162 research outputs found

    ROVER: a DNS-based method to detect and prevent IP hijacks

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    2013 Fall.Includes bibliographical references.The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is critical to the global internet infrastructure. Unfortunately BGP routing was designed with limited regard for security. As a result, IP route hijacking has been observed for more than 16 years. Well known incidents include a 2008 hijack of YouTube, loss of connectivity for Australia in February 2012, and an event that partially crippled Google in November 2012. Concern has been escalating as critical national infrastructure is reliant on a secure foundation for the Internet. Disruptions to military, banking, utilities, industry, and commerce can be catastrophic. In this dissertation we propose ROVER (Route Origin VERification System), a novel and practical solution for detecting and preventing origin and sub-prefix hijacks. ROVER exploits the reverse DNS for storing route origin data and provides a fail-safe, best effort approach to authentication. This approach can be used with a variety of operational models including fully dynamic in-line BGP filtering, periodically updated authenticated route filters, and real-time notifications for network operators. Our thesis is that ROVER systems can be deployed by a small number of institutions in an incremental fashion and still effectively thwart origin and sub-prefix IP hijacking despite non-participation by the majority of Autonomous System owners. We then present research results supporting this statement. We evaluate the effectiveness of ROVER using simulations on an Internet scale topology as well as with tests on real operational systems. Analyses include a study of IP hijack propagation patterns, effectiveness of various deployment models, critical mass requirements, and an examination of ROVER resilience and scalability

    From the edge to the core : towards informed vantage point selection for internet measurement studies

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    Since the early days of the Internet, measurement scientists are trying to keep up with the fast-paced development of the Internet. As the Internet grew organically over time and without build-in measurability, this process requires many workarounds and due diligence. As a result, every measurement study is only as good as the data it relies on. Moreover, data quality is relative to the research question—a data set suitable to analyze one problem may be insufficient for another. This is entirely expected as the Internet is decentralized, i.e., there is no single observation point from which we can assess the complete state of the Internet. Because of that, every measurement study needs specifically selected vantage points, which fit the research question. In this thesis, we present three different vantage points across the Internet topology— from the edge to the Internet core. We discuss their specific features, suitability for different kinds of research questions, and how to work with the corresponding data. The data sets obtained at the presented vantage points allow us to conduct three different measurement studies and shed light on the following aspects: (a) The prevalence of IP source address spoofing at a large European Internet Exchange Point (IXP), (b) the propagation distance of BGP communities, an optional transitive BGP attribute used for traffic engineering, and (c) the impact of the global COVID-19 pandemic on Internet usage behavior at a large Internet Service Provider (ISP) and three IXPs.Seit den frühen Tagen des Internets versuchen Forscher im Bereich Internet Measu- rement, mit der rasanten Entwicklung des des Internets Schritt zu halten. Da das Internet im Laufe der Zeit organisch gewachsen ist und nicht mit Blick auf Messbar- keit entwickelt wurde, erfordert dieser Prozess eine Meg Workarounds und Sorgfalt. Jede Measurement Studie ist nur so gut wie die Daten, auf die sie sich stützt. Und Datenqualität ist relativ zur Forschungsfrage - ein Datensatz, der für die Analyse eines Problems geeiget ist, kann für ein anderes unzureichend sein. Dies ist durchaus zu erwarten, da das Internet dezentralisiert ist, d. h. es gibt keinen einzigen Be- obachtungspunkt, von dem aus wir den gesamten Zustand des Internets beurteilen können. Aus diesem Grund benötigt jede Measurement Studie gezielt ausgewählte Beobachtungspunkte, die zur Forschungsfrage passen. In dieser Arbeit stellen wir drei verschiedene Beobachtungspunkte vor, die sich über die gsamte Internet-Topologie erstrecken— vom Rand bis zum Kern des Internets. Wir diskutieren ihre spezifischen Eigenschaften, ihre Eignung für verschiedene Klas- sen von Forschungsfragen und den Umgang mit den entsprechenden Daten. Die an den vorgestellten Beobachtungspunkten gewonnenen Datensätze ermöglichen uns die Durchführung von drei verschiedenen Measurement Studien und damit die folgenden Aspekte zu beleuchten: (a) Die Prävalenz von IP Source Address Spoofing bei einem großen europäischen Internet Exchange Point (IXP), (b) die Ausbreitungsdistanz von BGP-Communities, ein optionales transitives BGP-Attribut, das Anwendung im Bereich Traffic-Enigneering findet sowie (c) die Auswirkungen der globalen COVID- 19-Pandemie auf das Internet-Nutzungsverhalten an einem großen Internet Service Provider (ISP) und drei IXPs

