A Survey of Layer-Two Blockchain Protocols

After the success of the Bitcoin blockchain, came several cryptocurrencies and blockchain solutions in the last decade. Nonetheless, Blockchain-based systems still suffer from low transaction rates and high transaction processing latencies, which hinder blockchains' scalability. An entire class of solutions, called Layer-1 scalability solutions, have attempted to incrementally improve such limitations by adding/modifying fundamental blockchain attributes. Recently, a completely different class of works, called Layer-2 protocols, have emerged to tackle the blockchain scalability issues using unconventional approaches. Layer-2 protocols improve transaction processing rates, periods, and fees by minimizing the use of underlying slow and costly blockchains. In fact, the main chain acts just as an instrument for trust establishment and dispute resolution among Layer-2 participants, where only a few transactions are dispatched to the main chain. Thus, Layer-2 blockchain protocols have the potential to transform the domain. However, rapid and discrete developments have resulted in diverse branches of Layer-2 protocols. In this work, we systematically create a broad taxonomy of such protocols and implementations. We discuss each Layer-2 protocol class in detail and also elucidate their respective approaches, salient features, requirements, etc. Moreover, we outline the issues related to these protocols along with a comparative discussion. Our thorough study will help further systematize the knowledge dispersed in the domain and help the readers to better understand the field of Layer-2 protocols.Comment: 21 pages, 15 figures, 2 table

On the difficulty of hiding the balance of lightning network channels

International audienceThe Lightning Network is a second layer technology running on top of Bitcoin and other Blockchains. It is composed of a peer-to-peer network, used to transfer raw information data. Some of the links in the peer-to-peer network are identified as payment channels, used to conduct payments between two Lightning Network clients (i.e., the two nodes of the channel). Payment channels are created with a fixed credit amount, the channel capacity. The channel capacity, together with the IP address of the nodes, is published to allow a routing algorithm to find an existing path between two nodes that do not have a direct payment channel. However, to preserve users' privacy, the precise balance of the pair of nodes of a given channel (i.e. the bandwidth of the channel in each direction), is kept secret. Since balances are not announced, second-layer nodes probe routes iteratively, until they find a successful route to the destination for the amount required, if any. This feature makes the routing discovery protocol less efficient but preserves the privacy of channel balances. In this paper, we present an attack to disclose the balance of a channel in the Lightning Network. Our attack is based on performing multiple payments ensuring that none of them is finalized, minimizing the economical cost of the attack. We present experimental results that validate our claims, and countermeasures to handle the attack

On the difficulty of hiding the balance of lightning network channels

The Lightning Network is a second layer technology running on top of Bitcoin and other Blockchains. It is composed of a peer-to-peer network, used to transfer raw information data. Some of the links in the peer-to-peer network are identified as payment channels, used to conduct payments between two Lightning Network clients (i.e., the two nodes of the channel). Payment channels are created with a fixed credit amount, the channel capacity. The channel capacity, together with the IP address of the nodes, is published to allow a routing algorithm to find an existing path between two nodes that do not have a direct payment channel. However, to preserve users' privacy, the precise balance of the pair of nodes of a given channel (i.e. the bandwidth of the channel in each direction), is kept secret. Since balances are not announced, second-layer nodes probe routes iteratively, until they find a successful route to the destination for the amount required, if any. This feature makes the routing discovery protocol less efficient but preserves the privacy of channel balances. In this paper, we present an attack to disclose the balance of a channel in the Lightning Network. Our attack is based on performing multiple payments ensuring that none of them is finalized, minimizing the economical cost of the attack. We present experimental results that validate our claims, and countermeasures to handle the attac

SoK: Layer-Two Blockchain Protocols

Blockchains have the potential to revolutionize markets and services. However, they currently exhibit high latencies and fail to handle transaction loads comparable to those managed by traditional financial systems. Layer-two protocols, built on top of layer-one blockchains, avoid disseminating every transaction to the whole network by exchanging authenticated transactions off-chain. Instead, they utilize the expensive and low-rate blockchain only as a recourse for disputes. The promise of layer-two protocols is to complete off-chain transactions in sub-seconds rather than minutes or hours while retaining asset security, reducing fees and allowing blockchains to scale. We systematize the evolution of layer-two protocols over the period from the inception of cryptocurrencies in 2009 until today, structuring the multifaceted body of research on layer-two transactions. Categorizing the research into payment and state channels, commit-chains and protocols for refereed delegation, we provide a comparison of the protocols and their properties. We provide a systematization of the associated synchronization and routing protocols along with their privacy and security aspects. This Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) clears the layer-two fog, highlights the potential of layer-two solutions and identifies their unsolved challenges, indicating propitious avenues of future work

AC/DC: Adaptive Cutoffs and Disputable Cutoffs for robust critical transactions in smart-contracts

To guarantee delivery of their intended functionalities in the presence of unresponsive parties, current smart-contracts cut users off from being able to commit their responses after a fixed period of time has elapsed. However, current blockchains have limited transaction processing capacities, so a fixed amount of time will not always be sufficient to receive every (C-TX). This paper presents a mechanism for adaptive cutoffs (ACs) which ensures that users retain the opportunity to commit despite blockchain congestion, and enables early cutoffs when the number of required is low. A non-interactive argument system for setting adaptive cutoffs under the current Ethereum Virtual Machine is described. Additionally, disputable cutoffs (DCs) are presented, which are a more efficient approach used in parallel to ACs based on a bisection-based dispute. Furthermore, it’s empirically demonstrated that an AC/DC-enabled smart-contract can receive a larger number of than its non-adaptive counterparts when user responsiveness is slowed due to denial of service or congestion

A Study on Transaction Replacement Using Timelocks in Bitcoin

学位の種別: 修士University of Tokyo(東京大学

PEER TO PEER DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT USING BLOCKCHAIN

Content distribution networks deliver content like videos, apps, and music to users through servers deployed in multiple datacenters to increase availability and delivery speed of content. The motivation of this work is to create a content distribution network that maintains a consumer’s rights and access to works they have purchased indefinitely. If a user purchases content from a traditional content distribution network, they lose access to the content when the service is no longer available. The system uses a peer to peer network for content distribution along with a blockchain for digital rights management. This combination may give users indefinite access to purchased works. The system benefits content rights owners because they can sell their content in a lower cost manner by distributing costs among the community of peers