Joint Cooperative Spectrum Sensing and MAC Protocol Design for Multi-channel Cognitive Radio Networks

In this paper, we propose a semi-distributed cooperative spectrum sen sing (SDCSS) and channel access framework for multi-channel cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In particular, we c onsider a SDCSS scheme where secondary users (SUs) perform sensing and exchange sensing outcomes with ea ch other to locate spectrum holes. In addition, we devise the p -persistent CSMA-based cognitive MAC protocol integrating the SDCSS to enable efficient spectrum sharing among SUs. We then perform throughput analysis and develop an algorithm to determine the spectrum sensing and access parameters to maximize the throughput for a given allocation of channel sensing sets. Moreover, we consider the spectrum sensing set optimization problem for SUs to maxim ize the overall system throughput. We present both exhaustive search and low-complexity greedy algorithms to determine the sensing sets for SUs and analyze their complexity. We also show how our design and analysis can be extended to consider reporting errors. Finally, extensive numerical results are presented to demonstrate the sig nificant performance gain of our optimized design framework with respect to non-optimized designs as well as the imp acts of different protocol parameters on the throughput performance.Comment: accepted for publication EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking, 201

Byzantine Attack and Defense in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Survey

The Byzantine attack in cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS), also known as the spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack in the literature, is one of the key adversaries to the success of cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In the past couple of years, the research on the Byzantine attack and defense strategies has gained worldwide increasing attention. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey and tutorial on the recent advances in the Byzantine attack and defense for CSS in CRNs. Specifically, we first briefly present the preliminaries of CSS for general readers, including signal detection techniques, hypothesis testing, and data fusion. Second, we analyze the spear and shield relation between Byzantine attack and defense from three aspects: the vulnerability of CSS to attack, the obstacles in CSS to defense, and the games between attack and defense. Then, we propose a taxonomy of the existing Byzantine attack behaviors and elaborate on the corresponding attack parameters, which determine where, who, how, and when to launch attacks. Next, from the perspectives of homogeneous or heterogeneous scenarios, we classify the existing defense algorithms, and provide an in-depth tutorial on the state-of-the-art Byzantine defense schemes, commonly known as robust or secure CSS in the literature. Furthermore, we highlight the unsolved research challenges and depict the future research directions.Comment: Accepted by IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutoiral