Do CEOs Ever Lose? Fairness Perspective on the Allocation of Residuals Between CEOs and Shareholders

In this study we introduce a justice perspective to examining the result of bargaining between CEOs and boards over the allocation of firm residuals that ultimately determines CEO compensation. Framing CEO pay as the result of bargaining between CEOs and boards focuses attention on the power of CEOs to increase their share of firm residuals in the form of increased compensation, and the diligence of boards of directors to constrain CEO opportunism. Framing this negotiation through a theory of justice offers an alternative perspective to the search for pay-performance sensitivity. We predict and find that as board diligence in controlling opportunism declines and CEO power increases, CEOs are increasingly able to capture a larger portion of firm residuals relative to shareholders. This finding supports critics who charge that CEO pay violates norms of distributive and procedural justice

A Generic Agent Organisation Framework For Autonomic Systems

Autonomic computing is being advocated as a tool for managing large, complex computing systems. Specifically, self-organisation provides a suitable approach for developing such autonomic systems by incorporating self-management and adaptation properties into large-scale distributed systems. To aid in this development, this paper details a generic problem-solving agent organisation framework that can act as a modelling and simulation platform for autonomic systems. Our framework describes a set of service-providing agents accomplishing tasks through social interactions in dynamically changing organisations. We particularly focus on the organisational structure as it can be used as the basis for the design, development and evaluation of generic algorithms for self-organisation and other approaches towards autonomic systems

Organization of Multi-Agent Systems: An Overview

In complex, open, and heterogeneous environments, agents must be able to reorganize towards the most appropriate organizations to adapt unpredictable environment changes within Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). Types of reorganization can be seen from two different levels. The individual agents level (micro-level) in which an agent changes its behaviors and interactions with other agents to adapt its local environment. And the organizational level (macro-level) in which the whole system changes it structure by adding or removing agents. This chapter is dedicated to overview different aspects of what is called MAS Organization including its motivations, paradigms, models, and techniques adopted for statically or dynamically organizing agents in MAS.Comment: 12 page

Variable time scales, agent-based models, and role-playing games: The PIEPLUE river basin management game

This article presents a specific association of a role-playing game (RPG) and an agent-based model (ABM) aimed at dealing with a large range of time scales. Applications to the field of natural resource management lead one to consider the short time scale of resource use in practice at the same time as the longer ones related to resource dynamics or actors' investments. In their daily practice, stakeholders are translating their long-term strategies, a translation that is contextualized and combined with some cooccurring events. Long-term thinking is required for sustainable use of natural resources, but it should take into account its necessary adaptation on a short time scale. This raises the necessity for tools able to tackle jointly these various time scales. The similarity of architecture between computerized ABMs and RPGs makes them easy to associate in a hybrid tool, targeted at meeting this requirement. The proposition of this article is to allocate the representation of short time scales to computerized ABMs and the long ones to RPGs, while keeping the same static structural conceptual model, shared as a common root by both. This synergy is illustrated with PIEPLUE, an interactive setting tackling water-sharing issues.GESTION DE L'EAU;BASSIN VERSANT;RESSOURCE NATURELLE;MODELE;JEU DE ROLE;SYSTEME MULTIAGENTS;AGENT-BASED MODEL;CASE STUDY OF WATER SHARING;CONCEPTUAL MODEL;HYBRID TOOL;INVESTMENTS;LONG-TERM ISSUES;NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT;PIEPLUE;PARTICIPATORY MODELING;RESOURCE DYNAMICS;RESOURCE USE;ROLE-PLAYING GAME;STAKEHOLDERS;SUSTAINABLE USE OF NATURAL RESOURCES;TIME-SCALE DIVERSITY;VARIABLE TIME SCALES;WATER MANAGEMENT

Theory of the Avatar

The internet has given birth to an expanding number of shared virtual reality spaces, with a collective population well into the millions. These virtual worlds exhibit most of the traits we associate with the Earth world: economic transactions, interpersonal relationships, organic political institutions, and so on. A human being experiences these worlds through an avatar, which is the representation of the self in a given physical medium. Most worlds allow an agent to choose what kind of avatar she or he will inhabit, allowing a person with any kind of Earth body to inhabit a completely different body in the virtual world. The emergence of avatar-mediated living raises both positive and normative questions. This paper explores several choice models involving avatars. Analysis of these models suggests that the emergence of avatar-mediated life may increase aggregate human well-being, while decreasing its cross-sectional variance. These efficiency and equity effects are contingent on the maintenance and protection of certain rights, however, including the right of agents to free movement, unbiased information, and political participation.information and internet services, computer software, equity, justice, inequality, synthetic worlds

A theoretical and computational basis for CATNETS

The main content of this report is the identification and definition of market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. These build the theoretical foundation for the work within the following two years of the CATNETS project. --Grid Computing

Learning to Reach Agreement in a Continuous Ultimatum Game

It is well-known that acting in an individually rational manner, according to the principles of classical game theory, may lead to sub-optimal solutions in a class of problems named social dilemmas. In contrast, humans generally do not have much difficulty with social dilemmas, as they are able to balance personal benefit and group benefit. As agents in multi-agent systems are regularly confronted with social dilemmas, for instance in tasks such as resource allocation, these agents may benefit from the inclusion of mechanisms thought to facilitate human fairness. Although many of such mechanisms have already been implemented in a multi-agent systems context, their application is usually limited to rather abstract social dilemmas with a discrete set of available strategies (usually two). Given that many real-world examples of social dilemmas are actually continuous in nature, we extend this previous work to more general dilemmas, in which agents operate in a continuous strategy space. The social dilemma under study here is the well-known Ultimatum Game, in which an optimal solution is achieved if agents agree on a common strategy. We investigate whether a scale-free interaction network facilitates agents to reach agreement, especially in the presence of fixed-strategy agents that represent a desired (e.g. human) outcome. Moreover, we study the influence of rewiring in the interaction network. The agents are equipped with continuous-action learning automata and play a large number of random pairwise games in order to establish a common strategy. From our experiments, we may conclude that results obtained in discrete-strategy games can be generalized to continuous-strategy games to a certain extent: a scale-free interaction network structure allows agents to achieve agreement on a common strategy, and rewiring in the interaction network greatly enhances the agents ability to reach agreement. However, it also becomes clear that some alternative mechanisms, such as reputation and volunteering, have many subtleties involved and do not have convincing beneficial effects in the continuous case

Theoretical and Computational Basis for Economical Ressource Allocation in Application Layer Networks - Annual Report Year 1

This paper identifies and defines suitable market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. --Grid Computing

Theory of deferred action: Agent-based simulation model for designing complex adaptive systems

Deferred action is the axiom that agents act in emergent organisation to achieve predetermined goals. Enabling deferred action in designed artificial complex adaptive systems like business organisations and IS is problematical. Emergence is an intractable problem for designers because it cannot be predicted. We develop proof-of-concept, conceptual proto-agent model, of emergent organisation and emergent IS to understand better design principles to enable deferred action as a mechanism for coping with emergence in artefacts. We focus on understanding the effect of emergence when designing artificial complex adaptive systems by developing an exploratory proto-agent model and evaluate its suitability for implementation as agent-based simulation