    Impact of prefix hijacking on payments of providers

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    Abstract—Whereas prefix hijacking is usually examined from security perspectives, this paper looks at it from a novel economic angle. Our study stems from an observation that a transit AS (Autonomous System) has a financial interest in attracting extra traffic to the links with its customers. Based on real data about the actual hijacking incident in the Internet, we conduct simulations in the real AS-level Internet topology with synthetic demands for the hijacked traffic. Then, we measure traffic on all inter-AS links and compute the payments of all providers. The analysis of our results from technical, business, and legal viewpoints suggests that hijacking-based traffic attraction is a viable strategy that can create a fertile ground for tussles between providers. In particular, giant top-tier providers appear to have the strongest financial incentives to hijack popular prefixes and then deliver the intercepted traffic to the proper destinations. We also discuss directions for future research in the area of hijacking-based traffic attraction

    Leveraging Conventional Internet Routing Protocol Behavior to Defeat DDoS and Adverse Networking Conditions

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    The Internet is a cornerstone of modern society. Yet increasingly devastating attacks against the Internet threaten to undermine the Internet\u27s success at connecting the unconnected. Of all the adversarial campaigns waged against the Internet and the organizations that rely on it, distributed denial of service, or DDoS, tops the list of the most volatile attacks. In recent years, DDoS attacks have been responsible for large swaths of the Internet blacking out, while other attacks have completely overwhelmed key Internet services and websites. Core to the Internet\u27s functionality is the way in which traffic on the Internet gets from one destination to another. The set of rules, or protocol, that defines the way traffic travels the Internet is known as the Border Gateway Protocol, or BGP, the de facto routing protocol on the Internet. Advanced adversaries often target the most used portions of the Internet by flooding the routes benign traffic takes with malicious traffic designed to cause widespread traffic loss to targeted end users and regions. This dissertation focuses on examining the following thesis statement. Rather than seek to redefine the way the Internet works to combat advanced DDoS attacks, we can leverage conventional Internet routing behavior to mitigate modern distributed denial of service attacks. The research in this work breaks down into a single arc with three independent, but connected thrusts, which demonstrate that the aforementioned thesis is possible, practical, and useful. The first thrust demonstrates that this thesis is possible by building and evaluating Nyx, a system that can protect Internet networks from DDoS using BGP, without an Internet redesign and without cooperation from other networks. This work reveals that Nyx is effective in simulation for protecting Internet networks and end users from the impact of devastating DDoS. The second thrust examines the real-world practicality of Nyx, as well as other systems which rely on real-world BGP behavior. Through a comprehensive set of real-world Internet routing experiments, this second thrust confirms that Nyx works effectively in practice beyond simulation as well as revealing novel insights about the effectiveness of other Internet security defensive and offensive systems. We then follow these experiments by re-evaluating Nyx under the real-world routing constraints we discovered. The third thrust explores the usefulness of Nyx for mitigating DDoS against a crucial industry sector, power generation, by exposing the latent vulnerability of the U.S. power grid to DDoS and how a system such as Nyx can protect electric power utilities. This final thrust finds that the current set of exposed U.S. power facilities are widely vulnerable to DDoS that could induce blackouts, and that Nyx can be leveraged to reduce the impact of these targeted DDoS attacks

    Detecting IP prefix hijack events using BGP activity and AS connectivity analysis

