The Permissible Reach of National Environmental Policies

Trading nations exchange tariff concessions in the context of trade liberalizing rounds. Tariffs, nonetheless, are not the only instrument affecting the value of a concession. Domestic instruments affect it as well, but public order is not negotiable, and, consequently, is not scheduled. Public order is unilaterally defined, but must respect the default rules concerning allocation of jurisdiction which are common to all WTO Members and bind them by virtue of their appurtenance to the international community. In this paper, we focus on the interaction between trade and environment. The purpose of this study is to highlight how these rules and the GATT/WTO jointly determine the scope for unilateral environmental policies for WTO Members. In the study we examine the relevant multilateral framework dealing with this issue, as well as the relevant GATT and WTO case-law. We also briefly present the jurisdictional default rules in Public International Law. As a means of focusing the discussion, we consider a series of scenarios, partly building on factual aspects of cases that have already been brought before the WTO. These scenarios are intended to isolate issues of specific interest from a policy point of view. For each scenario we then seek to determine what would the outcome be, in case WTO adjudicating bodies were to explicitly take account of the default rules concerning allocation of jurisdiction, something which has not been done to date. Our main conclusions are two-fold: on occasion, the outcome would be different, had WTO panels observed the default rules concerning allocation of jurisdiction; more generally, the default rules can help us understand the limits of some key obligations assumed under the WTO. Crucially, absent recourse to the default rules concerning allocation of jurisdiction, one risks understanding non-discrimination (the key GATT-obligation) as an instrument aimed to harmonize conditions of competition across markets, and not within markets, as the intent of negotiators has always been.Trade and Environment; WTO

21st century trade agreements: implications for long-run development policy

This repository item contains a single issue of The Pardee Papers, a series papers that began publishing in 2008 by the Boston University Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future. The Pardee Papers series features working papers by Pardee Center Fellows and other invited authors. Papers in this series explore current and future challenges by anticipating the pathways to human progress, human development, and human well-being. This series includes papers on a wide range of topics, with a special emphasis on interdisciplinary perspectives and a development orientation.This paper examines the extent to which the emerging world trading regime leaves nations the “policy space” to deploy effective policy for long-run diversification and development and the extent to which there is a convergence of such policy space under global and regional trade regimes. We examine the economic theory of trade and long-run growth and underscore the fact that traditional theories lose luster in the presence of the need for long-run dynamic comparative advantages and when market failures are rife. We then review a “toolbox” of policies that have been deployed by developed and developing countries past and present to kick-start diversity and development with the hope of achieving longrun growth. Next, we examine the extent to which rules under the World Trade Organization (WTO), trade agreements between the European Union (EU) and developing countries, trade agreements between the United States (US) and developing countries, and those among developing countries (South-South, or S-S, agreements) allow for the use of such policies. We demonstrate that there is a great divergence among trade regimes over this question. While S-S agreements provide ample policy space for industrial development, the WTO and EU agreements largely represent the middle of the spectrum in terms of constraining policy space choices. On the far end, opposite S-S agreements, US agreements place considerably more constraints by binding parties both broadly and deeply in their trade commitments. Rachel Denae Thrasher holds a master’s degree in International Relations and a law degree, both from Boston University, and she is a Research Fellow at the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future. Her recent research has focused on policy issues related to regional trade agreements, multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and on global forests governance. Kevin P. Gallagher is an Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations and Research Fellow at the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, both at Boston University. He is also a fellow at the Global Development and Environment Institute at Tufts University. He has written extensively on trade and global development. Also see related publication The Future of the WTO, by Kevin Gallagher

Eco-Labels for Credence Attributes: The Case of Shade-Grown Coffee

Using the case of shade-grown coffee, this paper examines the market impacts of eco-labels for credence attributes. First, the Mattoo and Singh (1994) test is conducted for the case of shade-grown coffee to investigate the market impacts of a shade label. This analysis in Section II shows that a shade label could pass the test, but the market impacts are likely to be minor. Section II also shows how to use estimates of supply, potential demand, and price elasticities of demand and supply to predict eco-label premiums in the post-label equilibrium. And second, given the importance of consumer demands for eco-label impacts, and since the theoretical foundations of demand for eco-labeled items are not well developed in the literature, Section III takes a closer look at the microeconomics of labels and consumer demand. A nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution preference structure is used to derive theoretically consistent Marshallian demands for shade and non-shade coffee. A numerical simulation shows how relative prices and consumer preferences for the credence attribute and variety are both important factors in demand creation of labeled items.Environmental Economics and Policy, Marketing,

The Strategic Determinants of Tardy Entry: Is Timeliness Next to Godliness?

