1,945 research outputs found
Securing the RTP framework: why RTP does not mandate a single media security solution
This memo discusses the problem of securing real-time multimedia
sessions, and explains why the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP),
and the associated RTP control protocol (RTCP), do not mandate a
single media security mechanism. Guidelines for designers and
reviewers of future RTP extensions are provided, to ensure that
appropriate security mechanisms are mandated, and that any such
mechanisms are specified in a manner that conforms with the RTP
architecture
Reflections on security options for the real-time transport protocol framework
The Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) supports a range of video conferencing, telephony, and streaming video ap- plications, but offers few native security features. We discuss the problem of securing RTP, considering the range of applications. We outline why this makes RTP a difficult protocol to secure, and describe the approach we have recently proposed in the IETF to provide security for RTP applications. This approach treats RTP as a framework with a set of extensible security building blocks, and prescribes mandatory-to-implement security at the level of different application classes, rather than at the level of the media transport protocol
Multimedia congestion control: circuit breakers for unicast RTP sessions
The Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) is widely used in telephony, video conferencing, and telepresence applications. Such applications are often run on best-effort UDP/IP networks. If congestion control is not implemented in these applications, then network congestion can lead to uncontrolled packet loss and a resulting deterioration of the user's multimedia experience. The congestion control algorithm acts as a safety measure by stopping RTP flows from using excessive resources and protecting the network from overload. At the time of this writing, however, while there are several proprietary solutions, there is no standard algorithm for congestion control of interactive RTP flows. This document does not propose a congestion control algorithm. It instead defines a minimal set of RTP circuit breakers: conditions under which an RTP sender needs to stop transmitting media data to protect the network from excessive congestion. It is expected that, in the absence of long-lived excessive congestion, RTP applications running on best-effort IP networks will be able to operate without triggering these circuit breakers. To avoid triggering the RTP circuit breaker, any Standards Track congestion control algorithms defined for RTP will need to operate within the envelope set by these RTP circuit breaker algorithms
Options for Securing RTP Sessions
The Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) is used in a large number of
different application domains and environments. This heterogeneity
implies that different security mechanisms are needed to provide
services such as confidentiality, integrity, and source
authentication of RTP and RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) packets
suitable for the various environments. The range of solutions makes
it difficult for RTP-based application developers to pick the most
suitable mechanism. This document provides an overview of a number
of security solutions for RTP and gives guidance for developers on
how to choose the appropriate security mechanism
Using Transcoding for Hidden Communication in IP Telephony
The paper presents a new steganographic method for IP telephony called
TranSteg (Transcoding Steganography). Typically, in steganographic
communication it is advised for covert data to be compressed in order to limit
its size. In TranSteg it is the overt data that is compressed to make space for
the steganogram. The main innovation of TranSteg is to, for a chosen voice
stream, find a codec that will result in a similar voice quality but smaller
voice payload size than the originally selected. Then, the voice stream is
transcoded. At this step the original voice payload size is intentionally
unaltered and the change of the codec is not indicated. Instead, after placing
the transcoded voice payload, the remaining free space is filled with hidden
data. TranSteg proof of concept implementation was designed and developed. The
obtained experimental results are enclosed in this paper. They prove that the
proposed method is feasible and offers a high steganographic bandwidth.
TranSteg detection is difficult to perform when performing inspection in a
single network localisation.Comment: 17 pages, 16 figures, 4 table
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