1,183 research outputs found
Hawks and Doves on Small-World Networks
We explore the Hawk-Dove game on networks with topologies ranging from
regular lattices to random graphs with small-world networks in between. This is
done by means of computer simulations using several update rules for the
population evolutionary dynamics. We find the overall result that cooperation
is sometimes inhibited and sometimes enhanced in those network structures, with
respect to the mixing population case. The differences are due to different
update rules and depend on the gain-to-cost ratio. We analyse and qualitatively
explain this behavior by using local topological arguments.Comment: 12 pages, 8 figure
The Impact of Network Flows on Community Formation in Models of Opinion Dynamics
We study dynamics of opinion formation in a network of coupled agents. As the
network evolves to a steady state, opinions of agents within the same community
converge faster than those of other agents. This framework allows us to study
how network topology and network flow, which mediates the transfer of opinions
between agents, both affect the formation of communities. In traditional models
of opinion dynamics, agents are coupled via conservative flows, which result in
one-to-one opinion transfer. However, social interactions are often
non-conservative, resulting in one-to-many transfer of opinions. We study
opinion formation in networks using one-to-one and one-to-many interactions and
show that they lead to different community structure within the same network.Comment: accepted for publication in The Journal of Mathematical Sociology.
arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1201.238
Evolutionary Dilemmas in a Social Network
We simulate the prisoner's dilemma and hawk-dove games on a real social
acquaintance network. Using a discrete analogue of replicator dynamics, we show
that surprisingly high levels of cooperation can be achieved, contrary to what
happens in unstructured mixing populations. Moreover, we empirically show that
cooperation in this network is stable with respect to invasion by defectors.Comment: 13 pages, 9 figures; to be published in Lecture Notes in Computer
Science 200
Supercooperation in Evolutionary Games on Correlated Weighted Networks
In this work we study the behavior of classical two-person, two-strategies
evolutionary games on a class of weighted networks derived from
Barab\'asi-Albert and random scale-free unweighted graphs. Using customary
imitative dynamics, our numerical simulation results show that the presence of
link weights that are correlated in a particular manner with the degree of the
link endpoints, leads to unprecedented levels of cooperation in the whole
games' phase space, well above those found for the corresponding unweighted
complex networks. We provide intuitive explanations for this favorable behavior
by transforming the weighted networks into unweighted ones with particular
topological properties. The resulting structures help to understand why
cooperation can thrive and also give ideas as to how such supercooperative
networks might be built.Comment: 21 page
Evolution of Cooperation and Coordination in a Dynamically Networked Society
Situations of conflict giving rise to social dilemmas are widespread in
society and game theory is one major way in which they can be investigated.
Starting from the observation that individuals in society interact through
networks of acquaintances, we model the co-evolution of the agents' strategies
and of the social network itself using two prototypical games, the Prisoner's
Dilemma and the Stag Hunt. Allowing agents to dismiss ties and establish new
ones, we find that cooperation and coordination can be achieved through the
self-organization of the social network, a result that is non-trivial,
especially in the Prisoner's Dilemma case. The evolution and stability of
cooperation implies the condensation of agents exploiting particular game
strategies into strong and stable clusters which are more densely connected,
even in the more difficult case of the Prisoner's Dilemma.Comment: 18 pages, 14 figures. to appea
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