Previous research has considered extensively the causes and effects of market entry order and timing. It has neglected, however, the timeliness of such entry — the degree to which a firm delivered a new product on the date it had set for its release. In this article, we begin to fill the need for such research by evaluating some strategic explanations for why a firm might miss a scheduled entry date. We then test whether such “tardy entry” influences sales performance in the new market

The Permissible Reach of National Environmental Policies

Trading nations exchange tariff concessions in the context of trade liberalizing rounds. Tariffs, nonetheless, are not the only instrument affecting the value of a concession. Domestic instruments affect it as well, but public order is not negotiable, and, consequently, is not scheduled. Public order is unilaterally defined, but must respect the default rules concerning allocation of jurisdiction which are common to all WTO Members and bind them by virtue of their appurtenance to the international community. In this paper, we focus on the interaction between trade and environment. The purpose of this study is to highlight how these rules and the GATT/WTO jointly determine the scope for unilateral environmental policies for WTO Members. In the study we examine the relevant multilateral framework dealing with this issue, as well as the relevant GATT and WTO case‐law. We also briefly present the jurisdictional default rules in Public International Law. As a means of focusing the discussion, we consider a series of scenarios, partly building on factual aspects of cases that have already been brought before the WTO. These scenarios are intended to isolate issues of specific interest from a policy point of view. For each scenario we then seek to determine what would the outcome be, in case WTO adjudicating bodies were to explicitly take account of the default rules concerning allocation of jurisdiction, something which has not been done to date. Our main conclusions are two‐fold: on occasion, the outcome would be different, had WTO panels observed the default rules concerning allocation of jurisdiction; more generally, the default rules can help us understand the limits of some key obligations assumed under the WTO. Crucially, absent recourse to the default rules concerning allocation of jurisdiction, one risks understanding non‐discrimination (the key GATT obligation) as an instrument aimed to harmonize conditions of competition across markets, and not within markets, as the intent of negotiators has always been

Characterizing Strategic Cascades on Networks

Transmission of disease, spread of information and rumors, adoption of new products, and many other network phenomena can be fruitfully modeled as cascading processes, where actions chosen by nodes influence the subsequent behavior of neighbors in the network graph. Current literature on cascades tends to assume nodes choose myopically based on the state of choices already taken by other nodes. We examine the possibility of strategic choice, where agents representing nodes anticipate the choices of others who have not yet decided, and take into account their own influence on such choices. Our study employs the framework of Chierichetti et al. [2012], who (under assumption of myopic node behavior) investigate the scheduling of node decisions to promote cascades of product adoptions preferred by the scheduler. We show that when nodes behave strategically, outcomes can be extremely different. We exhibit cases where in the strategic setting 100% of agents adopt, but in the myopic setting only an arbitrarily small epsilon % do. Conversely, we present cases where in the strategic setting 0% of agents adopt, but in the myopic setting (100-epsilon)% do, for any constant epsilon > 0. Additionally, we prove some properties of cascade processes with strategic agents, both in general and for particular classes of graphs.Comment: To appear in EC 201

Determinants of EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) Adoption and Integration in the US and Japanese Automobile Suppliers

This paper examines determinants of EDI adoption and integration in the US and Japanese automobile suppliers. The paper constructs several hypotheses based on the transaction-cost and resource- dependence approaches, and tests these hypotheses by using data from the automobile suppliers. Our study shows: (1) the resource-dependence approach seemed more effective in explaining EDI adoption, while the transaction-cost approach seemed more effective in explaining EDI integration; (2) the transaction-cost approach seemed more suited to the US context, while the resource-dependence approach seemed more suited to the Japanese context; (3) EDI adoption and EDI integration had positive impacts on EDI performance in the US, suggesting the higher validity of our framework in the US.Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), Business-to-Business Electronic Commerce, Automotive Industry, Automobile Suppliers, Technology Adoption

Consumer Shopping Costs as a Cause of Slotting Fees: A Rent-Shifting Mechanism

Analyzing a sequential bargaining framework with one retailer and two suppliers of substitutable goods, we show that slotting fees may emerge as a result of a rent-shifting mechanism when consumer shopping costs are taken into account. If consumers economize on their shopping costs by bundling their purchases, their buying decision depends rather on the price for the whole shopping basket than on individual product prices. This induces complementarities between the goods offered at a retail outlet. If the complementarity effect resulting from shopping costs dominates the original substitution effect, the wholesale price negotiated with the first supplier is upward distorted in order to shift rent from the second supplier. As long as the first supplier has only little bargaining power, she compensates the retailer for the upward distorted wholesale price by paying a slotting fee. We also show that banning slotting fees causes per- unit price to fall and welfare to increase.Shopping costs, rent-shifting, slotting fees

That was then but this is now

Current agricultural negotiations in the World Trade Organization are grappling on how to fully integrate agriculture within the general rules for trade in goods. The notion of multifunctionality of agriculture has been suggested as a reason to justify special treatment for that sector, including the continuation of its protection and subsidization. Many developing countries are still analyzing whether the idea has something to offer them in terms of their negotiating positions and policy framework. While multifunctionality has been invoked for supporting agriculture in developed countries, a similar idea, although not called so at the time, was clearly behind support for industry in developing countries. Again in this case, the policy implication was that government intervention was required (through trade protection, subsidies, and other special policies) to develop an industrial base that contributed to society more than what market valuations alone would suggest. The debate on industrialization in developing countries was part of a broader discussion regarding nation-building, economic development, and social modernization. The current arguments around multifunctionality are similarly embedded in a larger economic, political and social matrix. This paper, although it does not present a full account of either debate, discusses some of the intriguing parallelisms in their theoretical frameworks, policy implications and economic and social impacts. The main objective is to clarify current policy issues for the agricultural sector in developing countries, highlighting possible consequences for the negotiating position of developing countries in the WTO process.World Trade Organization. ,Trade policy. ,Agriculture Economic aspects ,Agricultural subsidies Developing countries. ,Industrialization Developing countries. ,Economic development Developing countries. ,Agricultural policy. ,Markets Economic policy. ,