3 research outputs found
Detecting ADS-B Spoofing Attacks using Deep Neural Networks
The Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) system is a key
component of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) that
manages the increasingly congested airspace. It provides accurate aircraft
localization and efficient air traffic management and also improves the safety
of billions of current and future passengers. While the benefits of ADS-B are
well known, the lack of basic security measures like encryption and
authentication introduces various exploitable security vulnerabilities. One
practical threat is the ADS-B spoofing attack that targets the ADS-B ground
station, in which the ground-based or aircraft-based attacker manipulates the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) address (a unique identifier
for each aircraft) in the ADS-B messages to fake the appearance of non-existent
aircraft or masquerade as a trusted aircraft. As a result, this attack can
confuse the pilots or the air traffic control personnel and cause dangerous
maneuvers. In this paper, we introduce SODA - a two-stage Deep Neural Network
(DNN)-based spoofing detector for ADS-B that consists of a message classifier
and an aircraft classifier. It allows a ground station to examine each incoming
message based on the PHY-layer features (e.g., IQ samples and phases) and flag
suspicious messages. Our experimental results show that SODA detects
ground-based spoofing attacks with a probability of 99.34%, while having a very
small false alarm rate (i.e., 0.43%). It outperforms other machine learning
techniques such as XGBoost, Logistic Regression, and Support Vector Machine. It
further identifies individual aircraft with an average F-score of 96.68% and an
accuracy of 96.66%, with a significant improvement over the state-of-the-art
detector.Comment: Accepted to IEEE CNS 201
GNSS Spoofing Detection via Opportunistic IRIDIUM Signals
In this paper, we study the privately-own IRIDIUM satellite constellation, to
provide a location service that is independent of the GNSS. In particular, we
apply our findings to propose a new GNSS spoofing detection solution,
exploiting unencrypted IRIDIUM Ring Alert (IRA) messages that are broadcast by
IRIDIUM satellites. We firstly reverse-engineer many parameters of the IRIDIUM
satellite constellation, such as the satellites speed, packet interarrival
times, maximum satellite coverage, satellite pass duration, and the satellite
beam constellation, to name a few. Later, we adopt the aforementioned
statistics to create a detailed model of the satellite network. Subsequently,
we propose a solution to detect unintended deviations of a target user from his
path, due to GNSS spoofing attacks. We show that our solution can be used
efficiently and effectively to verify the position estimated from standard GNSS
satellite constellation, and we provide constraints and parameters to fit
several application scenarios. All the results reported in this paper, while
showing the quality and viability of our proposal, are supported by real data.
In particular, we have collected and analyzed hundreds of thousands of IRA
messages, thanks to a measurement campaign lasting several days. All the
collected data ( hours) have been made available to the research
community. Our solution is particularly suitable for unattended scenarios such
as deserts, rural areas, or open seas, where standard spoofing detection
techniques resorting to crowd-sourcing cannot be used due to deployment
limitations. Moreover, contrary to competing solutions, our approach does not
resort to physical-layer information, dedicated hardware, or multiple receiving
stations, while exploiting only a single receiving antenna and
publicly-available IRIDIUM transmissions. Finally, novel research directions
are also highlighted.Comment: Accepted for the 13th Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless
and Mobile Networks (WISEC), 202