PS-TRUST: Provably Secure Solution for Truthful Double Spectrum Auctions

Truthful spectrum auctions have been extensively studied in recent years. Truthfulness makes bidders bid their true valuations, simplifying greatly the analysis of auctions. However, revealing one's true valuation causes severe privacy disclosure to the auctioneer and other bidders. To make things worse, previous work on secure spectrum auctions does not provide adequate security. In this paper, based on TRUST, we propose PS-TRUST, a provably secure solution for truthful double spectrum auctions. Besides maintaining the properties of truthfulness and special spectrum reuse of TRUST, PS-TRUST achieves provable security against semi-honest adversaries in the sense of cryptography. Specifically, PS-TRUST reveals nothing about the bids to anyone in the auction, except the auction result. To the best of our knowledge, PS-TRUST is the first provably secure solution for spectrum auctions. Furthermore, experimental results show that the computation and communication overhead of PS-TRUST is modest, and its practical applications are feasible.Comment: 9 pages, 4 figures, submitted to Infocom 201

Quantum Private Comparison: A Review

As an important branch of quantum secure multiparty computation, quantum private comparison (QPC) has attracted more and more attention recently. In this paper, according to the quantum implementation mechanism that these protocols used, we divide these protocols into three categories: The quantum cryptography QPC, the superdense coding QPC, and the entanglement swapping QPC. And then, a more in-depth analysis on the research progress, design idea, and substantive characteristics of corresponding QPC categories is carried out, respectively. Finally, the applications of QPC and quantum secure multi-party computation issues are discussed and, in addition, three possible research mainstream directions are pointed out

Quantum sealed-bid auction using a modified scheme for multiparty circular quantum key agreement

A feasible, secure and collusion-attack-free quantum sealed-bid auction protocol is proposed using a modified scheme for multi-party circular quantum key agreement. In the proposed protocol, the set of all ($n$) bidders is grouped in to $l$ subsets (sub-circles) in such a way that only the initiator (who prepares the quantum state to be distributed for a particular round of communication and acts as the receiver in that round) is a member of all the subsets (sub-circles) prepared for a particular round, while any other bidder is part of only a single subset. All $n$ bidders and auctioneer initiate one round of communication, and each of them prepares $l$ copies of a $\left(r-1\right)$-partite entangled state (one for each sub-circle), where $r=\frac{n}{l}+1$. The efficiency and security\textcolor{blue}{{} }of the proposed protocol are critically analyzed. It is shown that the proposed protocol is free from the collusion attacks that are possible on the existing schemes of quantum sealed-bid auction. Further, it is observed that the security against collusion attack increases with the increase in $l$, but that reduces the complexity (number of entangled qubits in each entangled state) of the entangled states to be used and that makes the scheme scalable and implementable with the available technologies. The additional security and scalability is shown to arise due to the use of a circular structure in place of a complete-graph or tree-type structure used earlier.Comment: 10 pages, 2 figure

Trustee: Full Privacy Preserving Vickrey Auction on top of Ethereum

The wide deployment of tokens for digital assets on top of Ethereum implies the need for powerful trading platforms. Vickrey auctions have been known to determine the real market price of items as bidders are motivated to submit their own monetary valuations without leaking their information to the competitors. Recent constructions have utilized various cryptographic protocols such as ZKP and MPC, however, these approaches either are partially privacy-preserving or require complex computations with several rounds. In this paper, we overcome these limits by presenting Trustee as a Vickrey auction on Ethereum which fully preserves bids' privacy at relatively much lower fees. Trustee consists of three components: a front-end smart contract deployed on Ethereum, an Intel SGX enclave, and a relay to redirect messages between them. Initially, the enclave generates an Ethereum account and ECDH key-pair. Subsequently, the relay publishes the account's address and ECDH public key on the smart contract. As a prerequisite, bidders are encouraged to verify the authenticity and security of Trustee by using the SGX remote attestation service. To participate in the auction, bidders utilize the ECDH public key to encrypt their bids and submit them to the smart contract. Once the bidding interval is closed, the relay retrieves the encrypted bids and feeds them to the enclave that autonomously generates a signed transaction indicating the auction winner. Finally, the relay submits the transaction to the smart contract which verifies the transaction's authenticity and the parameters' consistency before accepting the claimed auction winner. As part of our contributions, we have made a prototype for Trustee available on Github for the community to review and inspect it. Additionally, we analyze the security features of Trustee and report on the transactions' gas cost incurred on Trustee smart contract.Comment: Presented at Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2019, 3rd Workshop on Trusted Smart Contract