Psychick Order

Preserving Psychick Order is an investigation into the subliminal, of a body processing trauma and transition. I explore how my mind and body filter memory, fear, and the impact of the past into the present. Since childhood, making dolls has been a way for me to express complex feelings, especially as they relate to dynamics between biological and found family. By tenderly modeling dolls after my own transforming physical features and mental processes, I make connections between the effects of my mind on my body and vice versa. I like to describe the resulting forms as queer monsters trying to camouflage themselves poorly in my parents’ home in rural Georgia. Unconscious becomes conscious, inside moves outward, and unmasking realizes the self and the trickster within

Model for Human, Artificial & Collective Consciousness (Part I)

Borrowing the functional modeling approach common in systems and software engineering, an implementable model of the functions of human consciousness proposed to have the capacity for general problem solving ability transferable to any domain, or true self-aware intelligence, is presented. Being a functional model that is independent of implementation, this model is proposed to also be applicable to artificial consciousness, and to platforms that organize individuals into what is defined here as a first order collective consciousness, or at higher orders into what is defined here as Nth order collective consciousness. Part I of this two-part article includes: Summary; Introduction; Set of Postulates One; Set of Postulates Two; Overview of the Model; Model of Homeostasis; Model of the Functional Units; Model of the Body System; Model of the Other Basic Life Processes; Model of the Other Functional Systems; Model of Perceptions in the Perceptual Fields; Model of Body Processes as Paths in the Perceptual Field; & Model of Conscious Awarenes

The Mediating Role of Self-conscious Emotions, Disconnection and Rejection in the Relationship between Maternal Separation and Suicidal Ideation

Introduction: Suicide is one of the major health problems and challenges in the world, which hasvarious social, psychological, economic, and cultural dimensions. This study aims to determine themediating role of self-conscious emotions and the domain of disconnection and rejection schemasin the relationship between maternal psychological separation and suicidal ideation.Method: This study was a descriptive cross-sectional study. The sample consisted of 573 studentsfrom Tehran who were selected through multi-stage cluster sampling. In this study, the YoungSchema Questionnaire (YSQ), Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA-3), Psychological SeparationInventory (PSI), and the Beck Scale for Suicide Ideation (BSSI) were used. Data were analyzedusing structural equation modeling with SPSS 21 and AMOS 24 software.Results: The results showed a significant and indirect effect of maternal separation variable onsuicidal ideation (β = 0. 145, p<0.05), a significant and indirect effect of disconnection schema onsuicidal ideation (β = 0.040, p<0.05), and the indirect and significant effect of maternal separationvariable on the self-conscious emotions variable (β = 0.104, p<0.05). The results also revealed thatthe path coefficient of separation from the mother to suicidal ideation (0.01) and self-consciousemotions (-0.01) were not significant.Conclusion: The results of the fitted model data analysis showed that psychological separationfrom the mother, mediated by the domain of disconnection and rejection schemas, predicts suicidalideation. Clinical interventions are recommended to be conducted for identifying and targetingschemas, particularly the domain of disconnection and rejection ones, in order to prevent suicidalideation and thoughts or repair and control them

Statistical and Mathematical Modeling versus NHST? There’s No Competition!

Some of Robinson & Levin’s critique of Rodgers (2010) is cogent, helpful, and insightful – although limiting. Recent methodology has advanced through the development of structural equation modeling, multi-level modeling, missing data methods, hierarchical linear modeling, categorical data analysis, as well as the development of many dedicated and specific behavioral models. These methodological approaches are based on a revised epistemological system, and have emerged naturally, without the need for task forces, or even much self-conscious discussion. The original goal was neither to develop nor promote a modeling revolution. That has occurred; I documented its development and its status. Two organizing principles are presented that show how both perspectives can be reconciled and accommodated. A program of research that could not have occurred within the standard NHST epistemology, without a modeling perspective, is discussed. An historical and cross-disciplinary analogy suggests their view is similar to Galileo’s world view, whereas some branches of social and behavioral science may be ready for something closer to a Newtonian perspective

Model for Human, Artificial & Collective Consciousness (Part I)

