Conspiracy Theory

Over one-quarter of all federal criminal prosecutions and a large number of state cases involve prosecutions for conspiracy. Yet, the major scholarly articles and the bulk of prominent jurists have roundly condemned the doctrine. This Article offers a functional justification for the legal prohibition against conspiracy, centering on psychological and economic accounts. Advances in psychology over the past thirty years have demonstrated that groups cultivate a special social identity. This identity often encourages risky behavior, leads individuals to behave against their self-interest, solidifies loyalty, and facilitates harm against non-members. So, too, economists have developed sophisticated explanations for why firms promote efficiency, leading to new theories in corporate law. These insights can be reverse-engineered to make conspiracies operate less efficiently. In reverse-engineering corporate-law principles and introducing lessons from psychology, a rich account of how government should approach conspiracy begins to unfold. In particular, law enforcement strives to prevent conspiracies from forming by imposing high up-front penalties for joiners but uses mechanisms to harvest information from those who have joined and decide to cooperate with the government. Traditional conspiracy doctrines such as Pinkerton liability and the exclusion from merger not only further cooperation agreements, they also make conspiracies more difficult to create and maintain by forcing them to adopt bundles of inefficient practices. The possibility of defection forces the syndicate to use expensive monitoring of its employees for evidence of possible collusion with the government. Mechanisms for defection also break down trust within the group and prime members to think that others are acting out of self-interest. The Article concludes by offering a variety of refinements to conspiracy law that will help destabilize trust within the conspiracy, cue the defection of conspirators, and permit law enforcement to extract more information from them

Borderless Space - Ideas for Regional Collaboration

Regional planning initiatives emerge in response to a growing number of land use and related issues that transcent political and jurisdictional boundaries and often involve business and non-profit organizations. Cities are no longer central is planning discussions. Urban networks reflect better the new spatial dynamics. Regional planning strategies are sought to link the public and private spheres of this urban networks action. An important starting point is to organize relations between the relevant and different governmental bodies in the multi-level and multi agency society. How can the abundance of subterritorial governmental bodies be connected, especially within the light of decentralisation processes that are going on? In addition an important question is how this public sphere can be linked to the sphere of private regional action. What are important elements in strategies of ‘organizing connectivity’? Will ‘pragmatic regionalism with a purpose’ be an interesting strategy? In the light of this growing interest in acting regionally, this paper offers insights in motives for such regionalism. A framework to identify and promote best practices for regional collaboration, with attention for vertical as well as horizontal connectedness within the public sphere, as well as linking this public to the private sphere of regional action will be central. Several motives and principles that might be beneficiary for regional collaboration are dealt with. The case of Schiphol and Amsterdam in the Netherlands, as an important international transport cluster, will function as illustration.

Trust and Betrayal in the Medical Marketplace

The author argues in this Comment that disingenuity as first resort is an unwise approach to the conflict between our ex ante and our later, illness-endangered selves. Not only does rationing by tacit deceit raise a host of moral problems, it will not work, over the long haul, because markets reward deceit\u27s unmasking. The honesty about clinical limit-setting that some bioethicists urge may not be fully within our reach. But more candor is possible than we now achieve, and the more conscious we are about decisions to impose limits, the more inclined we will be to accept them without experiencing betrayal

Innovative Tokyo

This paper compares and contrasts Tokyo's innovation structure with the industrial districts model and the international hub model in the literature on urban and regional development. The Tokyo model embraces and yet transcends both industrial districts and international hub models. The paper details key elements making up the Tokyo model-organizational knowledge creation, integral and co-location systems of corporate R&D and new product development, test markets, industrial districts and clusters, participative consumer culture, continuous learning from abroad, local government policies, the national system of innovation, and the historical genesis of Tokyo in Japan's political economy. The paper finds that the Tokyo model of innovation will continue to evolve with the changing external environment, but fundamentally retains its main characteristics. The lessons from the Tokyo model is that openness, a diversified industrial base, the continuing development of new industries, and an emphasis on innovation, all contribute to the dynamism of a major metropolitan region.Labor Policies,Environmental Economics&Policies,Public Health Promotion,ICT Policy and Strategies,Agricultural Knowledge&Information Systems,ICT Policy and Strategies,Environmental Economics&Policies,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Agricultural Knowledge&Information Systems,Innovation

A pied-piper situation : do bureaucratic researchers produce more science?

¿Puede un científico confiar en que el gobierno le va a pagar honestamente? En la relación entre la ciencia y el Estado, el gobernante sale ganando si no paga (o si no paga honradamente). Todo científico público, así, afronta el riesgo de que tras una carrera larga y difícil el gobernante cambie las reglas del juego. A pesar de que la solución a este problema de credibilidad es lo que da forma a las instituciones de la ciencia pública el problema ha sido rara vez estudiado teórica o empíricamente en los estudios de la ciencia. En este trabajo proponemos un modelo de esa relación entre gobiernos y científicos de acuerdo con la teoría de juegos que muestra la importancia del tipo de contrato que los vincula, el que sea más o menos burocrático en un sentido weberiano. Hasta cierto punto, los contratos burocráticos —como los de los funcionarios— protegen a los científicos contra el mal comportamiento de los gobernantes. Mediante esas reglas burocráticas, los contratos atan las manos del gobierno con lo que se hace creíble su compromiso a la vez que se protege el delicado sistema de recompensas de la ciencia. De esta manera se estimula la productividad tanto en calidad como en cantidad. Sin embargo, cuando se da el caso de gobiernos fiables los contratos burocráticos limitan los sistemas de incentivos y van en contra tanto de la receptividad de los científicos a las demandas de los gobiernos o de la sociedad como, al final, al interés de los gobiernos por el producto que ofrecen. En este trabajo utilizamos evidencia comparada entre países que confirma las proposiciones del modelo teórico y muestra cómo los contratos burocráticos estimulan la productividad científica en el caso de gobiernos poco confiables —como en el caso de las dictaduras— pero limitan esa productividad con gobiernos más fiables — como las democracias—

The Elasticity of Trust: How to Promote Trust in the Arab Middle East and the United States

To trust is to risk. When we lend someone money, we make ourselves vulnerable, hoping or expecting that the borrower will reward our trust and return the money at a later stage, possibly with interest or a reciprocal favor added. This paper examines whether willingness to trust follows the same logic, that is, whether it responds to changes in the expected value of trusting, much like willingness to take risk responds to changes in the expected value of risk taking in various countries of the Arab Middle East, namely, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and in the United States