Application of Risk Informed Decision Making to Highly Reliable Three Dimensionally Woven Thermal Protection System for Mars Sample Return

The NASA Risk Informed Decision Making process is used to assess a trade space of three dimensionally woven thermal protection systems for application to the Mars Sample Return Earth Entry Vehicle. Candidate architectures are assessed based on mission assurance, technical development, cost, and schedule risk. Assessment methodology differed between the architectures, utilizing a four-point quantitative scale for mission assurance and technical development and highly tailored PERT techniques for cost and schedule. Risk results are presented, in addition to a review of RIDM effectiveness for this application

Risk-Informed Decision Making: Application to Technology Development Alternative Selection

NASA NPR 8000.4A, Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements, defines risk management in terms of two complementary processes: Risk-informed Decision Making (RIDM) and Continuous Risk Management (CRM). The RIDM process is used to inform decision making by emphasizing proper use of risk analysis to make decisions that impact all mission execution domains (e.g., safety, technical, cost, and schedule) for program/projects and mission support organizations. The RIDM process supports the selection of an alternative prior to program commitment. The CRM process is used to manage risk associated with the implementation of the selected alternative. The two processes work together to foster proactive risk management at NASA. The Office of Safety and Mission Assurance at NASA Headquarters has developed a technical handbook to provide guidance for implementing the RIDM process in the context of NASA risk management and systems engineering. This paper summarizes the key concepts and procedures of the RIDM process as presented in the handbook, and also illustrates how the RIDM process can be applied to the selection of technology investments as NASA's new technology development programs are initiated

Symmetries and Mass Degeneracies in the Scalar Sector

We explore some aspects of models with two and three SU(2) scalar doublets that lead to mass degeneracies among some of the physical scalars. In Higgs sectors with two scalar doublets, the exact degeneracy of scalar masses, without an artificial fine-tuning of the scalar potential parameters, is possible only in the case of the inert doublet model (IDM), where the scalar potential respects a global U(1) symmetry that is not broken by the vacuum. In the case of three doublets, we introduce and analyze the replicated inert doublet model, which possesses two inert doublets of scalars. We then generalize this model to obtain a scalar potential, first proposed by Ivanov and Silva, with a CP4 symmetry that guarantees the existence of pairwise degenerate scalar states among two pairs of neutral scalars and two pairs of charged scalars. Here, CP4 is a generalized CP symmetry with the property that $({\rm CP}4)^n$ is the identity operator only for integer $n$ values that are multiples of 4. The form of the CP4-symmetric scalar potential is simplest when expressed in the Higgs basis, where the neutral scalar field vacuum expectation value resides entirely in one of the scalar doublet fields. The symmetries of the model permit a term in the scalar potential with a complex coefficient that cannot be removed by any redefinition of the scalar fields within the class of Higgs bases (in which case, we say that no real Higgs basis exists). A striking feature of the CP4-symmetric model is that it preserves CP even in the absence of a real Higgs basis, as illustrated by the cancellation of the contributions to the CP violating form factors of the effective ZZZ and ZWW vertices.Comment: 52 pages, 2 figures, second revised version with new material, as published by JHE

PhD forum: extracting similar patterns of behavior with a network of binary sensors

The aging population is continuously growing and this results in increasing the demands for using technologies to help to manage the rapidly growing sector of the elderly population. To contribute in this effort, we propose a method that can find similar patterns of behavior for extended durations. Our method uses motion sensors as a privacy-aware alternative to cameras. We compute three initial parameters to extract similar patterns of behavior: (1) movement in spot; (2) movement between rooms; and (3) movement within rooms. The three parameters demonstrate good similarity indicators for finding patterns of behavior between each pair of days

The failure of the monetary model of exchange rate determination

In this paper, we test three popular versions of the monetary model (flexible price, forward-looking and real interest differential models) for the OECD member countries by applying Johansen cointegration technique. Based on country-by-country analysis, we conclude that monetary models do not provide the expected results. We reveal several shortcomings of the models and examine the building blocks of the fundamental version. Although researchers always blame the deviations from purchasing power parity as the reason for the failure of the monetary model, our analysis indicates that invalidity of Keynesian money demand function is also responsible for unfavourable results

