A peep or a gaze? References to Antonius Andreae in "Quaestiones super physicam" by Theodoricus of Magdeburg

Conference publication: Via Scoti : methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti : atti del Congresso scotistico internazionale, Roma 9-11 marzo 199

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Commencement; Aaron Gavant \u2709; UMLaw at the SCOTUS; Myerowitz Competition; WLE Anniversary; BLSA Banquet; MPILP Auction; Reunion; Honors Banquet; Bernard Manekin \u2736; Andre Davis \u277

O problema do conhecimento de entes contingentes em Aristóteles e Duns Scotus

This Monograph aims to present the question about the notion of contingency in Aristotle and John Duns Scotus. For this, the first chapter presents Aristotle‟s notion of episteme. From the works Posterior Analytics and Physics II, we highlight the two key aspects that constitute episteme, namely: causality and necessity. We emphasize the distinction proposed by Aristotle between necessary and contingent. For this, the analysis takes Metaphysics V, 5, according to which there are five senses of “necessary”. For the concept of contingent, the object of analysis is Prior Analytics, I, 13. The quarrel of future contingents from On Interpretation 9 is also presented, trying to prove why Aristotle defends a form of determinism. In the second chapter, we present the main aspects of Scotus‟s concept of metaphysics. It shows the reason “being” is said the first object of the human intellect, and the need for its univocity. We proceed to the notion of transcendent and its four classes, namely: being, the convertible attributes, the disjunctives attributes and pure perfections. We pay particular attention to the disjunction finite-infinite. The third chapter introduces the notion of contingency by Scotus. For this, synchronic contingency is distinguished from diachronic contingency and the notion of logical possibility is highlighted. The role of the will for the defense of contingency in the world is emphasized, along with the reasons why Duns Scotus opposes Aristotelian determinism. Finally, we compare the notion of contingent and of episteme by Aristotle and the notion of contingent and of scientia proposed by Duns Scotus, by showing that Scotus‟s theory can better explain the knowledge of contingent beings defending a form of indeterminEste trabalho de conclusão de curso tem por objetivo apresentar a problemática da noção de contingência em Aristóteles e em João Duns Scotus. Para tanto, no primeiro capítulo, apresenta-se a noção de episteme na filosofia de Aristóteles. A partir das obras Segundos Analíticos e Física II, busca-se evidenciar os dois traços fundamentais que constituem a episteme, a saber: causalidade e necessidade. Ressalta-se a distinção proposta por Aristóteles entre necessário e contingente. Para isso, a análise detém-se no livro V, 5, da obra Metafísica, no qual Aristóteles apresenta cinco sentidos para necessário. Para o conceito de contingente, o objeto de análise é a obra Primeiros Analíticos, I, 13. Apresenta-se ainda a noção de futuros contingentes a partir da obra Da Interpretação 9, buscando evidenciar porque Aristóteles defende um determinismo. Já no segundo capítulo, apresentam-se aspectos da metafísica de Scotus. Mostra-se o motivo pelo qual o conceito „ente‟ é dito o objeto primeiro do intelecto humano, bem como a necessidade de sua univocidade. Avança-se à noção de transcendente, e apresentam-se as quatro classes desta noção, a saber: o ente, os atributos conversíveis, os atributos disjuntos e as perfeições puras. Dedica-se especial atenção aos atributos disjuntivos finito e infinito. Já o terceiro capítulo apresenta a noção de contingência em Scotus. Para tanto, distingue-se contingência sincrônica de contingência diacrônica e avança-se para a noção de possibilidade lógica. Enfatiza-se o papel da vontade para a defesa da contingência no mundo, e o motivo pelo qual Duns Scotus se opõe ao determinismo aristotélico. Por fim, estabelece-se um paralelo entre a noção de contingente e de episteme pensadas por Aristóteles, e a noção de contingente e scientia pensadas por Duns Scotus, mostrando por que a teoria de Scotus consegue melhor explicar o conhecimento de entes contingentes através da defesa de um indeterminismo

