Does greater accountability improve the quality of delivery of public services? Evidence from Uganda

While the importance of corruption as a possible impediment to foreign investment in an international context is now well realized, it is not clear to what extent corruption affects, either directly through bribe-taking or indirectly through inadequate quality of public services, the level of economic activity by domestic entrepreneurs. Using a large survey from Uganda, the authors show that domestic and foreign entrepreneurs, government officials, and households are unanimous in highlighting the pervasiveness and importance of corruption. Efforts to establish institutions to deal with corrupt practices have not been matched by public education on the proper procedures. The fact that such lack of knowledge on procedures to report corruption increases households'risk of being subject to bribery and significantly reduces the quality of public service delivery leads the authors to conclude that improved accountability will be important to reduce the incidence of corruption and improve delivery of public services.Decentralization,Enterprise Development&Reform,Corruption&Anitcorruption Law,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,Poverty Monitoring&Analysis,Corruption&Anitcorruption Law,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,TF054599-PHRD-KYRGYZ REPUBLIC: WATER MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROJECT,Governance Indicators,National Governance

Does Aid Improve Public Service Delivery?

The expected increase in aid to Africa will put a big challenge for public service delivery. Using a simultaneous equation model, this paper provides an analysis of the effects of the volume and volatility of aid on education, health, water and sanitation outcomes, taking also into account the institutions related to public service delivery, including freedom of press, corruption and decentralization. Overall, the share of official development assistance (ODA) that is provided for education and health seems to have a positive impact on the outcomes in these sectors, whereas total aid seems to be negatively associated. Aid volatility is associated with better outcomes in sanitation, water and infant mortality, contrary to expectations.public expenditure, aid, education, health, water, sanitation, Africa

Corruption and decentralized public governance

This paper examines the conceptual and empirical basis of corruption and governance and concludes that decentralized local governance is conducive to reduced corruption in the long run. This is because localization helps to break the monopoly of power at the national level by bringing decisionmaking closer to people. Localization strengthens government accountability to citizens by involving citizens in monitoring government performance and demanding corrective actions. Localization as a means to making government responsive and accountable to people can help reduce corruption and improve service delivery. Efforts to improve service delivery usually force the authorities to address corruption and its causes. However, one must pay attention to the institutional environment and the risk of local capture by elites. In the institutional environments typical of some developing countries, when in a geographical area, feudal or industrial interests dominate and institutions of participation and accountability are weak or ineffective and political interference in local affairs is rampant, localization may increase opportunities for corruption. This suggests a pecking order of anticorruption policies and programs where the rule of law and citizen empowerment should be the first priority in any reform efforts. Localization in the absence of rule of law may not prove to be a potent remedy for combating corruption.National Governance,Governance Indicators,Corruption&Anitcorruption Law,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,Government Diagnostic Capacity Building

Audit risk and rent extraction: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in Brazil

We report results from a randomized policy experiment designed to test whether increased audit risk deters rent extraction in local public procurement and service delivery in Brazil. Our estimates suggest that temporarily increasing annual audit risk by about 20 percentage points reduced the proportion of irregular local procurement processes by about 17 percentage points. This reduction was driven entirely by irregularities involving mismanagement or corruption. In contrast, we find no evidence that increased audit risk affected the quality of publicly provided preventive and primary health care services -measured based on user satisfaction surveys- or compliance with national regulations of the conditional cash transfer program "Bolsa Família".Corruption, Rents, Local Governments, Law Enforcement

How does bribery affect public service delivery ? micro-evidence from service users and public officials in Peru

When seeking a public service, users may be required to pay in bribes more than the official price. Consequently, some users may be discouraged and choose not to seek a service due to the higher price imposed by the bribery"tax."This paper explores the price and quantity components of the relationship between governance and service delivery using micro-level survey data. The authors construct new measures of governance using data from users of public services from 13 government agencies in Peru. For some basic services, low-income users pay a larger share of their income than wealthier ones do; that is, the bribery tax is regressive. Where there are substitute private providers, low-income users appear to be discouraged more often and not to seek basic services. Thus, bribery may penalize poorer users twice - acting as a regressive tax and discouraging access to basic services. The paper explores the characteristics of households seeking public services. Higher education and age are associated with higher probability of being discouraged. Trust in state institutions decreases the probability of being discouraged, while knowledge of mechanisms to report corruption and extent of social network increase it, suggesting that households may rely on substitutes through networks. The study complements the household analysis with supply-side analysis based on data from public officials, and constructs agency-level measures for access to public services and institutional factors. Econometric results suggest that corruption reduces the supply of services, while voice mechanisms and clarity of the public agency's mission increase it.Governance Indicators,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,National Governance,Public Sector Management and Reform,Public Sector Economics&Finance

Redressing grievances and complaints regarding basic service delivery

Redress procedures are important for basic fairness. In addition, they can help address principal-agent problems in the implementation of social policies and provide information to policy makers regarding policy design. To function effectively, a system of redress requires a well-designed and inter-linked supply of redress procedures as well as, especially if rights consciousness is not well-developed in a society, a set of organizations that stimulate and aggregate demand for redress. On the supply side, this paper identifies three kinds of redress procedures: administrative venues within government agencies, independent institutions outside government departments, and courts. On the demand side, the key institutions are nongovernmental organizations/civil society organizations and the news media, both of which require a receptive political and economic climate to function effectively. Overall, procedures for redressing grievances and complaints regarding basic service delivery are under-developed in many countries, and deserve further analysis, piloting, and support.Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,Corruption&Anticorruption Law,Public Sector Regulation,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Governance Indicators

Corruption and Decentralisation: Some Evidence in Indonesia

This paper seeks to disentangle the relationship between decentralisation andcorruption In Indonesia. The implementations of decentralisation in Indonesia in2001, on one hand give an opportunity for local government for more responsiveand accountable to citizens. Therefore, service delivery will improve and corruptionwill decline. On the other hand, more decentralisation has a positive impact oncorruption, raising individual propensity to accept bribes due to an increasing anopportunities for corruption at local level. Some studies show that the implementationof decentralisation in Indonesia tends to an increasing in corruption at local level.However, some local governments have an initiative to addressing the problem ofcorruption through several approaches

Making services work : indicators, assessments, and benchmarking of the quality and governance of public service delivery in the human development sectors

Improving governance is central to improving results in human development. It is clear that money is not enough: improved outcomes from service delivery require better governance, including mechanisms for holding service providers accountable and appropriate incentives for performance. There is therefore a growing demand for indicators to measure how and whether these processes work, and how they affect health and education results. This paper makes the case for measuring governance policies and performance, and the quality of service delivery in health and education. It develops a framework for selecting and measuring a set of indicators and proposes options, drawing from new and innovative measurement tools and approaches. The paper proposes the adoption of a more systematic approach that will both facilitate the work of health and education policymakers and allow for cross-country comparisons and benchmarking.Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Governance Indicators,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,Poverty Monitoring&Analysis,Public Sector Expenditure Policy

Does aid improve public service delivery?

The expected increase in aid to Africa will put a big challenge for public service delivery. Using a simultaneous equation model, this paper provides an analysis of the effects of the volume and volatility of aid on education, health, water and sanitation outcomes, taking also into account the institutions related to public service delivery, including freedom of press, corruption and decentralization. Overall, the share of official development assistance (ODA) that is provided for education and health seems to have a positive impact on the outcomes in these sectors, whereas total aid seems to be negatively associated. Aid volatility is associated with better outcomes in sanitation, water and infant mortality, contrary to expectations