382,392 research outputs found
Sequential circuit design in quantum-dot cellular automata
In this work we present a novel probabilistic modeling scheme for sequential circuit design in quantum-dot cellular automata(QCA) technology. Clocked QCA circuits possess an inherent direction for flow of information which can be effectively modeled using Bayesian networks (BN). In sequential circuit design this presents a problem due to the presence of feedback cycles since BN are direct acyclic graphs (DAG). The model presented in this work can be constructed from a logic design layout in QCA and is shown to be a dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN). DBN are very powerful in modeling higher order spatial and temporal correlations that are present in most of the sequential circuits. The attractive feature of this graphical probabilistic model is that that it not only makes the dependency relationships amongst node explicit, but it also serves as a computational mechanism for probabilistic inference. We analyze our work by modeling clocked QCA circuits for SR F/F, JK F/F and RAM designs
- SEQUENTIAL DECISIONS IN THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM
This paper studies the sequential mechanisms which mimic matching procedures formany-to-one-real-life matching markets. We provide a family of mechanisms implementing thestudentÂŽ optimal allocation in subgame perfect equibrium.Matching, Implementation, Mechanism Design
Budget Constrained Auctions with Heterogeneous Items
In this paper, we present the first approximation algorithms for the problem
of designing revenue optimal Bayesian incentive compatible auctions when there
are multiple (heterogeneous) items and when bidders can have arbitrary demand
and budget constraints. Our mechanisms are surprisingly simple: We show that a
sequential all-pay mechanism is a 4 approximation to the revenue of the optimal
ex-interim truthful mechanism with discrete correlated type space for each
bidder. We also show that a sequential posted price mechanism is a O(1)
approximation to the revenue of the optimal ex-post truthful mechanism when the
type space of each bidder is a product distribution that satisfies the standard
hazard rate condition. We further show a logarithmic approximation when the
hazard rate condition is removed, and complete the picture by showing that
achieving a sub-logarithmic approximation, even for regular distributions and
one bidder, requires pricing bundles of items. Our results are based on
formulating novel LP relaxations for these problems, and developing generic
rounding schemes from first principles. We believe this approach will be useful
in other Bayesian mechanism design contexts.Comment: Final version accepted to STOC '10. Incorporates significant reviewer
comment
Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem.
This paper studies sequential mechanisms which mimic a matching procedures for many-to-one real life matching markets. We provide a family of mechanisms implementing the students' optimal allocation in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.Matching markets; College admission problems; Mechanism design;
Sequential Deliberation for Social Choice
In large scale collective decision making, social choice is a normative study
of how one ought to design a protocol for reaching consensus. However, in
instances where the underlying decision space is too large or complex for
ordinal voting, standard voting methods of social choice may be impractical.
How then can we design a mechanism - preferably decentralized, simple,
scalable, and not requiring any special knowledge of the decision space - to
reach consensus? We propose sequential deliberation as a natural solution to
this problem. In this iterative method, successive pairs of agents bargain over
the decision space using the previous decision as a disagreement alternative.
We describe the general method and analyze the quality of its outcome when the
space of preferences define a median graph. We show that sequential
deliberation finds a 1.208- approximation to the optimal social cost on such
graphs, coming very close to this value with only a small constant number of
agents sampled from the population. We also show lower bounds on simpler
classes of mechanisms to justify our design choices. We further show that
sequential deliberation is ex-post Pareto efficient and has truthful reporting
as an equilibrium of the induced extensive form game. We finally show that for
general metric spaces, the second moment of of the distribution of social cost
of the outcomes produced by sequential deliberation is also bounded
Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment
We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for mechanism design with
limited commitment. We identify a canonical class of mechanisms rich enough to
replicate the payoffs of any equilibrium in a mechanism-selection game between
an uninformed designer and a privately informed agent. A cornerstone of our
methodology is the idea that a mechanism should encode not only the rules that
determine the allocation, but also the information the designer obtains from
the interaction with the agent. Therefore, how much the designer learns, which
is the key tension in design with limited commitment, becomes an explicit part
of the design. We show how this insight can be used to transform the designer's
problem into a constrained optimization one: To the usual truthtelling and
participation constraints, one must add the designer's sequential rationality
constraint.Comment: Added an omitted assumption in Section 4 (see footnote 21 and the
proof of Proposition 4.1
Dividing the Indivisible: Procedures for Allocating Cabinet Ministries to Political Parties in a Parliamentary System
Political parties in Northern Ireland recently used a divisor method of apportionment to choose, in sequence, ten cabinet ministries. If the parties have complete information about each others' preferences, we show that it may not be rational for them to act sincerely by choosing their most-preferred ministry that is available. One consequence of acting sophisticatedly is that the resulting allocation may not be Pareto-optimal, making all the parties worse off. Another is nonmonotonicty-choosing earlier may hurt rather than help a party. We introduce a mechanism that combines sequential choices with a structured form of trading that results in sincere choices for two parties. Although there are difficulties in extending this mechanism to more than two parties, other approaches are explored, such as permitting parties to making consecutive choices not prescribed by an apportionment method. But certain problems, such as eliminating envy, remain.APPORTIONMENT METHODS; CABINETS; SEQUENTIAL ALLOCATION; MECHANISM DESIGN; FAIRNESS
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