Categoricity, Open-Ended Schemas and Peano Arithmetic

One of the philosophical uses of Dedekind’s categoricity theorem for Peano Arithmetic is to provide support for semantic realism. To this end, the logical framework in which the proof of the theorem is conducted becomes highly significant. I examine different proposals regarding these logical frameworks and focus on the philosophical benefits of adopting open-ended schemas in contrast to second order logic as the logical medium of the proof. I investigate Pederson and Rossberg’s critique of the ontological advantages of open-ended arithmetic when it comes to establishing the categoricity of Peano Arithmetic and show that the critique is highly problematic. I argue that Pederson and Rossberg’s ontological criterion deliver the bizarre result that certain first order subsystems of Peano Arithmetic have a second order ontology. As a consequence, the application of the ontological criterion proposed by Pederson and Rossberg assigns a certain type of ontology to a theory, and a different, richer, ontology to one of its subtheories

Second order logic, set theory and foundations of mathematics

The question, whether second order logic is a better foundation for mathematics than set theory, is addressed. The main difference between second order logic and set theory is that set theory builds up a transfinite cumulative hierarchy while second order logic stays within one application of the power sets. It is argued that in many ways this difference is illusory. More importantly, it is argued that the often stated difference, that second order logic has categorical characterizations of relevant mathematical structures, while set theory has non-standard models, amounts to no difference at all. Second order logic and set theory permit quite similar categoricity results on one hand, and similar non-standard models on the other hand.