Optimal and Myopic Information Acquisition

We consider the problem of optimal dynamic information acquisition from many correlated information sources. Each period, the decision-maker jointly takes an action and allocates a fixed number of observations across the available sources. His payoff depends on the actions taken and on an unknown state. In the canonical setting of jointly normal information sources, we show that the optimal dynamic information acquisition rule proceeds myopically after finitely many periods. If signals are acquired in large blocks each period, then the optimal rule turns out to be myopic from period 1. These results demonstrate the possibility of robust and "simple" optimal information acquisition, and simplify the analysis of dynamic information acquisition in a widely used informational environment

Motion Planning Among Dynamic, Decision-Making Agents with Deep Reinforcement Learning

Robots that navigate among pedestrians use collision avoidance algorithms to enable safe and efficient operation. Recent works present deep reinforcement learning as a framework to model the complex interactions and cooperation. However, they are implemented using key assumptions about other agents' behavior that deviate from reality as the number of agents in the environment increases. This work extends our previous approach to develop an algorithm that learns collision avoidance among a variety of types of dynamic agents without assuming they follow any particular behavior rules. This work also introduces a strategy using LSTM that enables the algorithm to use observations of an arbitrary number of other agents, instead of previous methods that have a fixed observation size. The proposed algorithm outperforms our previous approach in simulation as the number of agents increases, and the algorithm is demonstrated on a fully autonomous robotic vehicle traveling at human walking speed, without the use of a 3D Lidar

Risk-sensitive Inverse Reinforcement Learning via Semi- and Non-Parametric Methods

The literature on Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) typically assumes that humans take actions in order to minimize the expected value of a cost function, i.e., that humans are risk neutral. Yet, in practice, humans are often far from being risk neutral. To fill this gap, the objective of this paper is to devise a framework for risk-sensitive IRL in order to explicitly account for a human's risk sensitivity. To this end, we propose a flexible class of models based on coherent risk measures, which allow us to capture an entire spectrum of risk preferences from risk-neutral to worst-case. We propose efficient non-parametric algorithms based on linear programming and semi-parametric algorithms based on maximum likelihood for inferring a human's underlying risk measure and cost function for a rich class of static and dynamic decision-making settings. The resulting approach is demonstrated on a simulated driving game with ten human participants. Our method is able to infer and mimic a wide range of qualitatively different driving styles from highly risk-averse to risk-neutral in a data-efficient manner. Moreover, comparisons of the Risk-Sensitive (RS) IRL approach with a risk-neutral model show that the RS-IRL framework more accurately captures observed participant behavior both qualitatively and quantitatively, especially in scenarios where catastrophic outcomes such as collisions can occur.Comment: Submitted to International Journal of Robotics Research; Revision 1: (i) Clarified minor technical points; (ii) Revised proof for Theorem 3 to hold under weaker assumptions; (iii) Added additional figures and expanded discussions to improve readabilit