Repository of NSF Funded Publications and Data Sets: "Back of Envelope" 15 year Cost Estimate

In this back of envelope study we calculate the 15 year fixed and variable costs of setting up and running a data repository (or database) to store and serve the publications and datasets derived from research funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF). Costs are computed on a yearly basis using a fixed estimate of the number of papers that are published each year that list NSF as their funding agency. We assume each paper has one dataset and estimate the size of that dataset based on experience. By our estimates, the number of papers generated each year is 64,340. The average dataset size over all seven directorates of NSF is 32 gigabytes (GB). A total amount of data added to the repository is two petabytes (PB) per year, or 30 PB over 15 years. The architecture of the data/paper repository is based on a hierarchical storage model that uses a combination of fast disk for rapid access and tape for high reliability and cost efficient long-term storage. Data are ingested through workflows that are used in university institutional repositories, which add metadata and ensure data integrity. Average fixed costs is approximately $.0.90/GB over 15-year span. Variable costs are estimated at a sliding scale of$150 - $100 per new dataset for up-front curation, or$4.87 – $3.22 per GB. Variable costs reflect a 3 The total projected cost of the data and paper repository is estimated at$167,000,000 over 15 years of operation, curating close to one million of datasets and one million papers. After 15 years and 30 PB of data accumulated and curated, we estimate the cost per gigabyte at $5.56. This$167 million cost is a direct cost in that it does not include federally allowable indirect costs return (ICR). After 15 years, it is reasonable to assume that some datasets will be compressed and rarely accessed. Others may be deemed no longer valuable, e.g., because they are replaced by more accurate results. Therefore, at some point the data growth in the repository will need to be adjusted by use of strategic preservation

From Here to In\u3cem\u3eFinnerty\u3c/em\u3e: Tony Soprano and the American Way

As fellow critics have pointed out in a myriad of published studies on the series, The Sopranos challenges the traditional gangster genre formula and brings the mob closer to all of us: Tony and his gang inhabit a recognizable world of Starbucks, suburbia, and SUVs. They discuss issues of the day, the same ones we discuss when we turn off the TV after the episode. In short, they inhabit a quotidian reality that is continuous with our own, and we are prevented from drawing the neat lines that allow us a comfortable remove from the horror of the “criminal world,” as David Simon’s book Tony Soprano’s America convincingly demonstrates. Indeed, the series is an allegory that shows how the workings of the Italian American Mafia are not so different from the latest incarnation of the American way crystallized in the contemporary, corporate, middle-class consumer culture of the baby boomers, or what David Brooks has deemed “bobo culture.

Entry and access : how shareability comes about

Shareability is a design principle that refers to how a system, interface, or device engages a group of collocated, co-present users in shared interactions around the same content (or the same object). This is broken down in terms of a set of components that facilitate or constrain the way an interface (or product) is made shareable. Central are the notions of access points and entry points. Entry points invite and entice people into engagement, providing an advance overview, minimal barriers, and a honeypot effect that draws observers into the activity. Access points enable users to join a group's activity, allowing perceptual and manipulative access and fluidity of sharing. We show how these terms can be useful for informing analysis and empirical research

Evolution and complexity: the double-edged sword

We attempt to provide a comprehensive answer to the question of whether, and when, an arrow of complexity emerges in Darwinian evolution. We note that this expression can be interpreted in different ways, including a passive, incidental growth, or a pervasive bias towards complexification. We argue at length that an arrow of complexity does indeed occur in evolution, which can be most reasonably interpreted as the result of a passive trend rather than a driven one. What, then, is the role of evolution in the creation of this trend, and under which conditions will it emerge? In the later sections of this article we point out that when certain proper conditions (which we attempt to formulate in a concise form) are met, Darwinian evolution predictably creates a sustained trend of increase in maximum complexity (that is, an arrow of complexity) that would not be possible without it; but if they are not, evolution will not only fail to produce an arrow of complexity, but may actually prevent any increase in complexity altogether. We conclude that, with regard to the growth of complexity, evolution is very much a double-edged sword

The Varied Policies of International Juridical Bodies: Reflections on Theory and Practice

I would like to turn to how my current thinking and writing relate to the broader issues of international law norm creation. One such article is quite recent and it represents some of my thinking in these broader general issues. It is entitled Sovereignty Modern, and it is a close look at the question of sovereignty and how it affects the fundamental logic of international law. I do not pretend that I have finalized my views, but fundamentally very few people really accept the original, Westphalian idea of sovereignty anymore. There are many other constructs of what sovereignty currently means, and what its significance should be going forward, but there is a real confusion about the notion generally. It is an important notion to explore, however, as the fundamentals of international law arguably depend, at least somewhat, on the concept

Legal Archetypes and Metadata Collection

In discussions of state surveillance, the values of privacy and security are often set against one another, and people often ask whether privacy is more important than national security.2 I will argue that in one sense privacy is more important than national security. Just what more important means is its own question, though, so I will be more precise. I will argue that national security rationales cannot by themselves justify some kinds of encroachments on individual privacy (including some kinds that the United States has conducted). Specifically, I turn my attention to a recent, well publicized, and recently amended statute (section 215 of the USA Patriot Act3), a surveillance program based on that statute (the National Security Agency’s bulk metadata collection program), and a recent change to that statute that addresses some of the public controversy surrounding the surveillance program (the USA Freedom Act).4 That process (a statute enabling surveillance, a program abiding by that statute, a public controversy, and a change in the law) looks like a paradigm case of law working as it should; but I am not so sure. While the program was plausibly legal, I will argue that it was morally and legally unjustifiable. Specifically, I will argue that the interpretations of section 215 that supported the program violate what Jeremy Waldron calls “legal archetypes,”5 and that changes to the law illustrate one of the central features of legal archetypes and violation of legal archetypes. The paper proceeds as follows: I begin in Part 1 by setting out what I call the “basic argument” in favor of surveillance programs. This is strictly a moral argument about the conditions under which surveillance in the service of national security can be justified. In Part 2, I turn to section 215 and the bulk metadata surveillance program based on that section. I will argue that the program was plausibly legal, though based on an aggressive, envelope-pushing interpretation of the statute. I conclude Part 2 by describing the USA Freedom Act, which amends section 215 in important ways. In Part 3, I change tack. Rather than offering an argument for the conditions under which surveillance is justified (as in Part 1), I use the discussion of the legal interpretations underlying the metadata program to describe a key ambiguity in the basic argument, and to explain a distinct concern in the program. Specifically that it undermines a legal archetype. Moreover, while the USA Freedom Act does not violate legal archetypes, and hence meets a condition for justifiability, it helps illustrate why the bulk metadata program did violate archetypes