Borrowing the functional modeling approach common in systems and software engineering, an implementable model of the functions of human consciousness proposed to have the capacity for general problem solving ability transferable to any domain, or true self-aware intelligence, is presented. Being a functional model that is independent of implementation, this model is proposed to also be applicable to artificial consciousness, and to platforms that organize individuals into what is defined here as a first order collective consciousness, or at higher orders into what is defined here as Nth order collective consciousness. Part I of this two-part article includes: Summary; Introduction; Set of Postulates One; Set of Postulates Two; Overview of the Model; Model of Homeostasis; Model of the Functional Units; Model of the Body System; Model of the Other Basic Life Processes; Model of the Other Functional Systems; Model of Perceptions in the Perceptual Fields; Model of Body Processes as Paths in the Perceptual Field; & Model of Conscious Awarenes

Hard, Harder, and the Hardest Problem: The Society of Cognitive Selves

The hard problem of consciousness is explicating how moving matter becomes thinking matter. Harder yet is the problem of spelling out the mutual determinations of individual experiences and the experiencing self. Determining how the collective social consciousness influences and is influenced by the individual selves constituting the society is the hardest problem. Drawing parallels between individual cognition and the collective knowing of mathematical science, here we present a conceptualization of the cognitive dimension of the self. Our abstraction of the relations between the physical world, biological brain, mind, intuition, consciousness, cognitive self, and the society can facilitate the construction of the conceptual repertoire required for an explicit science of the self within human society

Principles for Consciousness in Integrated Cognitive Control

In this article we will argue that given certain conditions for the evolution of bi- \ud ological controllers, these will necessarily evolve in the direction of incorporating \ud consciousness capabilities. We will also see what are the necessary mechanics for \ud the provision of these capabilities and extrapolate this vision to the world of artifi- \ud cial systems postulating seven design principles for conscious systems. This article \ud was published in the journal Neural Networks special issue on brain and conscious- \ud ness

The pre-scientific concept of a "soul": A neurophenomenological hypothesis about its origin.

In this contribution I will argue that our traditional, folk-phenomenological concept of a "soul� may have its origins in accurate and truthful first-person reports about the experiential content of a specific neurophenomenological state-class. This class of phenomenal states is called the "Out-of-body experience� (OBE hereafter), and I will offer a detailed description in section 3 of this paper. The relevant type of conscious experience seems to possess a culturally invariant cluster of functional and phenomenal core properties: it is a specific kind of conscious experience, which can in principle be undergone by every human being. I propose that it probably is one of the most central semantic roots of our everyday, folk-phenomenological idea of what a soul actually is

The *subjectivity* of subjective experience - A representationalist analysis of the first-person perspective

This is a brief and accessible English summary of the "Self-model Theory of Subjectivity" (SMT), which is only available as German book in this archive. It introduces two new theoretical entities, the "phenomenal self-model" (PSM) and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality-relation" PMIR. A representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person persepctive is offered. This is a revised version, including two pictures

Why are identity disorders interesting for philosophers?

"Identity disorders" constitute a large class of psychiatric disturbances that, due to deviant forms ofself-modeling, result in dramatic changes in the patients' phenomenal experience of their own personal identity. The phenomenal experience of selfhood and transtemporal identity can vary along an extremely large number of dimensions: There are simple losses of content (for example, complete losses of proprioception, resulting in a "bodiless" state of self-consciousness, see Cole 1995, Gallagher and Cole 1995, Sacks 1998). There are also various typologies of phenomenal disintegration as in schizophrenia, in depersonalization disorders and in Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), sometimes accompanied by multiplications of the phenomenal self within one and the same physical system. It is important to not only analyze these state-classes in terms of functional deficits or phenomenology alone, but as self-representational content as well. For instance, in the second type of cases just mentioned, we confront major redistributions of the phenomenal property of "mineness" in representational space, of what is sometimes also called the "sense of ownership". Finally, there are at least four different delusions of misidentification (DM1; namely Capgras syndrome, Frégoli syndrome, intermetamorphosis, reverse intermetamorphosis and reduplicative paramnesia). Being a philosopher, I will discuss two particular types of identity disorder in this contribution - disorders, which are of direct philosophical relevance: A specific form of DM, and the Cotard delusion. Why should philosophers do this? And why should psychiatrists care