A Proactive and Top-Down Approach to Managing Risk at NASA

Our ultimate goal is to manage risk in a holistic and coherent fashion across the Agency: a) The RIDM process is intended to risk-inform direction-setting decisions. c) The CRM process is intended to manage risk associated with the implementation of baseline performance requirements. Currently we are working on: a) Enhancements to the CRM process. b) Better integration of the RIDM and CRM processes. c) Better integration of institutional risk considerations into RM framework

NASA Risk-Informed Decision Making Handbook

This handbook provides guidance for conducting risk-informed decision making in the context of NASA risk management (RM), with a focus on the types of direction-setting key decisions that are characteristic of the NASA program and project life cycles, and which produce derived requirements in accordance with existing systems engineering practices that flow down through the NASA organizational hierarchy. The guidance in this handbook is not meant to be prescriptive. Instead, it is meant to be general enough, and contain a sufficient diversity of examples, to enable the reader to adapt the methods as needed to the particular decision problems that he or she faces. The handbook highlights major issues to consider when making decisions in the presence of potentially significant uncertainty, so that the user is better able to recognize and avoid pitfalls that might otherwise be experienced

NASA System Safety Handbook

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks

NASA Risk Management Handbook

The purpose of this handbook is to provide guidance for implementing the Risk Management (RM) requirements of NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) document NPR 8000.4A, Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements [1], with a specific focus on programs and projects, and applying to each level of the NASA organizational hierarchy as requirements flow down. This handbook supports RM application within the NASA systems engineering process, and is a complement to the guidance contained in NASA/SP-2007-6105, NASA Systems Engineering Handbook [2]. Specifically, this handbook provides guidance that is applicable to the common technical processes of Technical Risk Management and Decision Analysis established by NPR 7123.1A, NASA Systems Engineering Process and Requirements [3]. These processes are part of the \Systems Engineering Engine. (Figure 1) that is used to drive the development of the system and associated work products to satisfy stakeholder expectations in all mission execution domains, including safety, technical, cost, and schedule. Like NPR 7123.1A, NPR 8000.4A is a discipline-oriented NPR that intersects with product-oriented NPRs such as NPR 7120.5D, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements [4]; NPR 7120.7, NASA Information Technology and Institutional Infrastructure Program and Project Management Requirements [5]; and NPR 7120.8, NASA Research and Technology Program and Project Management Requirements [6]. In much the same way that the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook is intended to provide guidance on the implementation of NPR 7123.1A, this handbook is intended to provide guidance on the implementation of NPR 8000.4A. 1.2 Scope and Depth This handbook provides guidance for conducting RM in the context of NASA program and project life cycles, which produce derived requirements in accordance with existing systems engineering practices that flow down through the NASA organizational hierarchy. The guidance in this handbook is not meant to be prescriptive. Instead, it is meant to be general enough, and contain a sufficient diversity of examples, to enable the reader to adapt the methods as needed to the particular risk management issues that he or she faces. The handbook highlights major issues to consider when managing programs and projects in the presence of potentially significant uncertainty, so that the user is better able to recognize and avoid pitfalls that might otherwise be experienced

Risk Evaluation in the Pre-Phase A Conceptual Design of Spacecraft

Typically, the most important decisions in the design of a spacecraft are made in the earliest stages of its conceptual design the Pre-Phase A stages. It is in these stages that the greatest number of design alternatives is considered, and the greatest number of alternatives is rejected. The focus of Pre-Phase A conceptual development is on the evaluation and comparison of whole concepts and the larger-scale systems comprising those concepts. This comparison typically uses general Figures of Merit (FOMs) to quantify the comparative benefits of designs and alternative design features. Along with mass, performance, and cost, risk should be one of the major FOMs in evaluating design decisions during the conceptual design phases. However, risk is often given inadequate consideration in conceptual design practice. The reasons frequently given for this lack of attention to risk include: inadequate mission definition, lack of rigorous design requirements in early concept phases, lack of fidelity in risk assessment methods, and under-evaluation of risk as a viable FOM for design evaluation. In this paper, the role of risk evaluation in early conceptual design is discussed. The various requirements of a viable risk evaluation tool at the Pre-Phase A level are considered in light of the needs of a typical spacecraft design study. A technique for risk identification and evaluation is presented. The application of the risk identification and evaluation approach to the conceptual design process is discussed. Finally, a computational tool for risk profiling is presented and applied to assess the risk for an existing Pre-Phase A proposal. The resulting profile is compared to the risks identified for the proposal by other means