisfy the many interests involved

New Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property: A Critical Appraisal of the Antiquities Trade Debates

In debates over the trade in archaeological objects or antiquities, on one end are those who believe that everyone has a shared interest in and claim to the common heritage of humanity, and thus support a vibrant and legal trade in cultural materials. On the other end are those who believe that cultural objects have special significance for specific groups and thus support the efforts of such groups to regulate their trade and seek their repatriation. The aim of this Essay is to critically examine the components of each group\u27s arguments--their goals, assumptions, and inconsistencies--and try, where possible, to identify what implicit concerns may be driving their current stances in the debate. For it is only when we unpack the individual positions and arguments of the different stakeholders in the antiquities debates that we may move the discussion forward from its current stalemate and develop more nuanced policies, which not only may represent pragmatic solutions, but might better satisfy the many interests involved

Dialogue as Moral Paradigm: Paths Toward Intercultural Transformation

The Council of Europe’s 2008 White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue: ‘living together as equals in dignity’ points to the need for shared values upon which intercultural dialogue might rest. In order, however, to overcome the monologic separateness that threatens community, we must educate ourselves to recognize the dialogism of our humanity and to engage in deep encounters with others with a mature skepticism of all dogmatisms, including our own. In order to aid us in reaching the necessary insight, the author calls upon Bakhtin’s ideas of the dialogism of every utterance and of the unity and heteroglossia of language, Gadamer’s hermeneutical experience that shakes us loose from what we think we know, and Levinas’s description of that transcendent ideal of a dialogue beyond reciprocity. These perspectives break open our certainty that tribalism and individualism are fundamental, placing them instead as secondary phenomena that, though powerful, pronounce neither the initial nor the final word on our life together

Radicalism and the limits of reform : the case of John Reed

Poet, journalist, editorial board member of the Masses and founding member of the Communist Labor Party, John Reed is a hero in both the worlds of cultural and political radicalism. This paper shows how his development through pre-World War One Bohemia and into left wing politics was part of a larger movement of middle class youngsters who were in that era in reaction against the reform mentality of their parent's generation. Reed and his peers were critical of the following, common reformist views: that economic individualism is the engine of progress; that the ideas and morals of WASP America are superior to those of all other ethnic groups; that the practical constitutes the best approach to social life. By tracing Reed's development on these issues one can see that his generation was critical of a larger cultural view, a system of beliefs common to middle class reformers and conservatives alike. Their revolt was thus primarily cultural, one which tested the psychic boundaries, the definitions of humanity, that reformers shared as part of their class

Marx\u27s Political Universalism

My main aim in this paper is to arrive at a defensible form of Marxian or socialist political universalism through a critical examination of Marx\u27s own political universalism. In the next section, I will outline several moral errors that Walzer ascribes to political universalism, including Marx\u27s, and show that Walzer largely misdirects his criticisms because what primarily accounts for Marx committing the errors is his Hegelian metaphysical conception of history, not his political universalism as such

Kant, Guyer, and Tomasello on the Capacity to Recognize the Humanity of Others

On the surface Kant himself seems quite clear about who is deserving of respect: The morally relevant others are all “rational, free beings” or all “human beings.” It is clear, however, that Kant does not want to identify “human beings” in this sense with members of a particular biological species, for he is explicitly open to the idea that there might be non-biologically human rational beings. Thus, for example he is explicitly open to the possibility of extraterrestrial rational beings, who would not be members of the same biological species as us, but who would, presumably be worthy of respect. And it would seem possible that there are members of our biological species who are not “human” in the morally relevant sense. Given these facts, a Kantian needs to give some account of how we are to recognize who or what counts as “human” in the morally relevant sense. I argue that to be “human” in the morally relevant sense is to have the capacity for morality, and that this involves: (a) the capacity to recognize others as ends rather than merely as means and (b) the capacity to enter into relations of ethical community with us. I defend a position I name moral reliabilism. According to this position: (a) We have a quasi-perceptual capacity to directly ascribe moral status to various bits of the world around us. I will argue that this capacity is best thought of in Gibsonian terms as a capacity to pick up on certain types of social affordances; morally relevant others have the capacity to engage in ethical interaction with us, and recognizing the humanity of others involves picking up on this capacity. Those beings who are “human” in the morally relevant sense, then, afford interaction based on mutual respect. (b) We should assume as a postulate of practical reason that this capacity is reliable (although fallible)

The Limits of Anthropocene Narratives

The rapidly growing transdisciplinary enthusiasm about developing new kinds of Anthropocene stories is based on the shared assumption that the Anthropocene predicament is best made sense of by narrative means. Against this assumption, this article argues that the challenge we are facing today does not merely lie in telling either scientific, socio-political, or entangled Anthropocene narratives to come to terms with our current condition. Instead, the challenge lies in coming to grips with how the stories we can tell in the Anthropocene relate to the radical novelty of the Anthropocene condition about which no stories can be told. What we need to find are meaningful ways to reconcile an inherited commitment to narrativization and the collapse of storytelling as a vehicle of understanding the Anthropocene as our current predicament