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    The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), the main component of core Internet connectivity, suffers vulnerability issues related to the impersonation of the ownership of IP prefixes for Autonomous Systems (ASes). In this context, a number of studies have focused on securing the BGP through several techniques, such as monitoring-based, historical-based and statistical-based behavioural models. In spite of the significant research undertaken, the proposed solutions cannot detect the IP prefix hijack accurately or even differentiate it from other types of attacks that could threaten the performance of the BGP. This research proposes three novel detection methods aimed at tracking the behaviour of BGP edge routers and detecting IP prefix hijacks based on statistical analysis of variance, the attack signature approach and a classification-based technique. The first detection method uses statistical analysis of variance to identify hijacking behaviour through the normal operation of routing information being exchanged among routers and their behaviour during the occurrence of IP prefix hijacking. However, this method failed to find any indication of IP prefix hijacking because of the difficulty of having raw BGP data hijacking-free. The research also proposes another detection method that parses BGP advertisements (announcements) and checks whether IP prefixes are announced or advertised by more than one AS. If so, events are selected for further validation using Regional Internet Registry (RIR) databases to determine whether the ASes announcing the prefixes are owned by the same organisation or different organisations. Advertisements for the same IP prefix made by ASes owned by different organisations are subsequently identified as hijacking events. The proposed algorithm of the detection method was validated using the 2008 YouTube Pakistan hijack event; the analysis demonstrates that the algorithm qualitatively increases the accuracy of detecting IP prefix hijacks. The algorithm is very accurate as long as the RIRs (Regional Internet Registries) are updated concurrently with hijacking detection. The detection method and can be integrated and work with BGP routers separately. Another detection method is proposed to detect IP prefix hijacking using a combination of signature-based (parsing-based) and classification-based techniques. The parsing technique is used as a pre-processing phase before the classification-based method. Some features are extracted based on the connectivity behaviour of the suspicious ASes given by the parsing technique. In other words, this detection method tracks the behaviour of the suspicious ASes and follows up with an analysis of their interaction with directly and indirectly connected neighbours based on a set of features extracted from the ASPATH information about the suspicious ASes. Before sending the extracted feature values to the best five classifiers that can work with the specifications of an implemented classification dataset, the detection method computes the similarity between benign and malicious behaviours to determine to what extent the classifiers can distinguish suspicious behaviour from benign behaviour and then detect the hijacking. Evaluation tests of the proposed algorithm demonstrated that the detection method was able to detect the hijacks with 96% accuracy and can be integrated and work with BGP routers separately.Saudi Cultural Burea

    On the Effectiveness of BGP Hijackers That Evade Public Route Collectors

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    Routing hijack attacks have plagued the Internet for decades. After many failed mitigation attempts, recent Internet-wide BGP monitoring infrastructures relying on distributed route collection systems, called route collectors, give us hope that future monitor systems can quickly detect and ultimately mitigate hijacks. In this paper, we investigate the effectiveness of public route collectors with respect to future attackers deliberately engineering longer hijacks to avoid being recorded by route collectors. Our extensive simulations (and attacks we device) show that monitor-based systems may be unable to observe many carefully crafted hijacks diverting traffic from thousands of ASes. Hijackers could predict whether their attacks would propagate to some BGP feeders (i.e., monitors) of public route collectors. Then, manipulate BGP route propagation so that the attack never reaches those monitors. This observation remains true when considering plausible future Internet topologies, with more IXP links and up to 4 times more monitors peering with route collectors. We then evaluate the feasibility of performing hijacks not observed by route collectors in the real-world. We experiment with two classifiers to predict the monitors that are dangerous to report the attack to route collectors, one based on monitor proximities (i.e., shortest path lengths) and another based on Gao-Rexford routing policies. We show that a proximity-based classifier could be sufficient for the hijacker to identify all dangerous monitors for hijacks announced to peer-to-peer neighbors. For hijacks announced to transit networks, a Gao-Rexford classifier reduces wrong inferences by ≥91%\ge 91\% without introducing new misclassifications for existing dangerous monitors

    BGP Security in Partial Deployment: Is the Juice Worth the Squeeze?

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    As the rollout of secure route origin authentication with the RPKI slowly gains traction among network operators, there is a push to standardize secure path validation for BGP (i.e., S*BGP: S-BGP, soBGP, BGPSEC, etc.). Origin authentication already does much to improve routing security. Moreover, the transition to S*BGP is expected to be long and slow, with S*BGP coexisting in "partial deployment" alongside BGP for a long time. We therefore use theoretical and experimental approach to study the security benefits provided by partially-deployed S*BGP, vis-a-vis those already provided by origin authentication. Because routing policies have a profound impact on routing security, we use a survey of 100 network operators to find the policies that are likely to be most popular during partial S*BGP deployment. We find that S*BGP provides only meagre benefits over origin authentication when these popular policies are used. We also study the security benefits of other routing policies, provide prescriptive guidelines for partially-deployed S*BGP, and show how interactions between S*BGP and BGP can introduce new vulnerabilities into the routing system

    A Macroscopic Study of Network Security Threats at the Organizational Level.

