Mechanism design for aggregating energy consumption and quality of service in speed scaling scheduling

We consider a strategic game, where players submit jobs to a machine that executes all jobs in a way that minimizes energy while respecting the given deadlines. The energy consumption is then charged to the players in some way. Each player wants to minimize the sum of that charge and of their job's deadline multiplied by a priority weight. Two charging schemes are studied, the proportional cost share which does not always admit pure Nash equilibria, and the marginal cost share, which does always admit pure Nash equilibria, at the price of overcharging by a constant factor

Scheduling under dynamic speed-scaling for minimizing weighted completion time and energy consumption

International audienceSince a few years there is an increasing interest in minimizing the energy consumption of computing systems. However in a shared computing system, users want to optimize their experienced quality of service, at the price of a high energy consumption. In this work, we address the problem of optimizing and designing mechanisms for a linear combination of weighted completion time and energy consumption on a single machine with dynamic speed-scaling. We show that minimizing linear combination reduces to a unit speed scheduling problem under a polynomial penalty function. In the mechanism design setting, we define a cost share mechanism and study its properties, showing that it is truthful and the overcharging of total cost share is bounded by a constant