Market-Based Task Allocation Mechanisms for Limited Capacity Suppliers

This paper reports on the design and comparison of two economically-inspired mechanisms for task allocation in environments where sellers have finite production capacities and a cost structure composed of a fixed overhead cost and a constant marginal cost. Such mechanisms are required when a system consists of multiple self-interested stakeholders that each possess private information that is relevant to solving a system-wide problem. Against this background, we first develop a computationally tractable centralised mechanism that finds the set of producers that have the lowest total cost in providing a certain demand (i.e. it is efficient). We achieve this by extending the standard Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism to allow for multi-attribute bids and by introducing a novel penalty scheme such that producers are incentivised to truthfully report their capacities and their costs. Furthermore our extended mechanism is able to handle sellers' uncertainty about their production capacity and ensures that individual agents find it profitable to participate in the mechanism. However, since this first mechanism is centralised, we also develop a complementary decentralised mechanism based around the continuous double auction. Again because of the characteristics of our domain, we need to extend the standard form of this protocol by introducing a novel clearing rule based around an order book. With this modified protocol, we empirically demonstrate (with simple trading strategies) that the mechanism achieves high efficiency. In particular, despite this simplicity, the traders can still derive a profit from the market which makes our mechanism attractive since these results are a likely lower bound on their expected returns

Competitive Auctions: Theory and Application

The theory of competitive auctions offers a coherent framework for modelling coordination frictions as a non-cooperative game. The theory represents an advancement over cooperative approaches that make exogenous assumptions about how output is divided between buyers and sellers and about the forces that bring buyers and sellers into local markets. Moreover, unlike price posting models, which fix the terms of trade prior to matching, competitive auction models have a bidding process that allocates the good (or service) to the highest valuation bidder at a price equal to the second highest valuation. Therefore, the competing auction model is more robust to problems in which there are heterogenous valuations. This paper develops the theory of competitive auctions and applies it to a number of practical problems in microeconomics, labor economics, industrial organization, investment theory and monetary economics.

Competitive Auctions: Theory and Application

The theory of competitive auctions offers a coherent framework for modelling coordination frictions as a non-cooperative game. The theory represents an advancement over cooperative approaches that make exogenous assumptions about how output is divided between buyers and sellers and about the forces that bring buyers and sellers into local markets. Moreover, unlike price posting models, which fix the terms of trade prior to matching, competitive auction models have a bidding process that allocates the good (or service) to the highest valuation bidder at a price equal to the second highest valuation. Therefore, the competitive auction model is more robust to problems in which there are heterogenous valuations. This paper develops the theory of competitive auctions and applies it to a number of practical problems in microeconomics, labor economics, industrial organization, investment theory and monetary economics.

Accelerating Scientific Discovery by Formulating Grand Scientific Challenges

One important question for science and society is how to best promote scientific progress. Inspired by the great success of Hilbert's famous set of problems, the FuturICT project tries to stimulate and focus the efforts of many scientists by formulating Grand Challenges, i.e. a set of fundamental, relevant and hardly solvable scientific questions.Comment: To appear in EPJ Special Topics. For related work see http://www.futurict.eu and http://www.soms.ethz.c

Underpricing and Firm’s Distance from Financial Centre: Evidence from three European Countries

We provide international evidence on the relationship between the extent of underpricing related to initial public offerings (IPOs) and the distance of the issuing firm from the financial centre of a country: for France, Germany and Italy, the higher the distance, the higher the level of underpricing. Under the maintained assumption that headquarters of institutional investors and underwriters are part of a financial centre, our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that ex ante uncertainty regarding the value per share of an issuing firm increases with the firm’s physical distance from the underwriter. As financial centres are usually located in the richest areas of the countries concerned, spatial difference in the cost of equity financing may contribute to the persistence or the widening of local disparities.Asymmetric information, Distance, IPO, Underpricing