Putting away childish things: incidents of recovery in Tolkien and Haddon

The article discusses the philosophy of author J.R.R. Tolkien. Borrowing concepts from Gerard Manley Hopkins and John Duns Scotus, Tolkien developed the concept of recovery, in which a person is able to interact with the world as though they have never done so before. Using Mark Haddon's novel "The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time" the article details how recovery can lead people to seeing things differently rather than just glancing at them and accepting it for what it is. The author also uses examples from Tolkien's "Lord of the Rings" series to prove his point

Exemplar Causality as similitudo aequivoca in Peter Auriol

The aim of this paper is to discuss the theory of exemplary causality of Peter Auriol (1280-1322). Until at least the late 13th century, medieval authors claim that the world is orderly and intelligible because God created it according to the models existing eternally in his mind (i.e. divine ideas). Auriol challenges the view of his predecessors and contemporaries. He argues that assuming divine ideas amounts to assuming multiplicity in God and therefore questioning the principle of his absolute simplicity. To avoid this problem, he develops a system that enables him to account for God’s knowledge of creatures (both as individuals and as species) and hence to preserve the theological principle of providence, but at the same time allows him to reject divine ideas as intermediaries for creation. In Auriol’s theory of exemplary causality, divine essence is the only object of God’s knowledge and thus the only exemplar for creation. God’s cognitive act is directed exclusively towards his own essence. However, he knows creatures through multiple connotations, i.e. the multiple ways divine essence is connotated when God knows himself. But these connotations play no role in creation, because imitability is only proper to divine essence. To explain how an object can be the only exemplar for the creation of many different creatures, Auriol has to rethink the concept of imitability and develop a new model of exemplary causality enabling him to account for the relationship between God and his creatures. The traditional model was that of analogy: a cause produces an effect which is partly similar and partly different from it. Auriol relies on the concept of equivocity. He argues that it is unnecessary to assume a particular similarity between a cause and its effect. Quite the contrary: for an object to be the exemplar of multiple different things, it is necessary that it should not be similar to any of them. The concept of aequivocatio allows Auriol to reject the traditional model of creation. Aequivocatio does not entail a resemblance between idea and ideatum. There is no contradiction, then, in claiming that a single object (divine essence) is in an equivocal way (aequivoce) the exemplary cause of multiple different objects. This is Auriol’s new theory of divine exemplarism: the theory of similitudo aequivoca

Francisco Suárez on Eternal Truths, Eternal Essences, and Extrinsic Being

It is necessarily true that water is H2O, but it is a contingent fact that there is any water at all. Water therefore seems ill suited to ground the necessary truth that water is H2O. One view traditionally attributed to Scotus and Henry of Ghent was that while water is contingent, the essence of water is necessary; hence, the essence of water can ground the so-called eternal truth that water is H2O. Francisco Suárez rejects this view on the grounds that it contradicts the Christian doctrine of creation, according to which everything other than God was contingently created in time. Suárez’s own view of the eternal truths has proven elusive to commentators, but I argue that Suárez ultimately endorses a version of the view he rejects: essences ground the eternal truths. But this raises several puzzles: how is Suárez’s view distinct from the views traditionally ascribed to Scotus and Henry? How does Suárez’s view escape the argument from creation, which Suárez raises against his opponents? I argue that Suárez distinguishes between his view and his opponents’ view by saying that essences have “extrinsic being,” whereas his opponents claim that essences have “intrinsic being.” The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic being has not received much attention, but I argue that it marks an important fault line in scholastic thinking about the ontological status of non-existents. I argue that the notion of extrinsic being can be explicated in terms of ontological pluralism and grounding. The notion of extrinsic being helps differentiate Suárez’s view from his Scotistic and Henrician opponents, and it allows Suárez to respond to the creation argument he raises against his opponents. On my reading, Suárez’s solution to the problem of eternal truths turns out to be both highly original and philosophically satisfying