Misunderstanding Models in Environmental and Public Health Regulation

Computational models are fundamental to environmental regulation, yet their capabilities tend to be misunderstood by policymakers. Rather than rely on models to illuminate dynamic and uncertain relationships in natural settings, policymakers too often use models as “answer machines.” This fundamental misperception that models can generate decisive facts leads to a perverse negative feedback loop that begins with policymaking itself and radiates into the science of modeling and into regulatory deliberations where participants can exploit the misunderstanding in strategic ways. This paper documents the pervasive misperception of models as truth machines in U.S. regulation and the multi-layered problems that result from this misunderstanding. The paper concludes with a series of proposals for making better use of models in environmental policy analysis.The Kay Bailey Hutchison Center for Energy, Law, and Busines

Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine

This article focuses on conflict of interest doctrine dealing with concur- rent conflict of interest issues. Its thesis is that a primary source of confusion in conflict of interest doctrine is its failure to clearly articulate and answer the central questions which lie at the heart of the subject. In essence it argues that to remedy this confusion we need to rethink attorney conflict of interest doctrine so that it focuses more clearly on articulating and answering these central questions

Institutional transplant and American corporate governance: the case of Ferodyn

This paper examines the relationship between employment relations and American corporate governance using the case of Ferodyn*. In response to difficult industry conditions and sagging performance, American-owned Landis* Steel Corporation and Japanese-owned Daiichi* Steel Corporation jointly financed and built Ferodyn, a state-of-the-art high quality steel finishing facility. Although the joint venture was extremely successful in terms of quality, productivity and industrial relations, it came under severe stress from both external and internal pressures. Ferodyn’s success was moderated by the market in that it was never able to extract a price premium for the quality of steel it produced. At the same time, pressures in the form of corporate governance and the parent / subsidiary relationship were substantial. Institutional investor demands for improvements in short run shareholder value ultimately resulted in the sale of Landis to Maxi-metal*, a global steel conglomerate, committed to a strategy of minimising costs. In this case, the organ transplant provides a useful metaphor: Ferodyn was like a strong and healthy ‘organ transplant’ in a weak and ailing corporate ‘body.’ So long as there were buffers in place to protect it from rejection by its host, Ferodyn could prosper, giving rise to exceptionally high labour standards and quality of life for its employees. In effect, the American system of corporate governance and the nature of power relations in the corporation created antigens that weakened both Landis’s ability to support the joint venture and Ferodyn’s ability to survive in an alien and hostile corporate, industry and macro-economic environment. * Ferodyn, Landis, Daiichi and Maxi-metal are fictitious names

Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine

This article focuses on conflict of interest doctrine dealing with concur- rent conflict of interest issues. Its thesis is that a primary source of confusion in conflict of interest doctrine is its failure to clearly articulate and answer the central questions which lie at the heart of the subject. In essence it argues that to remedy this confusion we need to rethink attorney conflict of interest doctrine so that it focuses more clearly on articulating and answering these central questions

The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation

The duty to mitigate is a universally accepted principle of contract law requiring that each party exert reasonable efforts to minimize losses whenever intervening events impede contractual objectives. Although applications of the mitigation principle pervade the specific rules of contract, it is startling how many questions remain unanswered as to precisely what efforts the mitigation duty requires and what point in time the obligation arises. For example, under what circumstances does mitigation require an injured party to deal with the contract breacher? Why does the duty to minimize losses mature only after the breach, even if the injured party became aware much earlier of a significant danger of breach and had a cost-effective opportunity to mitigate the prospective loss? Is the duty to communicate special or unforeseeable circumstances confined to the time of contracting, even where the communication of post-contract but pre-performance information might reduce costs? These and many similar questions remain unresolved because the relationship among the diverse rules of mitigation has not been systematically articulated. Recognizing that each party\u27s mitigation responsibility is inextricably linked to the performance obligation of his contracting partner is the key step in fitting the mitigation principle into a general theory of contractual obligation. In recent years, a maturing theoretical scholarship has furthered understanding of the performance and remedial obligations of contracting parties. By focusing on particular performance problems, this scholarship has not only uncovered further questions but also heightened interest in a theoretical formulation that weaves the performance and remedial rules of contract into a single fabric

