Quantum value indefiniteness

The indeterministic outcome of a measurement of an individual quantum is certified by the impossibility of the simultaneous, definite, deterministic pre-existence of all conceivable observables from physical conditions of that quantum alone. We discuss possible interpretations and consequences for quantum oracles.Comment: 19 pages, 2 tables, 2 figures; contribution to PC0

Scaling functions for nonequilibrium fluctuations: A picture gallery

The emergence of non-gaussian distributions for macroscopic quantities in nonequilibrium steady states is discussed with emphasis on the effective criticality and on the ensuing universality of distribution functions. The following problems are treated in more detail: nonequilibrium interface fluctuations (the problem of upper critical dimension of the Kardar-Parisi-Zhang equation), roughness of signals displaying Gaussian 1/f power spectra (the relationship to extreme-value statistics), effects of boundary conditions (randomness of the digits of pi).Comment: Invited contribution at SPIE conference on Fluctuations and Noise, Santa Fe, 2003; 9 pages, 6 figure

Computer-aided verification in mechanism design

In mechanism design, the gold standard solution concepts are dominant strategy incentive compatibility and Bayesian incentive compatibility. These solution concepts relieve the (possibly unsophisticated) bidders from the need to engage in complicated strategizing. While incentive properties are simple to state, their proofs are specific to the mechanism and can be quite complex. This raises two concerns. From a practical perspective, checking a complex proof can be a tedious process, often requiring experts knowledgeable in mechanism design. Furthermore, from a modeling perspective, if unsophisticated agents are unconvinced of incentive properties, they may strategize in unpredictable ways. To address both concerns, we explore techniques from computer-aided verification to construct formal proofs of incentive properties. Because formal proofs can be automatically checked, agents do not need to manually check the properties, or even understand the proof. To demonstrate, we present the verification of a sophisticated mechanism: the generic reduction from Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism design to algorithm design given by Hartline, Kleinberg, and Malekian. This mechanism presents new challenges for formal verification, including essential use of randomness from both the execution of the mechanism and from the prior type distributions. As an immediate consequence, our work also formalizes Bayesian incentive compatibility for the entire family of mechanisms derived via this reduction. Finally, as an intermediate step in our formalization, we provide the first formal verification of incentive compatibility for the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism