12 research outputs found
An Adaptive Policy Management Approach to BGP Convergence
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the current inter-domain routing protocol used to exchange reachability information between Autonomous Systems (ASes) in the Internet. BGP supports policy-based routing which allows each AS to independently adopt a set of local policies that specify which routes it accepts and advertises from/to other networks, as well as which route it prefers when more than one route becomes available. However, independently chosen local policies may cause global conflicts, which result in protocol divergence. In this paper, we propose a new algorithm, called Adaptive Policy Management Scheme (APMS), to resolve policy conflicts in a distributed manner. Akin to distributed feedback control systems, each AS independently classifies the state of the network as either conflict-free or potentially-conflicting by observing its local history only (namely, route flaps). Based on the degree of measured conflicts (policy conflict-avoidance vs. -control mode), each AS dynamically adjusts its own path preferences—increasing its preference for observably stable paths over flapping paths. APMS also includes a mechanism to distinguish route flaps due to topology changes, so as not to confuse them with those due to policy conflicts. A correctness and convergence analysis of APMS based on the substability property of chosen paths is presented. Implementation in the SSF network simulator is performed, and simulation results for different performance metrics are presented. The metrics capture the dynamic performance (in terms of instantaneous throughput, delay, routing load, etc.) of APMS and other competing solutions, thus exposing the often neglected aspects of performance.National Science Foundation (ANI-0095988, EIA-0202067, ITR ANI-0205294
The Strategic Justification for BGP
The Internet consists of many administrative domains, or \emph{Autonomous Systems} (ASes), each owned by an economic entity (Microsoft, AT\&T, The Hebrew University, etc.). The task of ensuring interconnectivity between ASes, known as \emph{interdomain routing}, is currently handled by the \emph{Border Gateway Protocol} (BGP). ASes are self-interested and might be willing to manipulate BGP for their benefit. In this paper we present the strategic justification for using BGP for interdomain routing in today's Internet: We show that, in the realistic Gao-Rexford setting, BGP is immune to almost all forms of rational manipulation by ASes, and can easily be made immune to all such manipulations. The Gao-Rexford setting is said to accurately depict the current commercial relations between ASes in the Internet. Formally, we prove that a slight modification of BGP is incentive-compatible in \emph{ex-post Nash equilibrium}. Moreover, we show that, if a certain reasonable condition holds, then this slightly modified BGP is also \emph{collusion-proof} in ex-post Nash -- i.e., immune to rational manipulations even by \emph{coalitions} of \emph{any} size. Unlike previous works on achieving incentive-compatibility in interdomain routing, our results \emph{do not require any monetary transfer between ASes} (as is the case in practice). We also strengthen the Gao-Rexford constraints by proving that one of the three constraints can actually be enforced by the rationality of ASes if the two other constraints hold.Networks; Ex post Nash; Routing; rational manipulation; Border Gateway Protocol; Dispute Wheel
Safe Inter-domain Routing under Diverse Commercial Agreements
Commercial agreements drive the routing policies used in today\u27s Internet. The two most extensively studied commercial agreements are transit and peering; however, they are only two of many diverse and continuously evolving commercial agreements that ISPs enter into. So far, the only known practical safe and robust routing policy is Gao and Rexford\u27s policy guideline, which is applicable to transit and peering agreements only. It is, therefore, of importance to identify routing policies that are safe and robust and at the same time capable of accommodating the diverse commercial agreements existing in the Internet. In particular, this paper investigates the extent to which routing policies can be devised to accommodate complex mutual transit agreements. We propose a series of policy guidelines that allow mutual transit agreements with progressively broader semantics to be established. Those policy guidelines guarantee routing safety and robustness as long as the AS graph satisfies a corresponding set of precise topological constraints. An experimental evaluation of the proposed policy guidelines demonstrates the benefits they would likely afford in terms of routing reliability, if adopted in the current Internet
The Strategic Justification for BGP
The Internet consists of many administrative domains, or
\emph{Autonomous Systems} (ASes), each owned by an economic entity
(Microsoft, AT\&T, The Hebrew University, etc.). The task of
ensuring interconnectivity between ASes, known as \emph{interdomain
routing}, is currently handled by the \emph{Border Gateway Protocol}
(BGP).
ASes are self-interested and might be willing to manipulate BGP for
their benefit. In this paper we present the strategic justification
for using BGP for interdomain routing in today's Internet: We show
that, in the realistic Gao-Rexford setting, BGP is immune to almost
all forms of rational manipulation by ASes, and can easily be made
immune to all such manipulations. The Gao-Rexford setting is said to
accurately depict the current commercial relations between ASes in
the Internet. Formally, we prove that a slight modification of BGP
is incentive-compatible in \emph{ex-post Nash equilibrium}.
Moreover, we show that, if a certain reasonable condition holds,
then this slightly modified BGP is also \emph{collusion-proof} in
ex-post Nash -- i.e., immune to rational manipulations even by
\emph{coalitions} of \emph{any} size.
