Resource Allocation with Reverse Pricing for Communication Networks

Reverse pricing has been recognized as an effective tool to handle demand uncertainty in the travel industry (e.g., airlines and hotels). To investigate its viability for communication networks, we study the practical limitations of (operator-driven) time-dependent pricing that has been recently introduced, taking into account demand uncertainty. Compared to (operator-driven) time-dependent pricing, we show that the proposed pricing scheme can achieve "triple-win" solutions: an increase in the total average revenue of the operator; higher average resource utilization efficiency; and an increment in the total average payoff of the users. Our findings provide a new outlook on resource allocation, and design guidelines for adopting the reverse pricing scheme.Comment: to appear in IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC) 2016, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (6 pages, 3 figures

Efficiency Resource Allocation for Device-to-Device Underlay Communication Systems: A Reverse Iterative Combinatorial Auction Based Approach

Peer-to-peer communication has been recently considered as a popular issue for local area services. An innovative resource allocation scheme is proposed to improve the performance of mobile peer-to-peer, i.e., device-to-device (D2D), communications as an underlay in the downlink (DL) cellular networks. To optimize the system sum rate over the resource sharing of both D2D and cellular modes, we introduce a reverse iterative combinatorial auction as the allocation mechanism. In the auction, all the spectrum resources are considered as a set of resource units, which as bidders compete to obtain business while the packages of the D2D pairs are auctioned off as goods in each auction round. We first formulate the valuation of each resource unit, as a basis of the proposed auction. And then a detailed non-monotonic descending price auction algorithm is explained depending on the utility function that accounts for the channel gain from D2D and the costs for the system. Further, we prove that the proposed auction-based scheme is cheat-proof, and converges in a finite number of iteration rounds. We explain non-monotonicity in the price update process and show lower complexity compared to a traditional combinatorial allocation. The simulation results demonstrate that the algorithm efficiently leads to a good performance on the system sum rate.Comment: 26 pages, 6 fgures; IEEE Journals on Selected Areas in Communications, 201

Reciprocity-driven Sparse Network Formation

A resource exchange network is considered, where exchanges among nodes are based on reciprocity. Peers receive from the network an amount of resources commensurate with their contribution. We assume the network is fully connected, and impose sparsity constraints on peer interactions. Finding the sparsest exchanges that achieve a desired level of reciprocity is in general NP-hard. To capture near-optimal allocations, we introduce variants of the Eisenberg-Gale convex program with sparsity penalties. We derive decentralized algorithms, whereby peers approximately compute the sparsest allocations, by reweighted l1 minimization. The algorithms implement new proportional-response dynamics, with nonlinear pricing. The trade-off between sparsity and reciprocity and the properties of graphs induced by sparse exchanges are examined.Comment: 19 page

Energy-Efficient Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks: An Overview of Game-Theoretic Approaches

An overview of game-theoretic approaches to energy-efficient resource allocation in wireless networks is presented. Focusing on multiple-access networks, it is demonstrated that game theory can be used as an effective tool to study resource allocation in wireless networks with quality-of-service (QoS) constraints. A family of non-cooperative (distributed) games is presented in which each user seeks to choose a strategy that maximizes its own utility while satisfying its QoS requirements. The utility function considered here measures the number of reliable bits that are transmitted per joule of energy consumed and, hence, is particulary suitable for energy-constrained networks. The actions available to each user in trying to maximize its own utility are at least the choice of the transmit power and, depending on the situation, the user may also be able to choose its transmission rate, modulation, packet size, multiuser receiver, multi-antenna processing algorithm, or carrier allocation strategy. The best-response strategy and Nash equilibrium for each game is presented. Using this game-theoretic framework, the effects of power control, rate control, modulation, temporal and spatial signal processing, carrier allocation strategy and delay QoS constraints on energy efficiency and network capacity are quantified.Comment: To appear in the IEEE Signal Processing Magazine: Special Issue on Resource-Constrained Signal Processing, Communications and Networking, May 200

Game-theoretic Resource Allocation Methods for Device-to-Device (D2D) Communication

Device-to-device (D2D) communication underlaying cellular networks allows mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets to use the licensed spectrum allocated to cellular services for direct peer-to-peer transmission. D2D communication can use either one-hop transmission (i.e., in D2D direct communication) or multi-hop cluster-based transmission (i.e., in D2D local area networks). The D2D devices can compete or cooperate with each other to reuse the radio resources in D2D networks. Therefore, resource allocation and access for D2D communication can be treated as games. The theories behind these games provide a variety of mathematical tools to effectively model and analyze the individual or group behaviors of D2D users. In addition, game models can provide distributed solutions to the resource allocation problems for D2D communication. The aim of this article is to demonstrate the applications of game-theoretic models to study the radio resource allocation issues in D2D communication. The article also outlines several key open research directions.Comment: Accepted. IEEE Wireless Comms Mag. 201