A model independent safeguard for unbinned Likelihood

We present a universal method to include residual un-modeled background shape uncertainties in likelihood based statistical tests for high energy physics and astroparticle physics. This approach provides a simple and natural protection against mismodeling, thus lowering the chances of a false discovery or of an over constrained confidence interval, and allows a natural transition to unbinned space. Unbinned likelihood allows optimal usage of information for the data and the models, and enhances the sensitivity. We show that the asymptotic behavior of the test statistic can be regained in cases where the model fails to describe the true background behavior, and present 1D and 2D case studies for model-driven and data-driven background models. The resulting penalty on sensitivities follows the actual discrepancy between the data and the models, and is asymptotically reduced to zero with increasing knowledge

WELFARE IMPROVING COLLUSION IN THE JAPANESE PORK IMPORT MARKET

Underlying parameter estimates suggest that reduction in pork exporters' profit is three times higher when the Japanese GATT safeguard is invoked, providing incentive to foreign suppliers to collude to avoid exceeding the trigger. This collusion is welfare-improving since the safeguard induces more inefficiencies. Workable and efficient allocation rules are constructed with a multi-plant monopolist structure that allows trade of quota.GATT Safeguard, gate price, collusion, International Relations/Trade,

Nepal: Earthquake Recovery Must Safeguard Human Rights

This briefing highlights some important areas of concern which Amnesty International believes could have an impact on the success of relief and reconstruction endeavours in Nepal.Protection and respect for human rights has been severely weakened by Nepal's unsettled political climate at the national level and the resulting governance vacuum at local levels, and also impacted by the armed conflict between government forces and Maoist insurgents between 1996 and 2006. Impunity persists for gross human rights abuses, including enforced disappearances, a hallmark of the conflict, as do longstanding problems of discrimination and social exclusion that affect large segments of Nepali society. Relief and reconstruction efforts grounded in human rights norms, including the universal principles of human dignity and non-discrimination, could help avoid further harm to recipients of humanitarian assistance and also have a better chance of successfully helping individuals and communities affected by the disaster to recover and become more resilient in future. Such efforts must include attention to deeper structural and systemic inequities that persist in Nepal and which accentuate the vulnerability of disadvantaged groups to the impact of the disaster

A Need for Caution in Applying the Volume-Based Special Safeguard Mechanism

The proximate cause of the collapse of the Doha Agenda negotiations in 2008 was disagreement over the volume-based Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM). This measure would provide a right, but not an obligation, for developing countries to impose a duty when imports increase. While many simulations of its impact on domestic prices are available, there appear to be no analyses of its potential impacts on the welfare of poor households. Whether such a safeguard will increase or reduce poverty can only be determined empirically—if there are enough small, poor farmers who are net sellers of the commodity when the duty is imposed, then imposition of a safeguard duty may reduce poverty. If, by contrast, most small, poor farmers are net buyers of the products subject to the duty, then it is likely that poverty will rise. Empirical analysis for twenty-eight countries finds that poverty is generally increased following the imposition of a safeguard-type measure. The adverse poverty impact of the safeguard-induced increase in prices is typically larger when the safeguard can be triggered, because the adverse output shocks typically giving rise to import surges when import prices have not declined reduce the benefit to poor producing households from higher prices.International Relations/Trade,

Safeguard Iowa Partnership, August 2008

Safeguard Iowa Partnership launched a survey to the business community to capture the impact from the 2008 disasters. Five hundred eighty surveys were completed and compiled for the report submitted to the Rebuild Iowa Office Economic and Workforce Development Task Force on August 20, 2008

Tariffs and steel: US safeguard actions

A multiproduct spatial equilibrium model of world steel trade is presented in this paper. The model is used to analyse the impacts of the safeguard trade barriers brought about by the USA in order to protect their domestic industry from the so-called unfair competition. Emphasis is placed on the likely effect on the Australian industry and possible policy responses available to the industry. A case study is made of Australia’s three largest export products; namely, slab, hot-rolled and cold-rolled steel, which share some substitutability in supply and demand because of the nature of the industry. As a result of the safeguard barriers to steel trade, world steel prices fell and trade shifted away from the USA to other importing regions.spatial equilibrium model, steel, trade, International Relations/Trade,

Countering the Excessive Subpoena for Scholarly Research

A researcher has many opportunities to safeguard research and take a stance in court to protect the privacy of study participants in the interest of well-grounded scientific or social analysis

Countering the Excessive Subpoena for Scholarly Research

A researcher has many opportunities to safeguard research and take a stance in court to protect the privacy of study participants in the interest of well-grounded scientific or social analysis

An Analysis of the Special Safeguard Mechanisms in the Doha Round of Negotiations - A Proposed Price-trigger-based Safeguard Mechanism

In the Doha Round of negotiations on agriculture it has been decided that all developing and least developed Member countries of the WTO will have access to a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM). This means that developing countries will now have the option to temporarily impose higher tariff rates on the import of an agricultural product if there is either a surge in its import volumes or a sharp dip in its import prices. However, the exact mechanisms of the implementation of SSMs have not been spelt out. It is also not clear what legal provisions the Member countries will have to follow to use this safeguard mechanism. This paper takes a detailed look at the SSM and analyzes its usefulness for developing countries. It also explores how the concept of a special agricultural safeguard has evolved in the present round of negotiations and what are the country positions on SSMs in the Doha Round. The paper then proposes a price-trigger-based SSM instrument which is consistent with the goals spelt out in the Doha Development Agenda and satisfies most of the desired features of a safeguard instrument.WTO, agriculture, Volatility, Special safeguards, Tariff rates