Unlike previous works on achieving incentive-compatibility in
interdomain routing, our results \emph{do not require any monetary
transfer between ASes} (as is the case in practice). We also
strengthen the Gao-Rexford constraints by proving that one of the
three constraints can actually be enforced by the rationality of
ASes if the two other constraints hold
The Strategic Justification for BGP
The Internet consists of many administrative domains, or
\emph{Autonomous Systems} (ASes), each owned by an economic entity
(Microsoft, AT\&T, The Hebrew University, etc.). The task of
ensuring interconnectivity between ASes, known as \emph{interdomain
routing}, is currently handled by the \emph{Border Gateway Protocol}
(BGP).
ASes are self-interested and might be willing to manipulate BGP for
their benefit. In this paper we present the strategic justification
for using BGP for interdomain routing in today's Internet: We show
that, in the realistic Gao-Rexford setting, BGP is immune to almost
all forms of rational manipulation by ASes, and can easily be made
immune to all such manipulations. The Gao-Rexford setting is said to
accurately depict the current commercial relations between ASes in
the Internet. Formally, we prove that a slight modification of BGP
is incentive-compatible in \emph{ex-post Nash equilibrium}.
Moreover, we show that, if a certain reasonable condition holds,
then this slightly modified BGP is also \emph{collusion-proof} in
ex-post Nash -- i.e., immune to rational manipulations even by
\emph{coalitions} of \emph{any} size.
Unlike previous works on achieving incentive-compatibility in
interdomain routing, our results \emph{do not require any monetary
transfer between ASes} (as is the case in practice). We also
strengthen the Gao-Rexford constraints by proving that one of the
three constraints can actually be enforced by the rationality of
ASes if the two other constraints hold
Proactive techniques for correct and predictable Internet routing
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, February 2006.This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.Includes bibliographical references (p. 185-193).The Internet is composed of thousands of autonomous, competing networks that exchange reachability information using an interdomain routing protocol. Network operators must continually reconfigure the routing protocols to realize various economic and performance goals. Unfortunately, there is no systematic way to predict how the configuration will affect the behavior of the routing protocol or to determine whether the routing protocol will operate correctly at all. This dissertation develops techniques to reason about the dynamic behavior of Internet routing, based on static analysis of the router configurations, before the protocol ever runs on a live network. Interdomain routing offers each independent network tremendous flexibility in configuring the routing protocols to accomplish various economic and performance tasks. Routing configurations are complex, and writing them is similar to writing a distributed program; the (unavoidable) consequence of configuration complexity is the potential for incorrect and unpredictable behavior. These mistakes and unintended interactions lead to routing faults, which disrupt end-to-end connectivity. Network operators writing configurations make mistakes; they may also specify policies that interact in unexpected ways with policies in other networks.(cont.) To avoid disrupting network connectivity and degrading performance, operators would benefit from being able to determine the effects of configuration changes before deploying them on a live network; unfortunately, the status quo provides them no opportunity to do so. This dissertation develops the techniques to achieve this goal of proactively ensuring correct and predictable Internet routing. The first challenge in guaranteeing correct and predictable behavior from a routing protocol is defining a specification for correct behavior. We identify three important aspects of correctness-path visibility, route validity, and safety-and develop proactive techniques for guaranteeing that these properties hold. Path visibility states that the protocol disseminates information about paths in the topology; route validity says that this information actually corresponds to those paths; safety says that the protocol ultimately converges to a stable outcome, implying that routing updates actually correspond to topological changes. Armed with this correctness specification, we tackle the second challenge: analyzing routing protocol configurations that may be distributed across hundreds of routers.(cont.) We develop techniques to check whether a routing protocol satisfies the correctness specification within a single independently operated network. We find that much of the specification can be checked with static configuration analysis alone. We present examples of real-world routing faults and propose a systematic framework to classify, detect, correct, and prevent them. We describe the design and implementation of rcc ("router configuration checker"), a tool that uses static configuration analysis to enable network operators to debug configurations before deploying them in an operational network. We have used rcc to detect faults in 17 different networks, including several nationwide Internet service providers (ISPs). To date, rcc has been downloaded by over seventy network operators. A critical aspect of guaranteeing correct and predictable Internet routing is ensuring that the interactions of the configurations across multiple networks do not violate the correctness specification. Guaranteeing safety is challenging because each network sets its policies independently, and these policies may conflict. Using a formal model of today's Internet routing protocol, we derive conditions to guarantee that unintended policy interactions will never cause the routing protocol to oscillate.(cont.) This dissertation also takes steps to make Internet routing more predictable. We present algorithms that help network operators predict how a set of distributed router configurations within a single network will affect the flow of traffic through that network. We describe a tool based on these algorithms that exploits the unique characteristics of routing data to reduce computational overhead. Using data from a large ISP, we show that this tool correctly computes BGP routing decisions and has a running time that is acceptable for many tasks, such as traffic engineering and capacity planning.by Nicholas Greer Feamster.Ph.D