10,701 research outputs found
Game Theory Meets Network Security: A Tutorial at ACM CCS
The increasingly pervasive connectivity of today's information systems brings
up new challenges to security. Traditional security has accomplished a long way
toward protecting well-defined goals such as confidentiality, integrity,
availability, and authenticity. However, with the growing sophistication of the
attacks and the complexity of the system, the protection using traditional
methods could be cost-prohibitive. A new perspective and a new theoretical
foundation are needed to understand security from a strategic and
decision-making perspective. Game theory provides a natural framework to
capture the adversarial and defensive interactions between an attacker and a
defender. It provides a quantitative assessment of security, prediction of
security outcomes, and a mechanism design tool that can enable
security-by-design and reverse the attacker's advantage. This tutorial provides
an overview of diverse methodologies from game theory that includes games of
incomplete information, dynamic games, mechanism design theory to offer a
modern theoretic underpinning of a science of cybersecurity. The tutorial will
also discuss open problems and research challenges that the CCS community can
address and contribute with an objective to build a multidisciplinary bridge
between cybersecurity, economics, game and decision theory
Attack-Resilient Supervisory Control of Discrete-Event Systems
In this work, we study the problem of supervisory control of discrete-event
systems (DES) in the presence of attacks that tamper with inputs and outputs of
the plant. We consider a very general system setup as we focus on both
deterministic and nondeterministic plants that we model as finite state
transducers (FSTs); this also covers the conventional approach to modeling DES
as deterministic finite automata. Furthermore, we cover a wide class of attacks
that can nondeterministically add, remove, or rewrite a sensing and/or
actuation word to any word from predefined regular languages, and show how such
attacks can be modeled by nondeterministic FSTs; we also present how the use of
FSTs facilitates modeling realistic (and very complex) attacks, as well as
provides the foundation for design of attack-resilient supervisory controllers.
Specifically, we first consider the supervisory control problem for
deterministic plants with attacks (i) only on their sensors, (ii) only on their
actuators, and (iii) both on their sensors and actuators. For each case, we
develop new conditions for controllability in the presence of attacks, as well
as synthesizing algorithms to obtain FST-based description of such
attack-resilient supervisors. A derived resilient controller provides a set of
all safe control words that can keep the plant work desirably even in the
presence of corrupted observation and/or if the control words are subjected to
actuation attacks. Then, we extend the controllability theorems and the
supervisor synthesizing algorithms to nondeterministic plants that satisfy a
nonblocking condition. Finally, we illustrate applicability of our methodology
on several examples and numerical case-studies
The Internet of Hackable Things
The Internet of Things makes possible to connect each everyday object to the
Internet, making computing pervasive like never before. From a security and
privacy perspective, this tsunami of connectivity represents a disaster, which
makes each object remotely hackable. We claim that, in order to tackle this
issue, we need to address a new challenge in security: education
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