Randomized Pursuit-Evasion with Local Visibility

We study the following pursuit-evasion game: One or more hunters are seeking to capture an evading rabbit on a graph. At each round, the rabbit tries to gather information about the location of the hunters but it can see them only if they are located on adjacent nodes. We show that two hunters su#ce for catching rabbits with such local visibility with high probability. We distinguish between reactive rabbits who move only when a hunter is visible and general rabbits who can employ more sophisticated strategies. We present polynomial time algorithms that decide whether a graph G is hunter-win, that is, if a single hunter can capture a rabbit of either kind on G

Variations on Cops and Robbers

We consider several variants of the classical Cops and Robbers game. We treat the version where the robber can move R > 1 edges at a time, establishing a general upper bound of N / \alpha ^{(1-o(1))\sqrt{log_\alpha N}}, where \alpha = 1 + 1/R, thus generalizing the best known upper bound for the classical case R = 1 due to Lu and Peng. We also show that in this case, the cop number of an N-vertex graph can be as large as N^{1 - 1/(R-2)} for finite R, but linear in N if R is infinite. For R = 1, we study the directed graph version of the problem, and show that the cop number of any strongly connected digraph on N vertices is at most O(N(log log N)^2/log N). Our approach is based on expansion.Comment: 18 page

Adaptive Resource Allocation in Jamming Teams Using Game Theory

In this work, we study the problem of power allocation and adaptive modulation in teams of decision makers. We consider the special case of two teams with each team consisting of two mobile agents. Agents belonging to the same team communicate over wireless ad hoc networks, and they try to split their available power between the tasks of communication and jamming the nodes of the other team. The agents have constraints on their total energy and instantaneous power usage. The cost function adopted is the difference between the rates of erroneously transmitted bits of each team. We model the adaptive modulation problem as a zero-sum matrix game which in turn gives rise to a a continuous kernel game to handle power control. Based on the communications model, we present sufficient conditions on the physical parameters of the agents for the existence of a pure strategy saddle-point equilibrium (PSSPE).Comment: 6 pages, 2 figures, submitted to RAWNET/WNC3 201

Cops and Invisible Robbers: the Cost of Drunkenness

We examine a version of the Cops and Robber (CR) game in which the robber is invisible, i.e., the cops do not know his location until they capture him. Apparently this game (CiR) has received little attention in the CR literature. We examine two variants: in the first the robber is adversarial (he actively tries to avoid capture); in the second he is drunk (he performs a random walk). Our goal in this paper is to study the invisible Cost of Drunkenness (iCOD), which is defined as the ratio ct_i(G)/dct_i(G), with ct_i(G) and dct_i(G) being the expected capture times in the adversarial and drunk CiR variants, respectively. We show that these capture times are well defined, using game theory for the adversarial case and partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDP) for the drunk case. We give exact asymptotic values of iCOD for several special graph families such as $d$-regular trees, give some bounds for grids, and provide general upper and lower bounds for general classes of graphs. We also give an infinite family of graphs showing that iCOD can be arbitrarily close to any value in [2,infinty). Finally, we briefly examine one more CiR variant, in which the robber is invisible and "infinitely fast"; we argue that this variant is significantly different from the Graph Search game, despite several similarities between the two games

Optimal Mixed Strategies to the Zero-sum Linear Differential Game

This paper exploits the weak approximation method to study a zero-sum linear differential game under mixed strategies. The stochastic nature of mixed strategies poses challenges in evaluating the game value and deriving the optimal strategies. To overcome these challenges, we first define the mixed strategy based on time discretization given the control period $\delta$. Then, we design a stochastic differential equation (SDE) to approximate the discretized game dynamic with a small approximation error of scale $\mathcal{O}(\delta^2)$ in the weak sense. Moreover, we prove that the game payoff is also approximated in the same order of accuracy. Next, we solve the optimal mixed strategies and game values for the linear quadratic differential games. The effect of the control period is explicitly analyzed when the payoff is a terminal cost. Our results provide the first implementable form of the optimal mixed strategies for a zero-sum linear differential game. Finally, we provide numerical examples to illustrate and elaborate on our results