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    Defenders of today's network are confronted with a large number of malicious activities such as spam, malware, and denial-of-service attacks. Although many studies have been performed on how to mitigate security threats, the interaction between attackers and defenders is like a game of Whac-a-Mole, in which the security community is chasing after attackers rather than helping defenders to build systematic defensive solutions. As a complement to these studies that focus on attackers or end hosts, this thesis studies security threats from the perspective of the organization, the central authority that manages and defends a group of end hosts. This perspective provides a balanced position to understand security problems and to deploy and evaluate defensive solutions. This thesis explores how a macroscopic view of network security from an organization's perspective can be formed to help measure, understand, and mitigate security threats. To realize this goal, we bring together a broad collection of reputation blacklists. We first measure the properties of the malicious sources identified by these blacklists and their impact on an organization. We then aggregate the malicious sources to Internet organizations and characterize the maliciousness of organizations and their evolution over a period of two and half years. Next, we aim to understand the cause of different maliciousness levels in different organizations. By examining the relationship between eight security mismanagement symptoms and the maliciousness of organizations, we find a strong positive correlation between mismanagement and maliciousness. Lastly, motivated by the observation that there are organizations that have a significant fraction of their IP addresses involved in malicious activities, we evaluate the tradeoff of one type of mitigation solution at the organization level --- network takedowns.PhDComputer Science and EngineeringUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/116714/1/jingzj_1.pd

    Novel architectures and strategies for security offloading

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    Internet has become an indispensable and powerful tool in our modern society. Its ubiquitousness, pervasiveness and applicability have fostered paradigm changes around many aspects of our lives. This phenomena has positioned the network and its services as fundamental assets over which we rely and trust. However, Internet is far from being perfect. It has considerable security issues and vulnerabilities that jeopardize its main core functionalities with negative impact over its players. Furthermore, these vulnerabilities¿ complexities have been amplified along with the evolution of Internet user mobility. In general, Internet security includes both security for the correct network operation and security for the network users and endpoint devices. The former involves the challenges around the Internet core control and management vulnerabilities, while the latter encompasses security vulnerabilities over end users and endpoint devices. Similarly, Internet mobility poses major security challenges ranging from routing complications, connectivity disruptions and lack of global authentication and authorization. The purpose of this thesis is to present the design of novel architectures and strategies for improving Internet security in a non-disruptive manner. Our novel security proposals follow a protection offloading approach. The motives behind this paradigm target the further enhancement of the security protection while minimizing the intrusiveness and disturbance over the Internet routing protocols, its players and users. To accomplish such level of transparency, the envisioned solutions leverage on well-known technologies, namely, Software Defined Networks, Network Function Virtualization and Fog Computing. From the Internet core building blocks, we focus on the vulnerabilities of two key routing protocols that play a fundamental role in the present and the future of the Internet, i.e., the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) and the Locator-Identifier Split Protocol (LISP). To this purpose, we first investigate current BGP vulnerabilities and countermeasures with emphasis in an unresolved security issue defined as Route Leaks. Therein, we discuss the reasons why different BGP security proposals have failed to be adopted, and the necessity to propose innovative solutions that minimize the impact over the already deployed routing solution. To this end, we propose pragmatic security methodologies to offload the protection with the following advantages: no changes to the BGP protocol, neither dependency on third party information nor on third party security infrastructure, and self-beneficial. Similarly, we research the current LISP vulnerabilities with emphasis on its control plane and mobility support. We leverage its by-design separation of control and data planes to propose an enhanced location-identifier registration process of end point identifiers. This proposal improves the mobility of end users with regards on securing a dynamic traffic steering over the Internet. On the other hand, from the end user and devices perspective we research new paradigms and architectures with the aim of enhancing their protection in a more controllable and consolidated manner. To this end, we propose a new paradigm which shifts the device-centric protection paradigm toward a user-centric protection. Our proposal focus on the decoupling or extending of the security protection from the end devices toward the network edge. It seeks the homogenization of the enforced protection per user independently of the device utilized. We further investigate this paradigm in a mobility user scenario. Similarly, we extend this proposed paradigm to the IoT realm and its intrinsic security challenges. Therein, we propose an alternative to protect both the things, and the services that leverage from them by consolidating the security at the network edge. We validate our proposal by providing experimental results from prof-of-concepts implementations.Internet se ha convertido en una poderosa e indispensable herramienta para nuestra sociedad moderna. Su omnipresencia y aplicabilidad han promovido grandes cambios en diferentes aspectos de nuestras vidas. Este fenómeno ha posicionado a la red y sus servicios como activos fundamentales sobre los que contamos y confiamos. Sin embargo, Internet está lejos de ser perfecto. Tiene considerables problemas de seguridad y vulnerabilidades que ponen en peligro sus principales funcionalidades. Además, las complejidades de estas vulnerabilidades se han ampliado junto con la evolución de la movilidad de usuarios de Internet y su limitado soporte. La seguridad de Internet incluye tanto la seguridad para el correcto funcionamiento de la red como la seguridad para los usuarios y sus dispositivos. El primero implica los desafíos relacionados con las vulnerabilidades de control y gestión de la infraestructura central de Internet, mientras que el segundo abarca las vulnerabilidades de seguridad sobre los usuarios finales y sus dispositivos. Del mismo modo, la movilidad en Internet plantea importantes desafíos de seguridad que van desde las complicaciones de enrutamiento, interrupciones de la conectividad y falta de autenticación y autorización globales. El propósito de esta tesis es presentar el diseño de nuevas arquitecturas y estrategias para mejorar la seguridad de Internet de una manera no perturbadora. Nuestras propuestas de seguridad siguen un enfoque de desacople de la protección. Los motivos detrás de este paradigma apuntan a la mejora adicional de la seguridad mientras que minimizan la intrusividad y la perturbación sobre los protocolos de enrutamiento de Internet, sus actores y usuarios. Para lograr este nivel de transparencia, las soluciones previstas aprovechan nuevas tecnologías, como redes definidas por software (SDN), virtualización de funciones de red (VNF) y computación en niebla. Desde la perspectiva central de Internet, nos centramos en las vulnerabilidades de dos protocolos de enrutamiento clave que desempeñan un papel fundamental en el presente y el futuro de Internet, el Protocolo de Puerta de Enlace Fronterizo (BGP) y el Protocolo de Separación Identificador/Localizador (LISP ). Para ello, primero investigamos las vulnerabilidades y medidas para contrarrestar un problema no resuelto en BGP definido como Route Leaks. Proponemos metodologías pragmáticas de seguridad para desacoplar la protección con las siguientes ventajas: no cambios en el protocolo BGP, cero dependencia en la información de terceros, ni de infraestructura de seguridad de terceros, y de beneficio propio. Del mismo modo, investigamos las vulnerabilidades actuales sobre LISP con énfasis en su plano de control y soporte de movilidad. Aprovechamos la separacçón de sus planos de control y de datos para proponer un proceso mejorado de registro de identificadores de ubicación y punto final, validando de forma segura sus respectivas autorizaciones. Esta propuesta mejora la movilidad de los usuarios finales con respecto a segurar un enrutamiento dinámico del tráfico a través de Internet. En paralelo, desde el punto de vista de usuarios finales y dispositivos investigamos nuevos paradigmas y arquitecturas con el objetivo de mejorar su protección de forma controlable y consolidada. Con este fin, proponemos un nuevo paradigma hacia una protección centrada en el usuario. Nuestra propuesta se centra en el desacoplamiento o ampliación de la protección de seguridad de los dispositivos finales hacia el borde de la red. La misma busca la homogeneización de la protección del usuario independientemente del dispositivo utilizado. Además, investigamos este paradigma en un escenario con movilidad. Validamos nuestra propuesta proporcionando resultados experimentales obtenidos de diferentes experimentos y pruebas de concepto implementados.Postprint (published version

