Bankruptcy Courts are Divided on Reducing a Debtor’s Obligation to Pay Rent When Government Regulations Restrict a Debtor’s Ability to Generate Income

(Excerpt) Many indoor retail establishments and restaurants that faced shutdowns due to the COVID-19 pandemic (the “Pandemic”) filed voluntary petitions for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”), and subsequently requested rent abatement under § 365(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code or state law. Notwithstanding the unique and extreme circumstances caused by the Pandemic, not all bankruptcy courts agree on the extent to which judges have the discretion to grant abatement motions for rent payments that are otherwise due under § 365(d)(3). Some bankruptcy courts have granted debtors the ability to defer post-petition rent payments, especially in the early months of the Pandemic. However, rent abatement is not a guarantee in chapter 11. This Memorandum addresses the varying views of bankruptcy courts with respect to rent abatement. Part I examines the different rationales based in the Bankruptcy Code or contract doctrines for rent abatement. Part II illustrates examples of bankruptcy courts’ approach to rent abatement motions throughout different stages of the Pandemic

On Computing Shannon’s Sphere Packing Bound and Applications

file: :home/zaki/.local/share/data/Mendeley Ltd./Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Ahmed, Ambroze, Tomlinson - 2007 - On Computing Shannon’s Sphere Packing Bound and Applications.pdf:pdf keywords: SPB mendeley-tags: SPBA new method to numerically evalu- ate Shannon’s lower bound is presented in this pa- per. This new method is based on the Incomplete Beta function and permits the exact evaluation of the Sphere Packing Bound for a large range of code sizes, rates and probability of error. Comparisons with cur- rent standards (DVB–RCS, DVB–S2 and 3GPP) are also presented and discussed. It is shown that cur- rent standard coding schemes are about 0.6dB from the Shannon Limit corrected for Binary Signalling

A Bankruptcy Court May Temporarily Suspend Rent Obligation

(Excerpt) Section 365(d)(3) of title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) authorizes a court to “extend, for cause, the time for performance of any [rent] obligation[‘s] [on unexpired leases of nonresidential real property] that arise[] within 60 days after the date of the order for relief[.]” Historically, courts have recognized that under § 365(d)(3), there is a statutory obligation on debtors to pay rent on unexpired leases. Courts have also recognized that if a debtor’s rent obligation is deferred, lessors are entitled to adequate protection. However, courts are divided on the exact timing of when a debtor’s statutory obligation to pay rent arises, what circumstances permit courts to defer a debtor’s rent obligation, and the subsequent treatment of lessors’ claims. Consequently, the Covid-19 pandemic has created challenges that have further complicated the already unclear applicability of § 365(d)(3). This memorandum analyzes a court’s ability to defer a debtor’s statutory rent obligations on unexpired leases. Part I discusses the majority and minority positions regarding § 365(d)(3) rent deferral issues that were prevalent in jurisprudence prior to the Covid-19 pandemic. Part II addresses how the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, one of the first courts to address the issue of rent deferral during a pandemic, approached these unparalleled circumstances. Part III analyzes how courts have since dealt with these issues throughout the pandemic

Homeless People Count: Vacant Properties in Manhattan

We need significant changes in housing policy to develop real housing out of empty property. Our core demands include: Creation of a regular citywide census of vacant buildings and lots. Empowerment of NYC Department of Buildings to expand the Building Code concerning "nuisance" buildings, to declare unoccupied buildings "nuisances" on the grounds that they are "detrimental to the life or health" of the community at large, including homeless people. Empowerment of NYC HPD to levy an annually-increasing fine against non-compliant landlords in an amount equivalent to the current cost of bringing the building online. Development of a mechanism by which DHS-funded shelter residents can "opt out" of shelter and into housing, with a portion of the money currently being paid by the City to their shelter being used to rehabilitate empty buildings. Amendment of NYC Rent Stabilization guidelines to ensure that when these properties are brought back online, previously-rent-stabilized units, which typically lose their stabilization as a result of their vacancy, will revert to stabilized status

Optimal taxation with rent-seeking

We develop a framework for optimal taxation when agents can earn their income both in traditional activities, where private and social products coincide, and in rent-seeking activities, where private returns exceed social returns either because they involve the capture of pre-existing rents or because they reduce the returns to traditional work. We characterize Pareto optimal income taxes that do not condition on how much of an individual's income is earned in each of the two activities. These optimal taxes feature an externality-corrective term, the magnitude of which depends both on the Pigouvian correction that would obtain if rent-seeking incomes could be perfectly targeted and on the relative impact of rent-seeking externalities on the private returns to traditional and to rent-seeking activities. If rent-seeking externalities primarily affect other rent-seekers, for example, the optimal correction lies strictly below the Pigouvian correction. A calibrated model indicates that the gap between the Pigouvian and optimal correction can be quantitatively important. Our results thus point to a hefty informational requirement for correcting rent-seeking externalities through the income tax code

