1,823 research outputs found
Quantization of Prior Probabilities for Collaborative Distributed Hypothesis Testing
This paper studies the quantization of prior probabilities, drawn from an
ensemble, for distributed detection and data fusion. Design and performance
equivalences between a team of N agents tied by a fixed fusion rule and a more
powerful single agent are obtained. Effects of identical quantization and
diverse quantization are compared. Consideration of perceived common risk
enables agents using diverse quantizers to collaborate in hypothesis testing,
and it is proven that the minimum mean Bayes risk error is achieved by diverse
quantization. The comparison shows that optimal diverse quantization with K
cells per quantizer performs as well as optimal identical quantization with
N(K-1)+1 cells per quantizer. Similar results are obtained for maximum Bayes
risk error as the distortion criterion.Comment: 11 page
Beliefs in Decision-Making Cascades
This work explores a social learning problem with agents having nonidentical
noise variances and mismatched beliefs. We consider an -agent binary
hypothesis test in which each agent sequentially makes a decision based not
only on a private observation, but also on preceding agents' decisions. In
addition, the agents have their own beliefs instead of the true prior, and have
nonidentical noise variances in the private signal. We focus on the Bayes risk
of the last agent, where preceding agents are selfish.
We first derive the optimal decision rule by recursive belief update and
conclude, counterintuitively, that beliefs deviating from the true prior could
be optimal in this setting. The effect of nonidentical noise levels in the
two-agent case is also considered and analytical properties of the optimal
belief curves are given. Next, we consider a predecessor selection problem
wherein the subsequent agent of a certain belief chooses a predecessor from a
set of candidates with varying beliefs. We characterize the decision region for
choosing such a predecessor and argue that a subsequent agent with beliefs
varying from the true prior often ends up selecting a suboptimal predecessor,
indicating the need for a social planner. Lastly, we discuss an augmented
intelligence design problem that uses a model of human behavior from cumulative
prospect theory and investigate its near-optimality and suboptimality.Comment: final version, to appear in IEEE Transactions on Signal Processin
Beliefs and expertise in sequential decision making
This work explores a sequential decision making problem with agents having diverse expertise and mismatched beliefs. We consider an N-agent sequential binary hypothesis test in which each agent sequentially makes a decision
based not only on a private observation, but also on previous agents’ decisions. In addition, the agents have their own beliefs instead of the true prior, and have varying expertise in terms of the noise variance in the private signal. We focus on the risk of the last-acting agent, where precedent agents are selfish. Thus, we call this advisor(s)-advisee sequential decision making. We first derive the optimal decision rule by recursive belief update and conclude, counterintuitively, that beliefs deviating from the true prior could be optimal in this setting. The impact of diverse noise levels (which means diverse expertise levels) in the two-agent case is also considered and the analytical properties of the optimal belief curves are given. These curves, for certain cases, resemble probability weighting functions from cumulative prospect theory, and so we also discuss the choice of Prelec weighting functions as an approximation for the optimal beliefs, and
the possible psychophysical optimality of human beliefs. Next, we consider an advisor selection problem where in the advisee of a certain belief chooses an advisor from a set of candidates with varying beliefs. We characterize the decision region for choosing such an advisor and argue that an advisee with beliefs varying from the true prior often ends up selecting a suboptimal advisor, indicating the need for a social planner. We close with a discussion on the implications of the study toward designing artificial intelligence systems for augmenting human intelligence.https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.04419First author draf
Keep Ballots Secret: On the Futility of Social Learning in Decision Making by Voting
We show that social learning is not useful in a model of team binary decision
making by voting, where each vote carries equal weight. Specifically, we
consider Bayesian binary hypothesis testing where agents have any
conditionally-independent observation distribution and their local decisions
are fused by any L-out-of-N fusion rule. The agents make local decisions
sequentially, with each allowed to use its own private signal and all precedent
local decisions. Though social learning generally occurs in that precedent
local decisions affect an agent's belief, optimal team performance is obtained
when all precedent local decisions are ignored. Thus, social learning is
futile, and secret ballots are optimal. This contrasts with typical studies of
social learning because we include a fusion center rather than concentrating on
the performance of the latest-acting agents
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