A Neural Architecture for Designing Truthful and Efficient Auctions

Auctions are protocols to allocate goods to buyers who have preferences over them, and collect payments in return. Economists have invested significant effort in designing auction rules that result in allocations of the goods that are desirable for the group as a whole. However, for settings where participants' valuations of the items on sale are their private information, the rules of the auction must deter buyers from misreporting their preferences, so as to maximize their own utility, since misreported preferences hinder the ability for the auctioneer to allocate goods to those who want them most. Manual auction design has yielded excellent mechanisms for specific settings, but requires significant effort when tackling new domains. We propose a deep learning based approach to automatically design auctions in a wide variety of domains, shifting the design work from human to machine. We assume that participants' valuations for the items for sale are independently sampled from an unknown but fixed distribution. Our system receives a data-set consisting of such valuation samples, and outputs an auction rule encoding the desired incentive structure. We focus on producing truthful and efficient auctions that minimize the economic burden on participants. We evaluate the auctions designed by our framework on well-studied domains, such as multi-unit and combinatorial auctions, showing that they outperform known auction designs in terms of the economic burden placed on participants

dOpenCL: Towards a Uniform Programming Approach for Distributed Heterogeneous Multi-/Many-Core Systems

Modern computer systems are becoming increasingly heterogeneous by comprising multi-core CPUs, GPUs, and other accelerators. Current programming approaches for such systems usually require the application developer to use a combination of several programming models (e. g., MPI with OpenCL or CUDA) in order to exploit the full compute capability of a system. In this paper, we present dOpenCL (Distributed OpenCL) – a uniform approach to programming distributed heterogeneous systems with accelerators. dOpenCL extends the OpenCL standard, such that arbitrary computing devices installed on any node of a distributed system can be used together within a single application. dOpenCL allows moving data and program code to these devices in a transparent, portable manner. Since dOpenCL is designed as a fully-fledged implementation of the OpenCL API, it allows running existing OpenCL applications in a heterogeneous distributed environment without any modifications. We describe in detail the mechanisms that are required to implement OpenCL for distributed systems, including a device management mechanism for running multiple applications concurrently. Using three application studies, we compare the performance of dOpenCL with MPI+OpenCL and a standard OpenCL implementation

Costs, Preferences, and Institutions: An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Government Decentralization

This paper examines the factors determining vertical government structures. An empirical analysis for a panel of OECD countries indicates that apart from preferences, economies of scale, and other factors, institutions explain cross-national differences in the degree of fiscal decentralization. Accounting for taxing powers of subnational governments, the evidence strongly supports the collusion hypothesis according to which delegation of decision-making concerning the assignment of powers and national legislation to subnational representatives leads to increased tax centralization, as compared to direct participation of the citizens of the subnational entities. On the other hand, direct democracy at the national level is associated with higher centralization. --Determinants of Decentralization,Decision-making Institutions,Decentralization Theorem,Collusion Hypothesis

Recent advances in industrial wireless sensor networks towards efficient management in IoT

With the accelerated development of Internet-of- Things (IoT), wireless sensor networks (WSN) are gaining importance in the continued advancement of information and communication technologies, and have been connected and integrated with Internet in vast industrial applications. However, given the fact that most wireless sensor devices are resource constrained and operate on batteries, the communication overhead and power consumption are therefore important issues for wireless sensor networks design. In order to efficiently manage these wireless sensor devices in a unified manner, the industrial authorities should be able to provide a network infrastructure supporting various WSN applications and services that facilitate the management of sensor-equipped real-world entities. This paper presents an overview of industrial ecosystem, technical architecture, industrial device management standards and our latest research activity in developing a WSN management system. The key approach to enable efficient and reliable management of WSN within such an infrastructure is a cross layer design of lightweight and cloud-based RESTful web service

Dynamic Auctions: A Survey

We survey the recent literature on designing auctions and mechanisms for dynamic settings. Two settings are considered: those with a dynamic population of agents or buyers whose private information remains fixed throughout time; and those with a fixed population of agents or buyers whose private information changes across time. Within each of these settings, we discuss both efficient (welfare-maximizing) and optimal (revenue-maximizing) mechanisms.Dynamic auctions and mechanisms, Random arrivals and departures, Changing private information, Incentive compatibility