Taxation of Profit Interests and the Reverse Mancur Olson Phenomenon

The Article proceeds from this point through four acts, each of which highlights, largely without subjective judgment whenever possible, the rent-seeking and rent extraction motivations animating the outcomes. Indeed, the Article agrees with the idea that rent seeking and rent extractions are rational behaviors and indeed may even have a legitimate place in tax law. So, in Act I the Article describes the law as it came to be as a result of Diamond v. Commissioner, a relatively small dollar amount case that challenged the unstated political compromise theretofore existing. Diamond and its aftermath provide the first evidence of successful rent-seeking behavior in the tax code with regard to the taxation of profit interests. The case expressed before-the-fact agreement with Fleischer\u27s proposal.\u27 8 Indeed, the legal outcome initially confirmed that rent-seeking would not prevail over sound tax policy. Surprisingly, that is if one ignores rational rent-seeking behavior as a determinate of tax law, the government promptly gave away that confirmation. The give-away was so stark that the judiciary once rejected the government\u27s concession. When, in a case subsequent to Diamond, the IRS attempted to disavow its policy-justified victory, that court explicitly rejected the disavowal. Even in that instance, though, the manner in which the court rejected the rent seeking outcome made possible by the government\u27s attempted disavowal left open the possibility that rent-seeking would eventually be rewarded

Assessing the Distributional Effects of Housing Taxation in Italy: From the Actual Tax Code to Imputed Rent

The presence of extensive housing subsidies characterises the current tax systems as inefficient. In this paper, we study whether inefficiency is the price to be paid to improve equity, by assessing the actual distributive impact of housing taxation on Italian households. We concentrate on the personal income tax on the main residence, and compare provisions of the Tax Code with an alternative approach, by considering the imputed rent from owner-occupied dwelling as a component of the Personal Income Tax gross income. Our results suggest that current tax system is just as inefficient as it is inequitable.housing taxation, imputed rents, microsimulation models

Decentralization and corruption - evidence across countries

The relationship between decentralization of government activities and the extent of rent extraction by private parties is an important element in the recent debate on institutional design. The theoretical literature makes ambiguous predictions about this relationship, and it has remained virtually unexamined by empiricists. The authors make a first attempt at examining the issue empirically, by looking at the cross-country relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption as measured by a number of different indices. Their estimates suggest that fiscal decentralization in government spending is significantly associated with lower corruption. Moreover, they find that the origin of a country's legal system - for example, civil versus common legal code - performs extremely well as an instrument for decentralization. The estimated relationship between decentralization, when so instrumented, and corruption is even stronger. The evidence suggests a number of interesting areas for future work, including investigating whether there are specific services for which decentralized provision has a particularly strong impact on political rent extraction, and understanding the channels through which decentralization succeeds in keeping corruption in check.National Governance,Decentralization,Pharmaceuticals&Pharmacoeconomics,Economic Theory&Research,Legal Products,National Governance,Governance Indicators,Pharmaceuticals&Pharmacoeconomics,Economic Theory&Research,Legal Products

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS - LIABILITY OF ORIGINAL LESSEE\u27S ESTATE ON ASSIGNED LONG - TERM LEASE

Defendant\u27s testator had entered into a ninety-nine year lease with the plaintiff lessor, and shortly afterward, with the consent of the plaintiff, had assigned the lease to a corporation. The lease was renewable forever. Fourteen years later the original lessee died testate, leaving an estate of approximately $1,000,000. The lessor now seeks to have the court impound nearly all of the estate as security for future rent payments. At the time of suit there had been no default in rent installments. Held, plaintiff has no present cause of action. In the absence of any default in rent, mere privity of contract with the original lessee\u27s estate does not render lessor\u27s claim for security for future rent a debt not due in contemplation of the code provisions defining allowable claims against an estate. Meek v. City Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 65 Ohio App. 349, 30 N. E. (2d) 347 (1940)

The tax treatment of homeowners and landlords and the progressivity of income taxation

This paper analyzes the connection between the asymmetric tax treatment of homeowners and landlords and the progressivity of income taxation using a quantitative overlapping generations general equilibrium model with housing and rental markets. Our model emphasizes the determinants of tenure choice (own vs. rent) and the household decision to supply housing services to the rental market. This formulation breaks the link between the rental price and the equilibrium interest rate and, hence, the aggregate supply of rental property responds differently to the direction of rental price changes, marginal tax rate changes, and maintenance cost changes. We show that the model replicates the key factors and the distributional patterns of ownership, house size, and landlords. The degree of progressivity in the income tax code has important implications for housing tenure and housing consumption. We find a movement toward a less progressive income tax code can generate sizeable increases in homeownership and welfare that result from the equilibrium effects and a portfolio reallocation mechanism absent in economies with a single asset (i.e. Conesa and Krueger (2006)). An examination of the removal of existing asymmetries in the tax code are found to have effects on housing that differ from those reported in the literature. We show that housing policy can increase the ownership rate of a particular segment of the population, but generate nontrivial distributional costs. The welfare increases are no larger than those found when the progressivity of the tax code is reduced.Home ownership ; Taxation