1 research outputs found
Secure Compute-and-Forward in a Bidirectional Relay
We consider the basic bidirectional relaying problem, in which two users in a
wireless network wish to exchange messages through an intermediate relay node.
In the compute-and-forward strategy, the relay computes a function of the two
messages using the naturally-occurring sum of symbols simultaneously
transmitted by user nodes in a Gaussian multiple access (MAC) channel, and the
computed function value is forwarded to the user nodes in an ensuing broadcast
phase. In this paper, we study the problem under an additional security
constraint, which requires that each user's message be kept secure from the
relay. We consider two types of security constraints: perfect secrecy, in which
the MAC channel output seen by the relay is independent of each user's message;
and strong secrecy, which is a form of asymptotic independence. We propose a
coding scheme based on nested lattices, the main feature of which is that given
a pair of nested lattices that satisfy certain "goodness" properties, we can
explicitly specify probability distributions for randomization at the encoders
to achieve the desired security criteria. In particular, our coding scheme
guarantees perfect or strong secrecy even in the absence of channel noise. The
noise in the channel only affects reliability of computation at the relay, and
for Gaussian noise, we derive achievable rates for reliable and secure
computation. We also present an application of our methods to the multi-hop
line network in which a source needs to transmit messages to a destination
through a series of intermediate relays.Comment: v1 is a much expanded and updated version of arXiv:1204.6350; v2 is a
minor revision to fix some notational issues; v3 is a much expanded and
updated version of v2, and contains results on both perfect secrecy and
strong secrecy; v3 is a revised manuscript submitted to the IEEE Transactions
on Information Theory in April 201