Dissipative Advertising Signals Quality even without Repeat Purchases

Economists have emphasized the role of dissipative advertising and price as signals of quality. Most works, however, limit the number of types to two options: high and low quality. Yet, production costs and quality both result from R&D efforts and therefore are both uncertain. I characterize the optimal separating marketing mix (price and advertising) when quality and marginal cost are both subject to chance. In a static framework (no repeat purchases and no informed consumers), advertising appears to be necessary together with price to signal quality. Equilibrium profits depend on cost but not on quality: all rents are dissipated for signaling purpose.quality, signaling, dissipative advertising

Ranking kinematics for revising by contextual information

Probability kinematics is a leading paradigm in probabilistic belief change. It is based on the idea that conditional beliefs should be independent from changes of their antecedents’ probabilities. In this paper, we propose a re-interpretation of this paradigm for Spohn’s ranking functions which we call Generalized Ranking Kinematics as a new principle for iterated belief revision of ranking functions by sets of conditional beliefs with respect to their specific subcontext. By taking into account semantical independencies, we can reduce the complexity of the revision task to local contexts. We show that global belief revision can be set up from revisions on the local contexts via a merging operator. Furthermore, we formalize a variant of the Ramsey-Test based on the idea of local contexts which connects conditional and propositional revision in a straightforward way. We extend the belief change methodology of c-revisions to strategic c-revisions which will serve as a proof of concept