Reputation Agent: Prompting Fair Reviews in Gig Markets

Our study presents a new tool, Reputation Agent, to promote fairer reviews from requesters (employers or customers) on gig markets. Unfair reviews, created when requesters consider factors outside of a worker's control, are known to plague gig workers and can result in lost job opportunities and even termination from the marketplace. Our tool leverages machine learning to implement an intelligent interface that: (1) uses deep learning to automatically detect when an individual has included unfair factors into her review (factors outside the worker's control per the policies of the market); and (2) prompts the individual to reconsider her review if she has incorporated unfair factors. To study the effectiveness of Reputation Agent, we conducted a controlled experiment over different gig markets. Our experiment illustrates that across markets, Reputation Agent, in contrast with traditional approaches, motivates requesters to review gig workers' performance more fairly. We discuss how tools that bring more transparency to employers about the policies of a gig market can help build empathy thus resulting in reasoned discussions around potential injustices towards workers generated by these interfaces. Our vision is that with tools that promote truth and transparency we can bring fairer treatment to gig workers.Comment: 12 pages, 5 figures, The Web Conference 2020, ACM WWW 202

Tuning the Diversity of Open-Ended Responses from the Crowd

Crowdsourcing can solve problems that current fully automated systems cannot. Its effectiveness depends on the reliability, accuracy, and speed of the crowd workers that drive it. These objectives are frequently at odds with one another. For instance, how much time should workers be given to discover and propose new solutions versus deliberate over those currently proposed? How do we determine if discovering a new answer is appropriate at all? And how do we manage workers who lack the expertise or attention needed to provide useful input to a given task? We present a mechanism that uses distinct payoffs for three possible worker actions---propose,vote, or abstain---to provide workers with the necessary incentives to guarantee an effective (or even optimal) balance between searching for new answers, assessing those currently available, and, when they have insufficient expertise or insight for the task at hand, abstaining. We provide a novel game theoretic analysis for this mechanism and test it experimentally on an image---labeling problem and show that it allows a system to reliably control the balance betweendiscovering new answers and converging to existing ones

Recommendation of Tourism Resources Supported by Crowdsourcing

Context-aware recommendation of personalised tourism resources is possible because of personal mobile devices and powerful data filtering algorithms. The devices contribute with computing capabilities, on board sensors, ubiquitous Internet access and continuous user monitoring, whereas the filtering algorithms provide the ability to match the profile (interests and the context) of the tourist against a large knowledge bases of tourism resources. While, in terms of technology, personal mobile devices can gather user-related information, including the user context and access multiple data sources, the creation and maintenance of an updated knowledge base of tourism-related resources requires a collaborative approach due to the heterogeneity, volume and dynamic nature of the resources. The current PhD thesis aims to contribute to the solution of this problem by adopting a Crowdsourcing approach for the collaborative maintenance of the knowledge base of resources, Trust and Reputation for the validation of uploaded resources as well as publishers, Big Data for user profiling and context-aware filtering algorithms for the personalised recommendation of tourism resources