A holistic approach for measuring the survivability of SCADA systems

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are responsible for controlling and monitoring Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and Critical Infrastructure Systems (CIS) among others. Such systems are responsible to provide services our society relies on such as gas, electricity, and water distribution. They process our waste; manage our railways and our traffic. Nevertheless to say, they are vital for our society and any disruptions on such systems may produce from financial disasters to ultimately loss of lives. SCADA systems have evolved over the years, from standalone, proprietary solutions and closed networks into large-scale, highly distributed software systems operating over open networks such as the internet. In addition, the hardware and software utilised by SCADA systems is now, in most cases, based on COTS (Commercial Off-The-Shelf) solutions. As they evolved they became vulnerable to malicious attacks. Over the last few years there is a push from the computer security industry on adapting their security tools and techniques to address the security issues of SCADA systems. Such move is welcome however is not sufficient, otherwise successful malicious attacks on computer systems would be non-existent. We strongly believe that rather than trying to stop and detect every attack on SCADA systems it is imperative to focus on providing critical services in the presence of malicious attacks. Such motivation is similar with the concepts of survivability, a discipline integrates areas of computer science such as performance, security, fault-tolerance and reliability. In this thesis we present a new concept of survivability; Holistic survivability is an analysis framework suitable for a new era of data-driven networked systems. It extends the current view of survivability by incorporating service interdependencies as a key property and aspects of machine learning. The framework uses the formalism of probabilistic graphical models to quantify survivability and introduces new metrics and heuristics to learn and identify essential services automatically. Current definitions of survivability are often limited since they either apply performance as measurement metric or use security metrics without any survivability context. Holistic survivability addresses such issues by providing a flexible framework where performance and security metrics can be tailored to the context of survivability. In other words, by applying performance and security our work aims to support key survivability properties such as recognition and resistance. The models and metrics here introduced are applied to SCADA systems as such systems insecurity is one of the motivations of this work. We believe that the proposed work goes beyond the current status of survivability models. Holistic survivability is flexible enough to support the addition of other metrics and can be easily used with different models. Because it is based on a well-known formalism its definition and implementation are easy to grasp and to apply. Perhaps more importantly, this proposed work is aimed to a new era where data is being produced and consumed on a large-scale. Holistic survivability aims to be the catalyst to new models based on data that will provide better and more accurate insights on the survivability of systems

Shifting Satellite Control Paradigms: Operational Cybersecurity in the Age of Megaconstellations

The introduction of automated satellite control systems into a space-mission environment historically dominated by human-in-the-loop operations will require a more focused understanding of cybersecurity measures to ensure space system safety and security. On the ground-segment side of satellite control, the debut of privately owned communication antennas for rent and a move to cloud-based operations or mission centers will bring new requirements for cyber protection for both Department of Defense and commercial satellite operations alike. It is no longer a matter of whether automation will be introduced to satellite operations, but how quickly satellite operators can adapt to the onset of control automation and promote cybersecurity in an increasingly competitive, contested, and congested space domain. To ensure the continued safety and security of on-orbit satellite systems, both the defense and commercial space sectors must adapt to the rapidly changing digital landscape of future space operations

Development of a Security Methodology for Cooperative Information Systems: The CooPSIS Project

Since networks and computing systems are vital components of today\u27s life, it is of utmost importance to endow them with the capability to survive physical and logical faults, as well as malicious or deliberate attacks. When the information system is obtained by federating pre-existing local systems, a methodology is needed to integrate security policies and mechanisms under a uniform structure. Therefore, in building distributed information systems, a methodology for analysis, design and implementation of security requirements of data and processes is essential for obtaining mutual trust between cooperating organizations. Moreover, when the information system is built as a cooperative set of e-services, security is related to the type of data, to the sensitivity context of the cooperative processes and to the security characteristics of the communication paradigms. The CoopSIS (Cooperative Secure Information Systems) project aims to develop methods and tools for the analysis, design, implementation and evaluation of secure and survivable distributed information systems of cooperative type, in particular with experimentation in the Public Administration Domain. This paper presents the basic issues of a methodology being conceived to build a trusted cooperative environment, where data sensitivity parameters and security requirements of processes are taken into account. The milestones phases of the security development methodology in the context of this project are illustrated

Survivability of Deterministic Dynamical Systems

The notion of a part of phase space containing desired (or allowed) states of a dynamical system is important in a wide range of complex systems research. It has been called the safe operating space, the viability kernel or the sunny region. In this paper we define the notion of survivability: Given a random initial condition, what is the likelihood that the transient behaviour of a deterministic system does not leave a region of desirable states. We demonstrate the utility of this novel stability measure by considering models from climate science, neuronal networks and power grids. We also show that a semi-analytic lower bound for the survivability of linear systems allows a numerically very efficient survivability analysis in realistic models of power grids. Our numerical and semi-analytic work underlines that the type of stability measured by survivability is not captured by common asymptotic stability measures.Comment: 21 pages, 6 figure

Survivability modeling for cyber-physical systems subject to data corruption

Cyber-physical critical infrastructures are created when traditional physical infrastructure is supplemented with advanced monitoring, control, computing, and communication capability. More intelligent decision support and improved efficacy, dependability, and security are expected. Quantitative models and evaluation methods are required for determining the extent to which a cyber-physical infrastructure improves on its physical predecessors. It is essential that these models reflect both cyber and physical aspects of operation and failure. In this dissertation, we propose quantitative models for dependability attributes, in particular, survivability, of cyber-physical systems. Any malfunction or security breach, whether cyber or physical, that causes the system operation to depart from specifications will affect these dependability attributes. Our focus is on data corruption, which compromises decision support -- the fundamental role played by cyber infrastructure. The first research contribution of this work is a Petri net model for information exchange in cyber-physical systems, which facilitates i) evaluation of the extent of data corruption at a given time, and ii) illuminates the service degradation caused by propagation of corrupt data through the cyber infrastructure. In the second research contribution, we propose metrics and an evaluation method for survivability, which captures the extent of functionality retained by a system after a disruptive event. We illustrate the application of our methods through case studies on smart grids, intelligent water distribution networks, and intelligent transportation systems. Data, cyber infrastructure, and intelligent control are part and parcel of nearly every critical infrastructure that underpins daily life in developed countries. Our work provides means for quantifying and predicting the service degradation caused when cyber infrastructure fails to serve its intended purpose. It can also serve as the foundation for efforts to fortify critical systems and mitigate inevitable failures --Abstract, page iii

Survivability analogy for cloud computing

As cloud computing has become the most popular computing platform, and cloud-based applications a commonplace, the methods and mechanisms used to ensure their survivability is increasingly becoming paramount. One of the prevalent trends in recent times is a turn to nature for inspiration in developing and supporting highly survivable environments. This paper aims to address the problems of survivability in cloud environments through inspiration from nature. In particular, the community metaphor in nature's predator-prey systems where autonomous individuals' local decisions focus on ensuring the global survival of the community. Thus, we develop analogies for survivability in cloud computing based on a range of mechanisms which we view as key determinants of prey's survival against predation. For this purpose we investigate some predator-prey systems that will form the basis for our analogical designs. Furthermore, due to a lack of a standardized definition of survivability, we propose a unified definition for survivability, which emphasizes as imperative, a high level of proactiveness to thwart black swan events, as well as high capacity to respond to insecurity in a timely and appropriate manner, inspired by prey's avoidance and anti-predation approaches. © 2017 IEEE