4 research outputs found
Rethinking Privacy for Extended Sanitizable Signatures and a Black-Box Construction of Strongly Private Schemes
Sanitizable signatures, introduced by Ateniese et al. at ESORICS\u2705, allow to issue a signature on a message where certain predefined message blocks may later be changed (sanitized) by some dedicated party (the sanitizer) without invalidating the original signature. With sanitizable signatures, replacements for modifiable (admissible) message blocks can be chosen arbitrarily by the sanitizer. However, in various scenarios this makes sanitizers too powerful. To reduce the sanitizers power, Klonowski and Lauks at ICISC\u2706 proposed (among others) an extension that enables the signer to limit the allowed modifications per admissible block to a well defined set each. At CT-RSA\u2710 Canard and Jambert then extended the formal model of Brzuska et al. from PKC\u2709 to additionally include the aforementioned and other extensions. We, however, observe that the privacy guarantees of their model do not capture privacy in the sense of the original definition of sanitizable signatures. That is, if a scheme is private in this model it is not guaranteed that the sets of allowed modifications remain concealed. To this end, we review a stronger notion of privacy, i.e., (strong) unlinkability (defined by Brzuska et al. at EuroPKI\u2713), in this context. While unlinkability fixes this problem, no efficient unlinkable scheme supporting the aforementioned extensions exists and it seems to be hard to construct such schemes. As a remedy, in this paper, we propose a notion stronger than privacy, but weaker than unlinkability, which captures privacy in the original sense. Moreover, it allows to easily construct efficient schemes satisfying our notion from secure existing schemes in a black-box fashion
Stronger Security for Sanitizable Signatures
Sanitizable signature schemes (SSS) enable a designated party (called the sanitizer ) to alter admissible
blocks of a signed message. This primitive can be used to remove or alter sensitive data from already signed
messages without involvement of the original signer.
Current state-of-the-art security definitions of SSSs only dene a \weak form of security. Namely, the unforgeability,
accountability and transparency definitions are not strong enough to be meaningful in certain use-cases. We
identify some of these use-cases, close this gap by introducing stronger definitions, and show how to alter an
existing construction to meet our desired security level. Moreover, we clarify a small yet important detail in the
state-of-the-art privacy definition. Our work allows to deploy this primitive in more and different scenarios
On Structural Signatures for Tree Data Structures
Abstract. In this paper, we present new attacks on the redactable signature scheme introduced by Kundu and Bertino at VLDB '08. This extends the work done by Brzuska et al. at ACNS '10 and Samelin et al. at ISPEC '12. The attacks address unforgeability, transparency and privacy. Based on the ideas of Kundu and Bertino, we introduce a new provably secure construction. The corresponding security model is more flexible than the one introduced by Brzuska et al. Moreover, we have implemented schemes introduced by Brzuska et al. and Kundu and Bertino. The evaluation shows that schemes with a quadratic complexity become unuseable very fast
Chameleon-Hashes with Dual Long-Term Trapdoors and Their Applications
A chameleon-hash behaves likes a standard collision-resistant hash function for outsiders. If, however, a trapdoor is known, arbitrary collisions can be found. Chameleon-hashes with ephemeral trapdoors (CHET; Camenisch et al., PKC â17) allow prohibiting that the holder of the long-term trapdoor can find collisions by introducing a second, ephemeral, trapdoor. However, this ephemeral trapdoor is required to be chosen freshly for each hash. We extend these ideas and introduce the notion of chameleon-hashes with dual long-term trapdoors (CHDLTT). Here, the second trapdoor is not chosen freshly for each new hash; Rather, the hashing party can decide if it wants to generate a fresh second trapdoor or use an existing one. This primitive generalizes CHETs, extends their applicability and enables some appealing new use-cases, including three-party sanitizable signatures, group-level selectively revocable signatures and break-the-glass signatures. We present two provably secure constructions and an implementation which demonstrates that this extended primitive is efficient enough for use in practice