A forward/reverse auction algorithm for asymmetric assignment problems

Includes bibliographical references (p. 20-21).Supported by the NSF. CCR-9108058 Supported by the BM/C3 Technology Branch of the United States Army Strategic Defense Command.by Dimitri P. Bertsekas and David A. Castañon

Joint Downlink Base Station Association and Power Control for Max-Min Fairness: Computation and Complexity

In a heterogeneous network (HetNet) with a large number of low power base stations (BSs), proper user-BS association and power control is crucial to achieving desirable system performance. In this paper, we systematically study the joint BS association and power allocation problem for a downlink cellular network under the max-min fairness criterion. First, we show that this problem is NP-hard. Second, we show that the upper bound of the optimal value can be easily computed, and propose a two-stage algorithm to find a high-quality suboptimal solution. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm is near-optimal in the high-SNR regime. Third, we show that the problem under some additional mild assumptions can be solved to global optima in polynomial time by a semi-distributed algorithm. This result is based on a transformation of the original problem to an assignment problem with gains $\log(g_{ij})$, where $\{g_{ij}\}$ are the channel gains.Comment: 24 pages, 7 figures, a shorter version submitted to IEEE JSA

Auction algorithms for network flow problems : a tutorial introduction

Caption title.Includes bibliographical references (p. 13-15).Research supported by the National Science Foundation. DDM-8903385 CCR-9103804 Research supported by the Army Research Office. DAAL03-86-K-0171by Dimitri P. Bertsekas

Auction algorithms for network flow problems : a tutorial introduction

"May 1992." "This is a greatly revised version of the earlier report LIDS-P-2064."Includes bibliographical references (p. 47-50).Supported by NSF. DDM-8903385 CCR-9103804 Supported by the ARO. DAAL03-86-K-0171by Dimitri P. Bertsekas

Putting auction theory to work : the simultaneous ascending auction

The"simultaneous ascending auction"was first introduced in 1994 to sell licenses to use bands of radio spectrum in the United States. Much of the attention devoted to the auction came from its role in reducing federal regulation of the radio spectrum and allowing market values, rather than administrative fiat, to determine who would use the spectrum resource. Several parts of economic theory proved helpful in designing the rules for simultaneous ascending auction and in thinking about how the design might be improved and adapted for new applications. After briefly reviewing the major rules of the auction in section 2, the author turns in section 3 to an analysis based on tatonnement theory, which regards the auction as a mechanism for discovering an efficient allocation and its supporting prices. The analysis reveals a fundamental difference between situations in which the licenses are mutual substitutes and others in which the same licenses are sometimes substitutes and sometimes complements. Section 4 is a selective account of some applications of game theory to evaluating the simultaneous ascending auction design for spectrum sales. Results like those reported in section 3 have led to renewed interest in auctions in which bids for license packages are permitted. In section 5, the author uses game theory to analyze the biases in a leading proposal for dynamic combinatorial bidding. Section 6 briefly answers two additional questions that economists often ask about auction design: If trading of licenses after the auction is allowed, why does the auction form matter at all for promoting efficient license assignments? Holding fixed the quantity of licenses to be sold, how sharp is the conflict between the objectives of assigning licenses efficiently and obtaining maximum revenue? Section 7 concludes.Economic Theory&Research,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Markets and Market Access,Environmental Economics&Policies,Labor Policies,Markets and Market Access,Access to Markets,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism

Auction algorithms for generalized nonlinear network flow problems

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston UniversityNetwork flow is an area of optimization theory concerned with optimization over networks with a range of applicability in fields such as computer networks, manufacturing, finance, scheduling and routing, telecommunications, and transportation. In both linear and nonlinear networks, a family of primal-dual algorithms based on "approximate" Complementary Slackness (ε-CS) is among the fastest in centralized and distributed environments. These include the auction algorithm for the linear assignment/transportation problems, ε-relaxation and Auction/Sequential Shortest Path (ASSP) for the min-cost flow and max-flow problems. Within this family, the auction algorithm is particularly fast, as it uses "second best" information, as compared to using the more generic ε-relaxation for linear assignment/transportation. Inspired by the success of auction algorithms, we extend them to two important classes of nonlinear network flow problems. We start with the nonlinear Resource Allocation Problem (RAP). This problem consists of optimally assigning N divisible resources to M competing missions/tasks each with its own utility function. This simple yet powerful framework has found applications in diverse fields such as finance, economics, logistics, sensor and wireless networks. RAP is an instance of generalized network (networks with arc gains) flow problem but it has significant special structure analogous to the assignment/transportation problem. We develop a class of auction algorithms for RAP: a finite-time auction algorithm for both synchronous and asynchronous environments followed by a combination of forward and reverse auction with ε-scaling to achieve pseudo polynomial complexity for any non-increasing generalized convex utilities including non-continuous and/ or non-differentiable functions. These techniques are then generalized to handle shipping costs on allocations. Lastly, we demonstrate how these techniques can be used for solving a dynamic RAP where nodes may appear or disappear over time. In later part of the thesis, we consider the convex nonlinear min-cost flow problem. Although E-relaxation and ASSP are among the fastest available techniques here, we illustrate how nonlinear costs, as opposed to linear, introduce a significant bottleneck on the progress that these algorithms make per iteration. We then extend the core idea of the auction algorithm, use of second best to make aggressive steps, to overcome this bottleneck and hence develop a faster version of ε-relaxation. This new algorithm shares the same theoretical complexity as the original but outperforms it in our numerical experiments based on random test problem suites