Institutional Transplant and American Corporate Governance: The case of Ferodyn

This paper examines the relationship between employment relations and American corporate governance using the case of Ferodyn*. In response to difficult industry conditions and sagging performance, American-owned Landis* Steel Corporation and Japanese-owned Daiichi* Steel Corporation jointly financed and built Ferodyn, a state-of-the-art high quality steel finishing facility. Although the joint venture was extremely successful in terms of quality, productivity and industrial relations, it came under severe stress from both external and internal pressures. Ferodyn's success was moderated by the market in that it was never able to extract a price premium for the quality of steel it produced. At the same time, pressures in the form of corporate governance and the parent / subsidiary relationship were substantial. Institutional investor demands for improvements in short run shareholder value ultimately resulted in the sale of Landis to Maxi-metal*, a global steel conglomerate, committed to a strategy of minimising costs. In this case, the organ transplant provides a useful metaphor: Ferodyn was like a strong and healthy 'organ transplant' in a weak and ailing corporate 'body.' So long as there were buffers in place to protect it from rejection by its host, Ferodyn could prosper, giving rise to exceptionally high labour standards and quality of life for its employees. In effect, the American system of corporate governance and the nature of power relations in the corporation created antigens that weakened both Landis's ability to support the joint venture and Ferodyn's ability to survive in an alien and hostile corporate, industry and macro-economic environment. * Ferodyn, Landis, Daiichi and Maxi-metal are fictitious names.industrial partnership, co-operation, corporate governance, corporate restructuring, steel industry

Political Institutions and Greenhouse Gas Controls

Research and insights taken from the field of political economy suggest that institutions limit the extent to which efficient policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are likely to be adopted. High transaction costs among nations, as well as domestic constraints like voter xenophobia and distrust of markets in the U.S. and ineffective legal and economic institutions in China, discourage international agreement. The U.S. must focus upon limiting economic harm from adopting poorly designed policies and developing strategies for adaptation or technology-driven geoengineering. Most importantly, the lessons of political economy must become central to the study of climate policy, including a healthy exchange of views between political economists and climate modelers.

The Emergent Logic of Health Law

The American health care system is on a glide path toward ruin. Health spending has become the fiscal equivalent of global warming, and the number of uninsured Americans is approaching fifty million. Can law help to divert our country from this path? There are reasons for deep skepticism. Law governs the provision and financing of medical care in fragmented and incoherent fashion. Commentators from diverse perspectives bemoan this chaos, casting it as an obstacle to change. I contend in this Article that pessimism about health law’s prospects is unjustified, but that a new understanding of health law’s disarray is urgently needed to guide reform. My core proposition is that the law of health care provision is best understood as an emergent system. Its contradictions and dysfunctions cannot be repaired by some master design. No one actor has a grand overview—or the power to impose a unifying vision. Countless market players, public planners, and legal and regulatory decisionmakers interact in oft-chaotic ways, clashing with, reinforcing, and adjusting to each other. Out of these interactions, a larger scheme emerges—one that incorporates the health sphere’s competing interests and values. Change in this system, for worse and for better, arises from the interplay between its myriad actors. By quitting the quest for a single, master design, we can better focus our efforts on possibilities for legal and policy change. We can and should continuously survey the landscape of stakeholders and expectations with an eye toward potential launching points for evolutionary processes—processes that leverage current institutions and incentives. What we cannot do is plan or predict these evolutionary pathways in precise detail; the complexity of interactions among market and government actors precludes fine-grained foresight of this sort. But we can determine the general direction of needed change, identify seemingly intractable obstacles, and envision ways to diminish or finesse them over time. Dysfunctional legal doctrines, interest group expectations, consumers’ anxieties, and embedded institutional and cultural barriers can all be dealt with in this way, in iterative fashion. This Article sets out a strategy for doing so. To illustrate this strategy, I suggest emergent approaches to the most urgent challenges in health care policy and law—the crises of access, value, and cost