    Internet Interconnection Ecosystem in Finland

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    For both fixed and mobile network operators, interconnection constitutes an indisputably key element to provide end users with a variety of services. Internet interconnection is particularly an intriguing subject due to the importance of the Internet in our everyday lives and our genuine curiosity to grasp its underlying structure. This thesis aims to provide a holistic approach to study the Internet interconnections in a nation-centric stance. To accomplish the objective, initially the method that breaks down the key features of the interconnection analysis is introduced. The nation-centric analysis is conducted for Finland by jointly utilizing the Internet registry data and collected Internet routing data. Covering the last decade of the Finnish Internet, the longitudinal analysis yields significant findings for the Internet address usage statistics and the level of multi-homed networks, along with the classification and inference of relationships between stakeholders in the interconnection ecosystem. The implications that the emerging interconnection models pose for the future global service delivery among both fixed and mobile networks are expounded from the perspective of the existing domestic interconnection practices. The longitudinal interconnectivity study allows us to comprehend both technical and business interfaces between market players by revealing a complete list of customer-provider relationships. Within a national milieu, the assessment of the current Internet market dynamics and future implications of emerging models can be considered in more rationally anticipated manner. Hence, authorities who desire to design new pricing schemes and policies for future networking interconnections can be guided more thoroughly
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