Quantum and Randomized Lower Bounds for Local Search on Vertex-Transitive Graphs

We study the problem of \emph{local search} on a graph. Given a real-valued black-box function f on the graph's vertices, this is the problem of determining a local minimum of f--a vertex v for which f(v) is no more than f evaluated at any of v's neighbors. In 1983, Aldous gave the first strong lower bounds for the problem, showing that any randomized algorithm requires $\Omega(2^{n/2 - o(1)})$ queries to determine a local minima on the n-dimensional hypercube. The next major step forward was not until 2004 when Aaronson, introducing a new method for query complexity bounds, both strengthened this lower bound to $\Omega(2^{n/2}/n^2)$ and gave an analogous lower bound on the quantum query complexity. While these bounds are very strong, they are known only for narrow families of graphs (hypercubes and grids). We show how to generalize Aaronson's techniques in order to give randomized (and quantum) lower bounds on the query complexity of local search for the family of vertex-transitive graphs. In particular, we show that for any vertex-transitive graph G of N vertices and diameter d, the randomized and quantum query complexities for local search on G are $\Omega(N^{1/2}/d\log N)$ and $\Omega(N^{1/4}/\sqrt{d\log N})$, respectively

Almost Envy-Freeness with General Valuations

The goal of fair division is to distribute resources among competing players in a "fair" way. Envy-freeness is the most extensively studied fairness notion in fair division. Envy-free allocations do not always exist with indivisible goods, motivating the study of relaxed versions of envy-freeness. We study the envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) property, which states that no player prefers the bundle of another player following the removal of any single good, and prove the first general results about this property. We use the leximin solution to show existence of EFX allocations in several contexts, sometimes in conjunction with Pareto optimality. For two players with valuations obeying a mild assumption, one of these results provides stronger guarantees than the currently deployed algorithm on Spliddit, a popular fair division website. Unfortunately, finding the leximin solution can require exponential time. We show that this is necessary by proving an exponential lower bound on the number of value queries needed to identify an EFX allocation, even for two players with identical valuations. We consider both additive and more general valuations, and our work suggests that there is a rich landscape of problems to explore in the fair division of indivisible goods with different classes of player valuations.Comment: Accepted to SODA 201