Desensitization and Deception in Differential Games with Asymmetric Information

Desensitization addresses safe optimal planning under parametric uncertainties by providing sensitivity function-based risk measures. This paper expands upon the existing work on desensitization to address safe planning for a class of two-player differential games. In the proposed game, parametric uncertainties correspond to variations in a vector of model parameters about its nominal value. The two players in the proposed formulation are assumed to have information about the nominal value of the parameter vector. However, only one of the players is assumed to have complete knowledge of parametric variation, creating a form of information asymmetry in the proposed game. The lack of knowledge regarding the parametric variations is expected to result in state constraint violations for the player with an information disadvantage. In this regard, a desensitized feedback strategy that provides safe trajectories is proposed for the player with incomplete information. The proposed feedback strategy is evaluated in instances involving one pursuer and one evader with an uncertain dynamic obstacle, where the pursuer is assumed to know only the nominal value of the obstacle's speed. At the same time, the evader knows the obstacle's true speed, and also the fact that the pursuer possesses only the nominal value. Subsequently, deceptive strategies are proposed for the evader, who has an information advantage, and these strategies are assessed against the pursuer's desensitized strategy

Cops and Invisible Robbers: the Cost of Drunkenness

We examine a version of the Cops and Robber (CR) game in which the robber is invisible, i.e., the cops do not know his location until they capture him. Apparently this game (CiR) has received little attention in the CR literature. We examine two variants: in the first the robber is adversarial (he actively tries to avoid capture); in the second he is drunk (he performs a random walk). Our goal in this paper is to study the invisible Cost of Drunkenness (iCOD), which is defined as the ratio ct_i(G)/dct_i(G), with ct_i(G) and dct_i(G) being the expected capture times in the adversarial and drunk CiR variants, respectively. We show that these capture times are well defined, using game theory for the adversarial case and partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDP) for the drunk case. We give exact asymptotic values of iCOD for several special graph families such as $d$-regular trees, give some bounds for grids, and provide general upper and lower bounds for general classes of graphs. We also give an infinite family of graphs showing that iCOD can be arbitrarily close to any value in [2,infinty). Finally, we briefly examine one more CiR variant, in which the robber is invisible and "infinitely fast"; we argue that this variant is significantly different from the Graph Search game, despite several similarities between the two games

Pursuit–Evasion Games with incomplete information in discrete time

Pursuit–Evasion Games, Incomplete information, Zero-sum stochastic games, Recursive games, Nonnegative payoffs,